Reflexives and Subjectivity:
A Contrastive Study of English and Japanese

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1. Introduction

In recent studies in the framework of cognitive linguistics, it is often argued that the choice of English nominal types (pronoun, reflexive or full noun phrase) in the discourse reflects the speaker's conception of the degree of subjectivity of the referent (Langacker 1987, Van Hoek 1997). In other words, each nominal type in English has a unique characteristic in terms of the conceptual accessibility. It can be said that each nominal type is considered different from others in its conceptual distance from the speaker's perspective.

Japanese has a variety of nominal types as English does. Therefore, the difference of the subjectivity between the different types of nominals is also observed in Japanese. However, there is a difference in the degree of subjectivity between English and Japanese reflexives. In many preceding studies on the Japanese reflexive zibun, this difference between Japanese and English has been ignored and the arguments given in them tend to lack consideration of the conceptual structure constructed in the use of the reflexive in the discourse. In the present paper, first I examine the varying subjectivity of the nominals including
the reflexive in English and Japanese, and then I give an analysis of *zibun* in terms of the conceptual structure established in the discourse. It will be shown that the Japanese reflexive *zibun* is relatively high in subjectivity as compared with the English counterpart, and accordingly, the analysis of various problems regarding the reflexive in Japanese must take this into consideration. As an instance of such analysis, I will apply the theory of mental spaces, which is advocated by Fauconnier (1994, 1997), to my examination of some problems about a Japanese reflexive construction which has not been given a fully persuasive account in previous studies.

2. English nominals and the stage model

Van Hoek (1997) argues that the two different types of nominals, pronouns and full noun phrases, are fundamentally different in conceptual accessibility although both of them have the function of referring to someone or something which participates in the event or state described in the discourse. In order to distinguish pronouns and full noun phrases clearly in her study on anaphora, she draws on the idea of the stage model advocated by Langacker (1985, 1987). In the stage model, the discourse participants, the speaker and the addressee, are metaphorically compared to the viewer of a play. The conceptions invoked by utterances of the speaker are put 'onstage' and are spotlighted as the immediate focus of attention of the participants. While, in the 'offstage' region, the speaker and the hearer share the conceived real-world context that is obligatorily required as the background knowledge for the discourse.

Making use of the notion of the stage model, the nature of the two
nominal types, i.e., pronouns and full noun phrases, are accounted for as follows. First, a pronoun is the concept that refers to the discourse context, i.e., the offstage knowledge. An individual referred to by a pronoun, therefore, is conceived to be conceptually close to the speaker and the addressee. For example, the first and second person pronouns should refer to the discourse participants themselves who are present at the very place of the discourse, hence are conceived as the pre-existent background knowledge. The third person pronoun refers to the individual already mentioned in the discourse, and accordingly knowledge about him is shared by both the speaker and the addressee previously. Thus, pronouns are conceived as the nominals that correspond to the offstage concepts.

In contrast, the full noun phrase corresponds to the onstage concepts. A full noun phrase does not require the discourse participants to have any pre-existing shared knowledge about the referent. When the speaker uses a full noun phrase, the concept of its referent is brought onto the onstage region and spotlighted as the topic of the discourse, and then the knowledge about the individual or thing referred to by the phrase is shared by the discourse participants and qualified to be referred to in the later discourse as an offstage concept.

To sum up, it can be said that a pronoun corresponds to someone or something which is already in the awareness of both the speaker and the addressee and conceived as the nominal that relies on the conception in the offstage region, while the full noun phrase describes someone or something that is new to the context and hence needs to be put onstage to become the topic of the discourse.

Then, how can the reflexive pronoun be accounted for in terms of the
stage model? To answer this question, the notions of subjectivity and objectivity in the sense of Langacker (1985, 1987, 1990) would be useful. In the stage model, when the viewer focuses attention on the referent and is consciously aware of the referent, the viewing activity is objective. On the contrary, when the referent is outside the conscious awareness of the speaker, and therefore part of the speaker's offstage, background knowledge, the speaker is considered to view the referent subjectively.

