Another Semantic Extension of *Go*

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**Abstract:** Semantic extensions in natural language mirror our creative cognitive processes of understanding abstract concepts in terms of concrete ones. Major factors involved are metaphor and metonymy. This paper explores semantic extensions of *go*, one from a motion verb to a future marker, another from a motion verb to a quotative. It especially demonstrates that the use of *go* as a quotative is the result of processes that involve both metaphoric and metonymic extensions. First involved is a metaphorical mapping from a more concrete source domain of spatial relations to a more abstract and subjective target domain. Next involved is a part-whole metonymic extension. Motivation for the semantic extension is discussed in terms of its problem-solving function.

1. **Introduction**

Yamanashi (1995, 1996) claims that “one of our most remarkable abilities is to understand in a fairly flexible way an enormous range of abstract concepts as well as concrete ones” (1996: 1). The ability to understand abstract concepts involves creative cognitive processes in which we
metaphorically understand structures in the abstract domain in terms of structures in the more concrete domain (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Hopper and Traugott 1993; Yamanashi 1995, 1996, 2000). These processes include metaphor and metonymy, which go beyond the direct mirroring of the external reality in our direct experience of the external world. These creative cognitive processes of understanding abstract concepts in terms of concrete ones serve as major factors in semantic change in natural language.

One of the most popular pieces of evidence for semantic change has been the metaphorical mapping from physical motion to futurity of the *go*-verb (an instance of *go* in each use is shown in examples [1] and [2]). This paper explores another semantic extension of *go*, namely from a motion verb to a verb of saying (example 3).

(1) My mother *goes* to the library every day.
(2) I am *going* to visit my parents tomorrow.
(3) He *goes*, “I’ve got to run.”

This paper demonstrates that the use of *go* as a verb of saying is the result of processes that involve both metaphorical and metonymic extensions.

The following section briefly overviews some basic concepts used in this paper such as metaphor, metonymy, and semantic extension. Section 3 outlines the semantic extension of *go* from a motion verb to a future marker. Section 4 focuses on its semantic extension from a motion verb to a verb of saying: I first view the colloquial use of quotative *go*; I then propose two steps of the extension to the quotative *go*—metaphoric and metonymic; I finally discuss the motivation for this semantic extension.

### 2. Metaphor and semantic extension

Metaphor is commonly regarded as understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another; it involves the processes of inference across conceptual boundaries and the processes of systematic mappings
from one domain to another that is motivated by analogy and iconic relationships. Its directionality of transfer is generally from a basic, concrete meaning to a more abstract one (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Claudi and Heine 1986, Heine, et al. 1991, Hopper and Traugott 1993). For an example of metaphorical mapping, Hopper and Traugott (1993) raises a “mind-as-body metaphor,” following Sweetser (1990):

(4) I see/grasp the point of your argument.

The relatively concrete concept of seeing and grasping is used to express the relatively abstract one of knowing and understanding. Since bodily experiences are conceptually more basic to human cognition than psychological states, the former serves as a source of vocabulary for the latter. The metaphorical process involved here is the “image-schemata” with concrete sources being mapped onto abstract concepts (Sweetser 1988). To generalize what is “conceptually more basic/concrete” and what is “more abstract,” and thus to generalize a direction of metaphorical mapping, Heine et al. (1991) propose the following hierarchy of basic categories:

PERSON > OBJECT > PROCESS > SPACE > TIME > QUALITY

Based on human egocentric distance, the hierarchy indicates that the categories to the left are relatively more basic and concrete than those situated to their right. Thus, the categories to the left serve as metaphorical vehicles for those situated to their right. Following this basic tendency, we metaphorically understand more abstract and complicated concepts in terms of systematic mappings from more concrete and highly structured experience (Yamanashi 1996).

Metaphor is known as one of the major factors in semantic change in general. In the process of grammaticalization, which Traugott (1988: 406) defines as “the dynamic, unidirectional historical process whereby lexical items in the course of time acquire a new status as grammatical, morpho-syntactic forms,” metaphor plays a central role:
... the vehicle of a metaphor and the lexeme undergoing desemanticization ... are governed by an arrangement of conceptualization ... which is unidirectional and proceeds from concrete to abstract, and from concepts which are close to human experience to those that are more difficult to define in terms of human cognition.

