Satire feeds on its target. A satiric target can be either animate or inanimate; the satirist can face his live target in a monolithic manner. If, however, he has in mind an abstract idea as his butt, his satire inevitably becomes structurally intricate. To satirize an idea or a habit of mind, the satirist is required to contrive a mechanism in which it could be symbolically incorporated in a kind of characters, and by which his satire could be addressed effectively to his potential readers.

In studying the nature of satire, therefore, one has to examine satiric mechanism as well as satiric targets. Most criticism of satire tends to be absorbed in identifying victims of satire, while the investigation of satiric mechanisms, presumably in consequence of its highly conceptual dimension, is always in danger of being put aside. The satiric effect can be achieved through the punishment of specific characters, but the punishment itself should be considered not only in relation to characters, but in the operation of the mechanism of satire, regardless of the personal traits of the characters involved. This paper aims to elucidate how satiric punishment works as a mechanism for the attainment of the satiric effect. I will take up curiosity as an abstract idea attracting satiric assault. My critical concern here will be with Apuleius's *Metamorphosis* and Swift's *Gulliver’s Travels*.

The protagonists of the two works are travellers; both Lucius and Gulliver are on a peregrination seeking truth. They are to be regarded as loyal apprentices of curiosity, and their curiosity, as with many heroes of travel literature, motivates them, almost exclusively, to the uncertain pilgrimage
for the attainment of truth.

In the *Metamorphosis, or the Golden Ass*, Lucius's initiation into the ritualistic mysteries of Isis and Osiris is synonymous with his acquisition of truth; in the *Travels*, Gulliver's disillusionment as to humanity and his delusion about a purely rational life are the final results of his thirst to see the world. The greatest distinction between the two masterpieces becomes clear when we think of the opposite directions in which they are oriented in point of curiosity. Lucius, though misguided at first by his insatiable *curiositas*, recovers and even increases his pleasure by the fulfilment of the mysticism of the Egyptian deities; Gulliver is absurdly submerged in the delusion of the perfectibility of reason in spite of his quasi-detached position of a neutral observer in the first three voyages. Gulliver is, say, betrayed by curiosity at the ultimate stage of his apprenticeship. The principal part of my aim is to explore the satirists' strategic choice that compels them to finish their works either in fulfilment or betrayal.

Curiosity is one of the most important themes in Plato's dialogues. In *Symposium* Socrates places the love of knowledge between absolute wisdom and absolute foolishness. The same theme is expounded in *Republic*, and is confirmed in *Apology*. Socrates's curiosity, as he himself seems to have been aware, brought him punishment which he may have known very well was false in nature. But the heart of our problem is not whether Socrates's punishment is valid or not; our interest is in the moment of punitive mechanism linked to the pursuit of truth—the meaning of the danger into which the curious are driven with almost antipathetic austerity. Plato seems to tell us that Socrates was the first mind to be conscious of the potential punishment incidental to the pursuit of truth, and that his self-imposed task is to systematize human curiosity in the way we can hardly escape from the institutionalized mechanism of a certain punitive framework.

Apuleius, a self-appointed lecturer-philosopher committed to the Platonic
tradition, may have recognized the fact that the desire for knowledge is inextricably related to punishment. His interest seems to have been oriented to analysis of the variety of punitive forms curiosity invites.

However, there is no seeking after the high-spirited, Socratic resolution in Apuleius's Milesian tale; Apuleius's analysis of the problem about Curiositas and the punitive procedure is based entirely on his concern with the popularity and readability of his narrative. In other words, we are expected to find in the Golden Ass the literary, instead of philosophical, significance as dominant in his exposition of man's thirst for knowledge.

Apuleius's Metamorphosis begins with the curiosity of the narrator-hero and, through a series of episodes told or directly experienced in which characters of various types are exposed to hazards and misfortunes due to their excessive curiosity, ends in the satisfactory fulfilment of the hero's supreme curiosity embodied in Lucius's access to the mysteries of the Egyptian deities. Even in the largest episode of the whole narrative, the story of Cupid and Psyche narrated by an old woman for the consolation of a kidnapped virgin, curiosity plays a decisive role. The only link imaginable between the substantive plot of the narrative and this inserted episode is in the forms of curiosity which drive the characters to the brink of destruction, the punitive scheme working with severity and disciplinary repetitiveness.