Then it can be said, first, that the referent of a pronoun is viewed by the speaker semi-subjectively; the concept which a pronoun invokes relies heavily on the knowledge in the offstage domain although the speaker is consciously aware of the referent to some extent. For example, when one refers to himself by pronoun, he uses the first person pronoun I. The original concept of the pronoun I is very subjective in the sense that a person is not always consciously aware of the presence of himself. When he talks about himself in the discourse, however, he inevitably becomes aware of the offstage concept of his SELF, which is described by means of the pronominal expression, and consequently the expression has some objectivity in it. Thus, the pronoun is conceived to be the nominal type that represents not completely subjective concepts but semi-subjective concepts.

Second, the referent of the reflexive is viewed within the onstage region in the stage model.¹ That is, the individual who is put onstage by means of some nominal expression preceding the reflexive in the linear sequence of the sentence views himself within the onstage region. The reflexive does not directly refer to the knowledge of the individual shared in the offstage region by the discourse participants, but it refers to the concept of another nominal (i.e., the antecedent) in the discourse which is
already put onstage and spotlighted within the immediate scope of attention. Consequently, the speaker views the referent of the reflexive from the perspective of the element which is already put onstage in the discourse; there is no need to refer to concepts in the offstage region as in the case of the pronoun. Thus, it can be said that the speaker views the referent of the reflexive more objectively than he views that of the pronoun.

The notional difference between the pronoun and the reflexive would be more intuitively observed by comparing a minimal pair of sentences like (1).

(1) a. The adults in the picture are facing away from us, with the children behind them.
   b. The adults in the picture are facing away from us, with the children behind themselves.

   (Cantrall 1974; cited by Van Hoek 1997:176)

In (1a), the pronoun *them* refers to *the adults* of course. As discussed above, the pronoun is viewed from the offstage region in the stage model; it is viewed semi-subjectively from the viewpoint of the speaker. Accordingly, the whole sentence is understood to mean that in the picture, *the adults* are placed closer to the camera than *the children* are. In (1b), on the other hand, although the reflexive refers to *the adults* too, the whole sentence is understood to mean that in the picture, *the children* are closer to the camera than *the adults* are since reflexive is the representation of the element which is objectively viewed from the viewpoint of the antecedent that is put onstage already. Thus, the choice
of the different kinds of nominals create differences in meaning of a sentence by virtue of the nature of the conceptual accessibility the respective nominal types inherently have.

3. Subject-reflexive construction of zibun

As observed by many researchers mainly in the framework of generative grammar, one of the major characteristics of Japanese reflexivization is that the reflexive zibun can be bound by the antecedent outside the clause which it belongs to. In other words, Japanese allows long-distance binding, while English does not (Shibatani 1977, Kuno 1973).

(2) *John told me; that [Hanako criticized myself].

(3) Taroo; ga Ziroo ni [Hanako ga zibuni o hihansita]
Taroo NOM Ziroo DAT Hanako NOM self ACC criticized
koto o hanasita.
COMP ACC told
'Taroo told Ziroo that Hanako criticized him.'

In English, as it can be observed in (2) above, the reflexive in the subordinate clause cannot be bound by the antecedent in the matrix clause; me and myself in (2) cannot be coreferential and hence the sentence is considered unacceptable. On the other hand, in example (3), the reflexive zibun in the subordinate clause is bound over the boundary of the clause by the antecedent nominal Taroo, which is the subject of the matrix clause.
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There is, however, another characteristic of the Japanese reflexive *zibun* which the English reflexive does not have, and I assume this characteristic presents more directly the nature of *zibun*. That is, *zibun* can appear in the subject position as well as in the object position in the clause, while English cannot appear in the subject position as observed in the following examples.

(4) Taroo wa [zibun ga tensai da] to omotte-iru rasii.
   Taroo TOP self NOM genius is COMP believe seem
   'Taro seems to believe that he is a genius.'

(5) *John believes (that) himself is genius.