(Claudi and Heine 1986: 328)

Thus, historically observed semantic changes generally conform to the above categorial hierarchy. Heine et al. (1991: 161) discuss the development of bodily part terms into locatives, and of spatially into temporals, by referring to “categorial metaphors” such as SPACE IS AN OBJECT and TIME IS SPACE. For instance, a body part noun *behind* meaning “back” as in sentence (5) metaphorically extends to a spatial term *behind* as in (6), and which subsequently extends to take on a temporal meaning “after” as in (7):

(5) He bounced them out on their *behinds*.

(6) He is *behind* the building.

(7) We are *behind* in paying our bills. (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 79)

These shifts are in accordance with the above hierarchy, proceeding from OBJECT to SPACE and to TIME.

To further generalize the observed tendency in semantic change, Traugott and König (1991) propose the following semantic-pragmatic tendency I, II, and III:

Semantic-pragmatic Tendency I: Meanings based in the external described situation > meanings based in the internal (evaluative/perceptual/cognitive) situation.

Semantic-pragmatic Tendency II: Meanings based in the described external or internal situation > meanings based in the textual situation.

Semantic-pragmatic Tendency III: Meanings tend to become increasingly situated in the speaker’s subjective belief-state/attitude toward the situation.

The I and II generalize the tendency of metaphoric change of meaning. In metaphorical change, a more complex thing is specified in terms of another that is not present in the context. This involves the shift from meanings situated in the external described situation to meanings situated in the internal evaluative, perceptual, cognitive situation, and in the textual
situation. On the other hand, the tendency III refers to metonymic change. Metonymy, generally defined in the most general sense as any figure based on contiguity, involves a cognitive process through which a word or expression normally used of one thing is used of something physically associated with it. Thus, metonymic change involves specifying one meaning in terms of another that is present in the context. The above tendency III generalizes this metonymic change of meaning as the shift to meanings situated in the subjective belief-state or attitude toward the situation.

Basically, the principle of semantic change is the exploitation of old means for novel functions, and the recruitment of concrete for more abstract terms (Traugott 1988: 212). In this term, semantic change in general, including grammaticalization, is a problem-solving process (413):

Grammaraticalization can be interpreted as the result of a process which has problem-solving as its main goal, its primary function being conceptualization by expressing one thing in terms of another. This function is not confined to grammaticalization, it is the main characteristic of metaphor in general. (Heine et al. 1991: 151)

Specifically, metaphor solves the problem of representation, while metonymy solves the problem of expressing speaker attitudes and of being informative and relevant in communication.

Finally, Hopper and Traugott (1993: 97) claim that “the lexical meanings subject to grammaticalization are usually quite general,” thus “the lexical items that grammaticalize are typically what are known as ‘basic words.’” For example, verbs which grammaticalize tend to be superordinate terms in lexical fields such as say, move, and go rather than more specialized terms such as whisper, assert, and writhe. In the following sections, we shall view semantic shifts of one of these basic words, namely go.
3. Semantic extension of go from a motion verb to a future marker

As mentioned earlier, spatio-temporal metaphors are widely known as typical examples of the metaphoric extension in the process of grammaticalization. Look at the following coexistent forms of go:

(8) My mother goes to the library every day.
(9) I am going to visit my parents tomorrow.

Go in (8) is a main verb which is a motion verb. The one in (9) is an auxiliary which expresses immediate futurity. The latter go in a temporal domain derives historically from the former one in a more concrete, spatial domain. Sweetser (1988) illustrates the metaphorical mapping of these two polysemous uses of go, from physical motion to futurity. Based on Lakoff’s claim that “metaphorical mapping inherently projects the image-schematic topological structure of the source domain into the structure of the target domain,” Sweetser proposes that in go-future, the image-schematic structure is preserved in the metaphorical mapping from physical motion to futurity. Figure 1 illustrates image schema for the physical motion go. The image schema for go essentially consists of movement along a linear path from a source proximal to ego towards a goal which is distal:

