Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria / by Eric Damme
| データ種別 | 電子書籍 |
|---|---|
| 版 | 2. |
| 出版者 | Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer |
| 出版年 | 1991 |
書誌詳細を非表示
| 書誌ID | OB00869223 |
|---|---|
| 本文言語 | 英語 |
| 一般注記 | Contents: Introduction -- Games in Normal Form -- Matrix and Bimatrix Games -- Control Costs -- Incomplete Information -- Extensive Form Games -- Bargaining and Fair Division -- Repeated Games -- Evolutionary Game Theory -- Strategic Stability and Applications. License restrictions may limit access Summary: This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory (that of Nash equilibria) and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts (such as sequential, perfect, proper and stable equilibria) that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview for normal form games. The remaining chapters are devoted to specific applications, illustrating the strength (resp. weakness) of the various concepts |
| 著者標目 | *Damme, Eric SpringerLink (Online service) |
| 件 名 | LCSH:Economics LCSH:Operations research FREE:Economics/Management Science FREE:Economic Theory FREE:Operation Research/Decision Theory |
| 分 類 | LCC:HB1-846.8 DC23:330.1 |
| 巻冊次 | ISBN:9783642582424 RefWorks出力（各巻） print ; ISBN:9783540538004 RefWorks出力（各巻） |
| 資料種別 | 機械可読データファイル |
| 所蔵情報へのリンク | Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria / Eric van Damme ; : gw,: us |
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