Typically, *zibun* as the subject-reflexive has been considered to appear only in the subordinate clause in the literature. This is in part true; in order to have the antecedent nominal that binds it, the subject-reflexive must appear in the subordinate clause. However, the usage of *zibun* as the subject of the matrix sentence is not completely impossible under some rather limited circumstances. In such cases, I assume, the background offstage knowledge about the first person, i.e., the concept of SELF, can supply the semantic content for the reflexive *zibun*. I argue that the very existence of this type of construction is the crucial factor that differentiates the reflexivization in Japanese from that in English. For example, a Japanese speaker can felicitously say sentences as (6) below.
Hirose (1997) refers to this usage of the reflexive as *private self*, as against the *public self*, which is the notion of the first person expressed by the pronoun. He argues that Japanese demands its speakers to use the two kinds of self according to the purpose of the utterance. When one verbalizes his thought or feelings in order to give his unsubstantial ideas an order, or when he gives utterance to what he thinks only for himself, the linguistic act is called *private expression act*. On the other hand, when one says something for the purpose of communicating with someone, this linguistic act is considered a *public expression act*. In a private expression act, the speaker does not take the presence of other people into account, and therefore he does not assume any addressee. Accordingly, it is considered that the fundamental nature of the private expression requires actual expressions not to contain addressee-oriented expressions of any kind including the first person nonreflexive pronoun. What the speaker does in a private expression act is not talking to someone (including himself as an objective individual), but only giving the linguistic form to the event or state that he is consciously aware of. As a natural result, this type of expression act is used only in limited circumstances where the speaker says things in a soliloquy-like fashion;
What should be noted here is that when a Japanese speaker becomes conscious of himself but has no intention to express it for any communicative purposes, he does not refer to himself by a nonreflexive pronoun like *watasi, boku, ore* (each of which is a first person pronoun in Japanese, and hence can be considered the counterpart of *I* in English.), but he refers to himself by *zibun* as the reflection of his awareness of himself. On the other hand, when the speaker utters sentences for some communicative purposes, he invariably adopts the public expression and he refers to himself by a first person pronoun such as *watasi, boku* or *ore*, which functions as public self term.

Let us now return to the analysis of the subject-reflexive construction in Japanese. I argue that the reason why the subject-reflexive construction is allowed in Japanese whereas it is not in English is attributed to the relative difference of the degree of conceptual accessibility to the reflexives in the two languages. Recall that the English reflexive is the concept that is rather objective in that it must be viewed from the perspective of the element that is already put onstage as the antecedent. This means that the concept of the reflexive in English is more distant from the offstage, subjective knowledge of the speaker than that of the pronoun is. Hence it can be said that the English reflexive is conceived as a concept of low-accessibility in terms of the viewing activity in the stage model. Due to the low-accessibility, the reflexive can be considered low also in subjectivity and topicality, and accordingly English speakers conceive sentences with a reflexive subject as anomalous.
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(7) a. ? My self is neurotic. (Better: I am neurotic.)
   b. I have learned too much about my neurotic self.
      (Daene 1992:196)

In contrast, in Japanese, the reflexive zibun is considered to be rather high in accessibility, and accordingly also in subjectivity and topicality. Japanese, therefore, allows the subject-reflexive construction as the description of the conception viewed from the individual whose perspective is focused in the discourse context. When the speaker uses zibun as the subject of the matrix clause as in (6), the expression act is not for a communicative purpose but only for giving utterance to his conception. This is possible because the Japanese reflexive can directly refer to the concept of the speaker's SELF which he has as the pre-existing offstage concept. Note that if the reflexive zibun was low in the accessibility, subjectivity and topicality, this would not be possible; but the speaker would have to rely on some more objective usage of the language when he says something about himself. When the reflexive zibun is used as the subject of a subordinate clause as in (8) below, on the other hand, the reflexive is understood to represent the concept of SELF of the individual (including speaker himself) who is referred to by the antecedent nominal and from whose point of view the event or state is described in the subordinate clause. It can be considered, hence, that in constructions of this type, the private expression containing zibun, which essentially is not used for communicative purposes, is embedded in the public expression containing the antecedent nominal that indicates the point of view.
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(8) a. Watasi wa zibun wa toosensuru koto o kitasiteiru.
   I TOP self NOM is-elected COMP ACC anticipate
   'I anticipate that I will be elected.'

b. Johni wa zibun ga sekai-iti kasikoi to sinziteiru.
   John TOP self NOM world-best wise COMP believe
   'John believes that he is the wisest in the world.'