Figure 1 (Sweetser 1988: 391)

The verb go indicates motion from proximal to distal in space. Its meaning is relatively general, and expresses any kind of motion away from the speaker. It can thus be analogically connected to the movement away from the present to the future in time. The topologically structured image schema is therefore abstracted from physical motion go, and mapped onto the
domain of futurity. Accordingly, the semantic domain of time is “metaphorically structured in terms of motion along a linear path, independently of the more particular semantic connection between going and futurity” (Sweetser 1988: 392). In this way, the metaphorical mapping of going onto futurity transfers the internal schematic structure of motion to that of time. In this developmental process of future go, Sweetser (ibid.) argues, although some of the original relatively concrete meaning, i.e., the sense of physical motion and directionality, have been lost in the mapping, some more abstract and speaker-based meanings, i.e., future prediction or intention based in speaker time, have been newly added. We have therefore “exchanged the embedding of this image-schema in a concrete, spatial domain of meaning for its embedding in a more abstract and possibly more subjective domain” (ibid.: 392).³

This process of grammaticalization of go-future involves structural adjustment as well as a semantic shift (Hopper and Traugott 1993). Notice that the semantic shift from a motion verb to a future marker involves such structural reanalysis as the sentence (10) coming to be rebracketed as (11):⁴

(10) [I am going [to marry Bill]].

(11) [I am going to marry Bill].

(10) is a purposive directional construction with a non-finite complement. In it, be going to with a motion verb consists of [main verb + progressive aspect + purposive preposition]. This is the same construction with a purposive preposition as in (12):

(12) [I am leaving [to marry Bill]].

In (11), on the other hand, the auxiliary be going to is a [tense marker]. Sentence (10) is rebracketed as (11) in the semantic shift of go to a future marker. This shift also involves a change of aspect from progressive to immediate future. Once this reanalysis has taken place, be going to in (11) may undergo phonological reduction:

(13) I’m gonna marry Bill.
The three morphemes *go-ing to* can be reduced into *gonna* as in (13), because there is no longer a phrasal bracket between *going* and *to* in (11).

4. **Semantic extension of *go* from a motion verb to a quotative**

4.1. **Use of quotative *go***

In casually spoken English, we notice the prevalence of *go* as a verb of saying. It may often appear alternatingly with the regular reporting verb *say* as in the following excerpt:

(14) You know, of course it’s this long drive, so I – I probably look like ... total hell, and she *goes*, .. “Oh, um, I was just getting ... some lemons.” And I *said*, “oh yeah? .. Who are you” And she *goes*, .. “oh, .. I’m your next door neighbor.”

No she *said* – First she *said*, “Kenneth said I could have some.”

[Transcription simplified; italics added](CSAE: CONCEPT)

In naturally occurring conversations and in personal narratives, *go* is the second most frequent verb of saying, with *say* being the most frequent and *be like* the third (Ferrara and Bell 1995; Sakita 1998). *Say* indicates the verbal act explicitly as seen in (15):

(15) I swear she said that. (Romaine and Lange 1991: 238)

*Like* introduces internal dialogues, inner states, as well as actual speeches:

(16) And I feel so much better, I’m *like*, “I can’t believe I did that. What a dummy. (H) .. What a fool. ... that I would think those things.” (CSAE: FEAR)

On the other hand, *go* often functions as a “channel cue” (Romaine and Lange 1991) and introduces sounds or onomatopoeic expressions as well as utterances:

(17) The bell *goes*, “dingdong.”

(18) Cows *go*, “moo.”

(19) She *goes*, “Oh, I’m sorry.”

In this sense, *go* may be paraphrased as “makes the sound of” (Butters 1980). Since sound effects cannot be reported indirectly, *go* is restricted to direct quotation, even when it introduces speeches:

(20) So John *goes*, “That’s what I mean.”
In addition, it is also used to introduce the mimicking of bodily actions, gestures, and postures:

(22) And then Louis goes [the speaker shrugs his shoulders].

The verb of saying go therefore has a broader range than mere say and has a scope different from that of like. As seen in all these examples, the verb of saying go appears most often in the present tense, even when past time is indicated. But past tense is also permitted, although rare:

(23) And when I was checking the mike, I was, “Ah-ah, test, test.” I blew into the mike. “Whhhhh.” And I did that consecutive. I went, “Ppppppppp - Hey, this sounds like an explosion - ppppp - let’s see if I can do a machine gun-ttttttt - hey, wow.”

Furthermore, go is not used in interrogatives.

(24) *What did he go? *How did he go?

It is most common among the young, especially among those under thirty (Schourup 1982).

4.2. Semantic extension to a quotative go

The question arises as to how the motion verb go has come to be used as the quotative go. As we noted in section 3, the motion verb go mainly indicates forward and outward movement. The image schema for it consists of movement from a source proximal to ego towards a goal which is distal. Since the act of vocalization is an act projected beyond the speaker towards a hearer, there could be a possible metaphorical mapping from spatial motion to vocal act. In the metaphorical mapping, I assume, the imageschematic structure of the motion verb go is preserved, with the spatial motion tracing a physical path while the vocal acts trace a mental path. There is a problem, however, if we assume a direct metaphorical mapping from a motion verb to a verb of saying. Compare the following two sentences:

(25) Sorry, I’ve got to go now.
(26) She goes, “I don’t know.”

(25) involves the movement of the subject I from proximal to distal in space, while in (26) what moves is not the subject she but her utterance. Thus, we need to assume an additional metonymic extension involved in this semantic extension. Furthermore, considering the broader range of go compared to the regular reporting verb say that we discussed in 4.1, we need to examine both the process and the motivation of its metaphorical and metonymic extension.

We discussed in the preceding section that go means “makes the sound of,” generalizing all sorts of sounds such as animal voices, human speech, sounds of musical instrument, etc. In a sense, sound physically traverses from a source to another locus, although it is an invisible movement. However, our perception of movement of sound relies mostly on a mental path rather than a physical one, so it is more subjective and therefore more abstract than concrete. Although the image-schema for the motion verb go represented in Figure 1 can be analogically mapped onto the sound movement, the original relatively concrete meaning, the sense of physical motion, is lost in this mapping, and is embedded in a more abstract and more subjective domain. We understood metaphorical abstraction as what relates more abstract contents with more concrete contents across conceptual domains, and the latter form the metaphorical vehicles for the former (Heine et al. 1991: 157). To consider the metaphorical mapping from a motion verb to a quotative in this framework of “vehicle and topic in metaphorical abstraction” (ibid.: 158), physical motion is used as a metaphorical vehicle to express a non-physical, mental process:

physical (visible, tangible, etc.) □ non-physical, mental

Note that the subject of the motion verb go is generally the person or object that actually moves. In (27), the subject is the car that actually moves from one location to another; in (28), the subject is my mother who physically moves to the library:
(27) The car goes very fast.
(28) My mother goes to the library every day.

The metaphorical mapping thus might have first resulted in (a) in the following examples:

(29) (a) The sound of the bell goes, “dingdong.”
    (b) The bell goes, “dingdong.”
(30) (a) The note of the cat goes, “meow.”
    (b) The cat goes, “meow.”

However, we have (b) rather than (a) most of the time. What is involved here is the metonymic extension from the sound itself to the person or object that produces the sound. This is a natural modification through metonymic extension, especially in such case as (30b) in which the subject of the sentence shifts from inanimate to animate.12

When the semantic extension occurred from physical motion to movement of sound, the imitative use of go became popular, especially for the sounds that animals make:

(31) Cows go, “moo.”
(32) Dogs go, “bow wow.”
(33) Cats go, “meow.”
(34) Cocks go, “cock-a-doodle-do.”

Butters (1980) points out that it is a traditional introductory word for telling children the imitative words for the sounds that animals make. He raises a popular childhood nursery rhyme that one recites:

(35) This little pig went to market,
    This little pig stayed home,
    This little pig had roast beef,
    And this little pig had none,
    And this little pig went wee-wee-wee all the way home. (Opie 1964: 124)

Once the physical motion of going has been mapped onto the animal imitation, the traditional rhetoric of personifying animals as in (35) naturally leads to treating the noises of animals as real utterances. Thus we find some variants of this nursery rhyme (35) in which the last line actually
has the little piggy saying a sentence (Butters 1980):

(36) This little pig said, “Wee, wee, wee! I can’t find my way home.”