4. Optimal and egocentric viewing arrangements

Langacker (1987:128-132, 1990:6-9) argues about the dichotomy of subjectivity and objectivity in terms of the inherent asymmetry between the perceiving individual and the entity perceived. According to him, when the speaker loses his awareness of himself while viewing some fully distinct object, the situation is referred to as the optimal viewing arrangement. In contrast, when the speaker objectively views himself and the relation to other entities as the center of his awareness, the situation is considered to be the egocentric viewing arrangement as against the optimal viewing arrangement. Although the judgment of subjectivity/objectivity is a matter of degree and there may be various in-between instances, the two poles of the scale is diagrammed as below (Langacker 1990:7).
Figure 1.

In Figure 1(a), which represents the optimal viewing arrangement, the subjective viewing relationship between the individual and the conceived object is apparent. V is the viewer, P is the perceived object, and the dashed arrow stands for the perceptual relationship between them. The box labeled PF represents the viewer's perceptual field, i.e., the maximal scope of the viewer’s awareness, and the dotted circle area OS placed within PF represents the onstage region (or objective scene). Here, the fact that V is outside the PF means that the viewer is conceived as an extremely subjective entity. For example, when one says a sentence like ‘the crow just flew up into the high tree’ while being in the scene, probably the speaker is not consciously aware of himself at all in spite of the indisputable fact that he is there as the viewer. A situation like this is conceived as an instance of the optimal viewing arrangement.

In Figure 1(b), on the other hand, the egocentric viewing arrangement is represented. Here, the viewer is included in the PF, the viewer's perceptual field. In other words, the viewer is aware of himself as well as the perceived object in the egocentric viewing arrangement. Moreover, the viewer is also included in the onstage region, OS, as one of the focal points within the objective scene. This means that the viewer in 1(b) is an entity that is very objective as compared with the viewer in 1(a), which is...
a very subjective entity. Examples of the egocentric viewing arrangement may be the first person pronouns in English (I) and in Japanese (watasi, boku, etc.). They are put onstage in the discourse and spotlighted as the focus in the objective event or state described in the speaker's utterance, although they refer to the speaker himself, who originally corresponds with the subjective concept, i.e., with the concept of SELF.

Having considered the two poles of the scale of subjectivity/objectivity, I will now examine the nature of the Japanese reflexive zibun in terms of Langacker's concept of the optimal/egocentric viewing arrangement configurations presented in Figure 1. As I mentioned already, zibun represents a very subjective concept in the offstage region in spite of the fact that the speaker is fully aware of himself when he uses the reflexive. Taking this into account, I propose the schematic configuration of the Japanese reflexive zibun as Figure 2 below.

Figure 2.

In Figure 2, the element V, the viewer, is put inside the box labeled PF, the viewer's perceived field, indicating that the individual is aware of the presence of himself. However, since the element V is not included in the onstage region, which is marked by the dotted circle in the figure, it is
also indicated that the individual is not focused in the discourse as the pronouns are, and accordingly the knowledge about the individual is not considered new, but rather old or preexistent. Thus, the degree of subjectivity of the Japanese reflexive zibun is considered between those of the optimal viewing arrangement and of the egocentric viewing arrangement. It should be noted, however, that zibun is much more subjective concept than the pronouns in both Japanese and English and than the reflexives in English, which can be accessed only via some kind of antecedent nominal that is already put onstage in the discourse.

5. Mental space theory

The characteristics of the Japanese reflexive zibun would be easily observed by introducing the theory of mental spaces advocated by Fauconnier (1985, 1994). According to Van Hoek (1997), what is crucial to the problems regarding the point of view effects which have been observed by many researchers in their studies on personal reference and anaphora is in fact not whether a different person's conceived point of view is adopted, but is the shift of focus from a mental space to another space. In the theory of mental spaces, a conceived referent may be represented in multiple mental spaces, and the nominal description used to access the referent may access a conception in one mental space or another. For example, let us examine a sentence that allows two different readings according to the choice of the focus space in the mental space configuration. Consider the sentence in (9) below.

(9) Max believes that the man with the gray hair is behind the fence.

(Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996:9)
One of the two possible readings of this sentence is that there is a man with the gray hair and the speaker knows of him, but it is unknown to the speaker whether or not Max knows that the man he has in mind is one with the gray hair. In this reading, the expression the man with the gray hair is considered to represent the speaker's knowledge about the man who Max believes is behind the fence. The other reading is that Max believes the person who is supposedly behind the fence is a man with the gray hair, although he may be mistaken and it is possible in fact that the man could have red hair. In this reading, the expression the man with the gray hair is understood to represent Max's belief about the man in question. In sum, the difference of these two readings is whether the event described by the sentence is transparent (de re) or is opaque (de dicto) to the speaker. This can be illustrated in the theory of mental spaces as in Figure 3(a) and (b).\footnote{4}

\textit{Figure 3.}

(a) Transparent reading

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure3a}
\caption{Figure 3(a) Transparent reading}
\end{figure}
In each of the configuration in Figure 3(a) and (b), there are two mental spaces within the discourse context: one is for the speaker's reality, in which the elements in the real-world context are perceived or conceptualized by the speaker; and the other is for Max's belief, where the elements perceived or conceptualized by Max are placed. The speaker and the addressee who access elements in mental spaces are represented as C (conceptualizer), and the nominal expression by which an element is described is represented as N. The critical issue in deciding the reading of the sentence (9) is which of the two spaces becomes the focus space and is accessed directly by the speaker. First, in Figure 3(a), which is description of the transparent reading that the speaker is not sure whether Max knows the person and his hair color or not, the reality space is focused and drawn in bold line. Consequently, the nominal *the man with the gray hair* is understood to be the representation of the concept within the speaker's reality space. Second, in Figure 3(b), which illustrates the opaque reading that Max knows a man and the color of his hair but he may be mistaken, Max's belief space is focused instead of the speaker's reality space. Here, in contrast to the case with the transparent reading, the nominal representation *the man with the gray hair* is
understood to refer to an element that appears in the Max's belief space. As the dotted arrow in Figure 3(b) indicates, the conceptualizer accesses the element in the Max's belief space rather than one in the speaker's reality space.

One thing that we should not fail to notice is that in both readings (transparent and opaque) of the sentence (9), the element that represents the concept of the individual who the nominal the man with the gray hair refers to is connected by the access principle to a correspondent element in the other space. Each space in Figure 3(a) and (b) has the element for the person who is supposedly behind the fence. This means that both the speaker and Max, whose belief is described in the sentence, have respectively a particular person in their mind. The person they conceive may be the same or may not. The nominal in question (the man with the gray hair) represents either the speaker's conception of the man or that of Max's. Thus, according to which mental space the conceptualizer chooses as the focus among the available candidate spaces, the interpretation of a sentence can vary considerably. This, incidentally, implies that a full noun phrase indicates the point of view from which the element in question is viewed as a real-world entity. For example, in the transparent reading of (9), it is understood that the speaker conceives the man with the gray hair as a real-world entity, while in the opaque reading of it, Max, not the speaker, is understood to conceive the man as a real-world entity.

Now I move on to the examination of Japanese reflexive zibun in terms of the mental space theory discussed above. As I mentioned already, the reflexive zibun is considered a concept of very high accessibility. This means that the viewer can easily access the reflexive without having any
intermediate element from whose point of view the reflexive is viewed semi-subjectively as in the case of English reflexivization. In other words, Japanese *zibun* represents the concept of SELF very subjectively, while the English reflexive represents the concept of SELF rather objectively. This contrast can be illustrated in terms of the theory of mental space as in Figure 4.

*Figure 4.*

(a) English  
\[
\begin{align*}
   a : I \\
   a' : myself
\end{align*}
\]

(b) Japanese  
\[
\begin{align*}
   a : watasi, boku, ore, etc. \\
   a' : zibun
\end{align*}
\]

In English, the speaker (conceptualizer) can refer to himself in the discourse only by the pronoun *I* because the language does not have nominals for the private expression act like *zibun* in Japanese. Hence, the concept of SELF is represented only semi-subjectively (or even rather objectively) by virtue of the reflexivization. In Japanese, on the other hand, the speaker can refer to himself by either the first person pronoun such as *watasi* or *boku*, or by the reflexive *zibun*. Recall that the two types of nominals in Japanese are used for different purposes. When the speaker utters a sentence for some communicative purpose, he refers to himself by the first person pronoun, which represents the speaker’s public self. The reflexive *zibun*, which represents the private self, is used
when the speaker "says" something concerning himself while not assuming the presence of the addressee. Thus Figure 4 above shows that the conceptualizer can directly access both elements a and a', which represent the first person pronoun and zibun respectively, in Japanese, whereas the conceptualizer can access directly only to element a in English.

6. A cognitive analysis of the ambiguity in zibun

Fauconnier (1994:16) defines the concept of mental space as constructs distinct from linguistic structures but built up in any discourse according to guidelines provided by the linguistic expression. The mental space configuration may consist of plural cognitive domains which are established as the discourse goes on by various kinds of linguistic expressions called mental space builders. First of all, there is a space that invariably exists preceding the establishment of any other spaces, i.e., the space for the speaker's reality. Since there must exist a speaker regardless of the kind of discourse, the speaker's reality space, from which other spaces are derived, is set up in the discourse participants' minds. Then as the discourse goes on, new spaces, elements within them, and relations that hold between the elements are established. The typical mental space builders, among others, are: prepositional phrases (in Len's picture, in John's mind, in 1929, at the factory, from her point of view); adverbs (really, probably, possibly, theoretically); connectives (if A then _, either _ or _) underlying subject-verb combinations (Max believes _, Mary hopes __, Gertrude claims __) (Fauconnier 1994: 17). Assuming that all of these can have their Japanese counterparts, I claim that there is another kind of possible mental space builder in Japanese. That is, any
nominal expression in the language is qualified to build new mental spaces in the discourse. This may sound a little odd at first. Recall, however, that the Japanese reflexive *zibun* is a concept that is high in accessibility and subjectivity. In other words, a speaker of Japanese assumes the concept of SELF as a concept that is very close to him, and, more importantly, he can refer to it directly by the nominal expression *zibun*. These characteristics of the concept of SELF in Japanese can be considered true not only for the first person but also for other individuals who participate in the event or state described in the discourse. I argue that the speaker, who has his own SELF and refers to it as *zibun*, applies the concept of SELF and *zibun* to other people who he mentions in the discourse assuming that they too have their own SELF. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the speaker may construct a mental space for the concept of SELF of any person other than himself who is put onstage by virtue of a nominal expression in the discourse. However, the fact that the concept of SELF is lent to any personal nominal in the discourse may create ambiguity in interpretation of the sentence with *zibun*. As an illustration of this, let us consider the example below. There, *zibun* can be bound by either *watasi* or *Ziroo*.

(10) Watasi wa [Zirooj ga zibuni] ni kibisisugiru

    I TOP Ziroo NOM self DAT too-strict
    to omou. (the speaker = Taroo)
    COMP think

    'I (= Taroo) think Zirooj is too strict with me/himself.'
Figure 5.

Speaker's Reality  Ziroo's Conception

To account for the ambiguity in *zibun* in sentences like (10), the theory of mental spaces would be very useful. In the mental space construction of Figure 5, the space for the speaker's reality is set up preceding any other spaces that are to be derived from it. In the most fundamental space, all the elements that occur in the speaker's consciousness are placed; that is, the elements for *watasi* and *Ziroo* are in the space. Moreover, since the speaker has his own SELF and refers to it as *zibun*, accordingly the reality space contains the element for the reflexive which is conceptually connected to the element representing *watasi*. Similarly, the concept of the third person individual *Ziroo*, which the speaker is consciously aware of and has put onstage giving the particular nominal form, is assumed to have his own SELF and consequently a new mental space is set up as the representation of *Ziroo's* conception, in which *Ziroo* supposedly refers to himself as *zibun*.