   (Huber 1940: 84)

(37) This little pig said, “Queeky, queeky, I can’t get over the barn door sill.”

   (Opie 1964: 124)

(38) And this little pig went, “Wee, wee, wee! I want some!”

   (Butters 1980: 306)

Naturally, the imitative use of go leads to including the human utterances:

(39) So, Mom said, you know, she goes, “when can I see you.” .. Or- – So Mo=m said, “well my next free day’s like October fourth.”

(40) And he goes, (H) “So you’re married.” And I said, “yeah I’m married.”

   (CSAE: CUZ)

As we have seen, go is used in a broader range than a regular reporting verb say and introduces all sorts of sounds. Furthermore, it introduces the mimicking of bodily actions, gestures, and postures. This may be because utterances with interjections that are introduced with go often accompany bodily actions, gestures, and postures. These bodily actions came to be reported with go along with the utterances. For instance:

(41) then they’re like, “What are we gonna learn today. See I’m originally a .. PE teacher, but, I guess I can teach math?” You know, they come in with that .. attitude, and they go, .. ((THUMP)) “I’ve always wanted to teach math. (H) Now, (H) what are we on?”

   (CSAE: MONSTER)

The students in a math class who come into the classroom thump the table when uttering, “I’ve always wanted to . . .” Rather than describing the motion of thumping the table, the narrator directly shows the bodily action of the speakers by imitating it. We even have cases in which go introduces no sound at all but only bodily actions where the narrator simply imitates them:

(42) He came to my show in - and on one of this television programs he did a sound effect that I think he really liked because it was a door opening scene where I go, “. . .,” with the mike. And he did the same thing. . . He’s trying to escape. And there’s a sequence where he opens a hidden door, and when he did this, he went, “. . .,” you know. Uh-oh, you stole that one from me, you know. And when I met him again, I asked him about it, and he said, “Well, thanks a lot.
I’ll give you one,” . . . (EJ 1991. 11: 131)

In the course of the narrative, silence conveys no less an important information than the actual utterances. Like in (42), with silence, the narrator often employs gestures and bodily actions. These points reasonably lead to a further generalization that what transfers from a source to a goal is information which is construed along a mental path. Information in this term includes verbal or nonverbal information, which may be all reported as a series of pieces of information in the course of a narrative.

As we noted in section 2, metaphor is a problem-solving strategy which serves to understand or describe more abstract concepts or conceptual domains in terms of more concrete ones. For the semantic extension of go to a quotative, what is the underlying motivation, or what particular problem is this extension motivated to solve? When we need to report animal noises, we need a reporting verb broader than say since this regular reporting verb is limited to introducing human utterances. When we need to report a noise or sound, or even bodily actions, we also need a broader verb. Although we may be able to describe them indirectly, it is usually more effective to directly quote them as imitations or as onomatopoeic expressions in narratives. To solve the problem of lack of a broader reporting verb, rather than inventing a new word, we use metaphorical mapping and use an existing word that is more concrete and that can be mapped onto the domain of sending information outward.

As we noted, go is a traditional introductory word for telling children the imitative words for the sounds that animals make, or for simply talking about animal noises with children. For children who are still developing their cognitive as well as linguistic ability, it is reasonable that we select from basic words the superordinate term for multiple concepts that would otherwise impose a heavier cognitive burden on children. We have a variety of verbs that can describe animal noises in the first place:
Cows bellow.
Dogs bark.
Cats purr.
Cocks crow.

However, we rather often introduce them in direct quotations by using *go* to cover all these animal noises rather than using different verbs for different animals:

(47) Cows *go*, “moo.”
(48) Dogs *go*, “bow wow.”
(49) Cats *go*, “meow.”
(50) Cocks *go*, “cock-a-doodle-do.”