Incidentally, one thing we should not fail to notice is that corresponding elements may be given different nominal forms according to the space they belong to. In the reality space, the speaker refers to himself as *watasi* or *zibun*, while theoretically he may be referred to by the full noun phrase *Taroo* in *Ziroo's* conception space (although the
sentence (10) does not reflect this conception of Ziroo's about the speaker Taroo. As to the third person Ziroo, he is referred to by the full noun phrase in the speaker's reality space, while its corresponding element in Ziroo's conception space is referred to by the reflexive zibun due to the viewpoint shift triggered by the construction of the new space.

It follows from the discussion so far that the problem about the two interpretations of (10) is attributed to the choice between the two mental spaces illustrated in Figure 5 for the focus space. If the speaker's reality is chosen to be the focus space, the predication in (10) can be understood to be described from the speaker's point of view, not taking that of Ziroo into account. Consequently the reflexive zibun in (10) is conceived as representing the element a' in the speaker's reality, and hence is conceived as referring to the speaker himself. On the other hand, if Ziroo's conception is chosen to be the focus space, the element that represents zibun in the space, i.e., b', becomes the referent of zibun in the sentence and consequently (10) is understood to mean that the speaker thinks Ziroo is too strict with himself.

Note, however, that Ziroo's conception space can be the focus space only in a local context, which can be syntactically distinguishable by the boundary of the subordinate clause in the present example; but it cannot be the focus space in the larger context of the predication described by the whole sentence in (10). It can be said, therefore, that in the mental space construction of this interpretation of (10), a shift of focus from the speaker's reality to Ziroo's conception takes place in the discourse. This is not strange at all in mental space theory which the present examination is based upon. Mental spaces are constructed rather arbitrarily according to the speaker's immediate conceptualization of the
discourse. Hence, it is natural that the focus spaces are shifted continually as the discourse goes on.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I examined the varying subjectivity of the nominals in English and Japanese and showed that the Japanese reflexive *zibun* is a concept that is highly subjective as compared with the English reflexives. From my perspective, this characteristic of the Japanese reflexive *zibun* is the most crucial factor that makes the behavior of the Japanese reflexive in the discourse quite different from that of the English reflexive. The analysis I presented in the present paper is very preliminary and may leave some points that need to be refined to be applied to further examinations. However, it seems to me that my argument that the syntactic and semantic differences between reflexives in English and Japanese are attributed to the subjectivity they are inherently given is a fact that needs to be considered well in any comprehensive studies between the languages. The cognitive linguistic approach can include the notion of subjectivity without any conflict with the other part of the theoretical architecture and has a potential for accounting not only for the problems regarding the reflexive but also for the problems about the nominals in general.

**Notes**

1. In the present argument, I only assume the usage of the English reflexive as the anaphoric expression; non-anaphoric or emphatic reflexives observed in sentences as below are excluded.
(i) a. I myself want no part of it.
   b. I wanted Marie herself to tell me.
   c. I gave myself a treat for Christmas.

   (Kemmer 1995:56)

For further analyses of non-anaphoric reflexives in English, see Kemmer (1995), Van Hoek (1997).

2. It would be possible for a speaker of Japanese to say about himself in a rather objective manner by using the first or second person pronoun.

   (i) Boku_spk wa nante baka nanda. (spk = the speaker)
      I TOP how stupid be
      'How stupid I_spk am!'

   (ii) Omae_spk wa nante baka nanda. (spk = the speaker)
      you TOP how stupid be
      'How stupid you_spk are!'

However, these expressions can be considered to be made by the speaker who assumes himself to be the addressee, and therefore they are viewed as public expressions. Incidentally, the hypothesis that the speaker conceptualizes himself as having two parts, the Subject, which is the locus of subjective experience, and the Self, which is the locus of physical and social properties, is advanced by George Lakoff. For further discussion on the notion of multiple selves, see Lakoff (1996).

3. As long as I know, the first scholar who discussed the notion of point of view is Cantrall (1974). Since then, the effects the notion has on various nominal expressions have been examined by many researchers; e.g., Kuno (1987), Zribi-Hertz (1989), Pollard and Sag (1992), Iida (1996).

4. The manner of description of the mental space configuration I adopt in the present paper is based on that of Van Hoek (1997).

5. Access principle: If two elements a and b are linked by a connector $F (b = F(a))$, then element b can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart a. (Fauconnier 1997:41)
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