The same is true of introducing sounds and noises or even of reporting someone singing and orally making noises:

(51) Patter, patter, *goes* the rain.
(52) Bang *went* the rifle.
(53) And the colored girls *go*, “Doo, tuh-doo, tuh-doo, tuh-doo-ti-do.”

(*Take a Walk on the Wild Side* 1972 [Butters 1980])

(54) I *went*, “Pppppppppp.”

Inclusion of these onomatopoetic and mimetic expressions in talking with children reduces their cognitive burdens.

The motion verb *go* nicely meets this end, for it is one of the basic words that may serve as a source concept in a metaphorical extension. As we noted, the source structures, including source concepts and source propositions refer to basic human activities grounded in our immediate environment. They provide concrete reference points for human orientation which evoke relevant associations, and are therefore exploited to understand less concrete concepts (Heine et al. 1991: 152). They are fundamental elements in a typical speech situation with a very general, unspecified content (ibid.: 151). Since the source concepts that refer to the most basic human movements like *go, come, leave, or arrive* (ibid.: 153) are cognitively basic and easy to process, they are immediately available even for young children. The source concepts are coded as lexemes, which have
much in common with the basic vocabulary.\textsuperscript{13}

When we focus our attention on speech exchange, its metaphorical structuring is information traversing spatial paths between speakers and hearers. Since speech exchange involves directed activity from each of two participants towards the other (Sweetser 1988: 398), the abstracted schema of the source domain, physical motion, is nicely preserved in the target domain, verbal acts. At the same time, this abstraction accompanies a loss of meaning, as is often the case with semantic extensions. The meaning of the target domain is added to the meaning of the verb \textit{go}, while the schema is transferred from the source domain to the target domain. Thus, an instance of \textit{go} which has lost the sense of physical motion has gained the sense of information traversing the mental path, whether it is verbal or nonverbal, or the subject is animate or inanimate. This involves subjectification (Langacker 1998, 1999), shifting from a relatively objective construal of the movement to a more abstract and subjective one. As the objective basis as construal of the movement disappears, it is replaced by the subjective construal along the speaker’s mental path, resulting in a more speaker-based new meaning.

5. Conclusion

This paper explored semantic extensions that mirror the creative cognitive processes of understanding abstract concepts in terms of concrete ones. In these processes, we metaphorically understand structures in the abstract domain in terms of structures in the more concrete domain. Besides a well-known metaphorical mapping of the \textit{go}-verb from physical motion to futurity, another semantic extension of \textit{go} was examined, namely from a motion verb to a verb of saying. The shift from physical motion to verbal act leads from a more concrete source domain of spatial relations to a
more abstract and subjective target domain.

The concrete physical action verb *go* has shifted to an abstract mental state verb that indicates its verbal aspect through the processes that involve both metaphoric and metonymic extensions. First involved was a metaphoric extension. The schema of the motion verb *go* was mapped onto the information traversing. It enabled the expressions like “the song *goes*, ‘. . .’” and “the speech *goes*, ‘. . .’” Next involved was a metonymic extension. The subjects that were confined to moving objects or information shifted to the agents or persons producing the information, enabling the expressions such as “he *goes*, ‘. . .’” *Go* has maintained its most central characteristics and its core structure, which is movement. The mapping extended from physical objects to information which is more subjective and mental. This metaphorical abstraction relates more abstract contents with more concrete contents across conceptual domains.

I pointed out a motivation or justification for the semantic extension of *go* to a quotative. Besides the other reporting verbs *say* and *be like*, *go* has a unique existential meaning. *Say* is used for human verbal exchanges in general. *Be like* has developed to express the internal state of the speaker. *Go* introduces not only human utterances but also sounds, noises, animal noises, physical motions with or without sound, etc. As a basic word based on our experiences in the immediate environment, *go* solves the problem of the lack of reporting verb for these concepts. It does so without causing much cognitive burden. The quotative *go* is fundamentally based on information movement whether it is verbal or nonverbal, since it has developed from the motion verb *go* that has its schematic structure of movement.

Finally, the semantic extension of *go* supports a cognitive principle of the exploitation of old means for novel functions, and follows the unidirectionality of the shift in which a more abstract domain is being metaphorically structured in terms of a more concrete one. The
metaphorically structured image-schematic inferential structure is preserved in this mapping.

Notes

1 Heine et al. (1991: 160) raises prototypical correlations between category and word type. For the category PERSON, a prototypical word type is a human noun; for OBJECT, a non-human noun; for PROCESS, a verb; for SPACE, an adverb or adposition; for TIME, an adverb or adposition; and for QUALITY, adjective or adverb.

2 Traugott (1988: 408) raises examples for spatio-temporal metaphors such as the use of go for future (I’m going to go), come for perfect (Fr. je viens de le faire) and be at/be in for progressive.

3 In discussing the process of one meaning of be going to being demoted while another is promoted, Hopper and Traugott (1993: 88) note Langacker’s (1990: 23) idea of the subjectification of be going to. In the process of grammaticalization of go-future, objective locational reference points are lost, and “this loss is replaced by realignment to the speaker’s temporal perspective.”

4 Hopper and Traugott (1993: 40) follows Langacker’s notion of reanalysis: “change in the structure of an expression or class of expressions that does not involve any immediate or intrinsic modification of its surface manifestation” (1977: 58).

5 “Quotative” is generally used interchangeably with the terms “verb of saying” and “reporting verb.” “Verb of saying” is typically more restricted to the verbs that introduce human speech. “Quotative” is somewhat broader, introducing any form of information quoted by the speaker.

6 University of California-Santa Barbara, Corpus of Spoken American English.

7 Ferrara and Bell’s (1995) survey of personal narratives reports: said/say/says (42.5%), go/went (24.5%), present/past tense be like (22.0%).

8 See Sakita (2000) for detailed discussions of functions and grammaticalization of be like.

9 Schourup (1982) gives a functional explanation that narrative go ‘say’ disambiguates direct from indirect quotations.


11 The earliest examples that Butters (1980) notes are in his transcripts in 1973 of both black and white, and in Mitchell’s one in 1969.
(i) We just talkin’, you know, and later on we just go, “Oh man, you shut your old prune face” - you know, start callin’ each other name. (Butters 1973)
(ii) I asked her if she wanted to ride downtown with me to pick up some things for her kids and here she goes: “Well . . . I don’t know.” (Mitchell 1969)

12 See Yamanashi (1995) for detailed discussions of the motivation for metonymic mapping.

13 Heine et al. (1991: 152) mentions that source concepts are coded as lexemes that are less subject to replacement than others. They raise the following examples of source concepts and the basic vocabulary: body part items like ‘head,’ ‘breast,’ ‘back,’ ‘belly,’ ‘hand,’ ‘foot’; natural phenomena like ‘earth’ and ‘sky’; some human items like ‘person,’ ‘fathe,’ ‘mother’ and ‘child’; process verbs like ‘come,’ ‘give,’ ‘take/hold’; posture verbs like ‘stand,’ ‘sit’; a mental process verb like ‘say’; or quantifiers like ‘one’ or ‘many’; or basic demonstratives.

References

Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
要旨：

崎田智子

自然言語における意味変化は我々の持つ創造的認知能力に基づいており、この認知プロセスにおいては、類似性やアナロジーの認識に基づくメタファー、及び、近接性ないしは隣接性の認識に基づくメトニミーが重要な役割を担っている。

本論文では、英語の移動動詞の意味拡張について論じた。移動動詞は物理的移動を表す本動詞としての用法の他に、未来時制標識としての用法、そして伝達動詞としての用法を持っている。未来時制標識への拡張はこれまで広く議論されてきたが、本論文では特に、伝達動詞としてのがメタファーとメトニミーの両プロセスを経て拡張してきた過程を明らかにした。まず、物理的移動という空間的なドメインから発話というより抽象的で主観的なドメインへのメタファー的写像が行われるが、ここでは「近くから遠くへの移動」というイメージ・スキーマ自体は保持される。次に、メトニミーの拡張によって、伝達動詞の主語が、発話される情報から発話主体へと変化する。最後に、この一連の意味拡張の背景として考えられる、意味拡張や文法化の問題解決機能について考察した。