Critics of Apuleius's work have been well aware of the contribution of curiosity to the development of the narrative. With reference to the inescapable link between Lucius's metamorphosis into an ass and his curiosity, James Tatum states:

Fortune and curiosity . . . are two words that describe basic aspects of Lucius's life and personality, and he eventually comes to loathe the very sound of them . . .

The reason for Lucius's loathing of "the very sound" of curiosity is easily
explicable when we read from Book VII onwards—the part containing his hardships among thieves and rapacious knaves. As Tatum says, Lucius’s transformation is symbolic of his proverbial curiosity incarnated in an ass’s lust.⁵ P.G. Walsh, a comprehensive critic of the Roman novel, also stresses the crucial part played by *curiositas* in Apuleius’s “comic romance.”⁶

These critics shed light on how the element of curiosity incites the hero to study magic, to transform himself, to undergo toils, and, finally, to be initiated into the ritualistic institution of Isis and Osiris. To be brief, Lucius’s initiation symbolizes both the collapse and fulfilment of his *curiositas*. The premonition of the fulfilment is shown at the beginning of Book XI:

Circa primam ferme noctis vigiliam, experrectus pavore subito, video praemicantis lunae candore nimio completum orbem commodum marinis emergentem fluctibus, nancusque opacae noctis silentiosa secreta, certus etiam summam deam praecipua maiestate pollere resque prorsus humanas ipsius regi providentia, nec tantum pecuina et ferina, verum inanima etiam divino eius luminis numinisque nutu vegetari, ipsa etiam corpora terra caelo marique nunc incrementis consequenter augeri, nunc detrimentis obsequenter imminui, fato scilicet iam meis tot tantisque cladibus satiato et spem salutis, licet tardam, subministrante, augustum specimen deae praesentis statui deprecari . . . ⁷

Psyche’s curiosity, too, does not function as fatal destroyer; she has her desire titillated by her vicious sisters to glance at the face of her disguised husband, and, towards the end of the episode, she becomes impatient to look into the box presented to Venus by Proserpine in spite of the warning given her by the tower.⁸ But the timely intervention of Cupid serves not only to save her, but to exalt her soul to heaven to make her his eternal consort. And herein lies the connection between the tale proper and this quasi-digressive story.
Thus, curiosity is the cause of punishment throughout the *Metamorphosis*; yet this punitive scheme remains uncompleted. The ancient satirist’s deliberate tolerance as to the fallibility of human nature may account for part of the incompleteness of the punitive mechanism, and the satirist’s method of training his protagonist by mitigating the punishment is incorporated in the allegorical intent current through the whole narrative. The reader is tactfully manipulated to detect the relevance of the satiric method in consequence of his consent to the contrast between the hero (and, presumably the heroine of the inserted episode as his equivalent), who is merely the slave of *Curiositas*, and the other characters whom the ass, intellectually intact, sees ruined in the process of his peregrination.

Apuleius’s purpose, perhaps, was principally to write a satiric apologue. His devotion to Plato’s view of human nature and the soul is evinced by the general agreement among his critics. This Menippean satirist, from a rather detached viewpoint, attempts to develop his disciplinary scheme of punishment, with *Curiositas* as the central subject-matter. Like flappers in the third voyage of *Gulliver’s Travels*, Apuleius never fails, at proper intervals, to remind the reader of the magnitude of inquisitive human inclination. What Apuleius makes his ass-hero obtain are the mysteries of the Egyptian deities—the *terminus ad quem* of Lucius’s apprenticeship to truth. This terminal bliss is made possible only when his curiosity about sorcery is superseded by an authentic aspiration for the rites of the deities.

Herein lies the satiric and prescriptive effect of the punishment; the satirist aims at the purification and authentication of the hero’s *curiositas*. Apuleius succeeds, so to speak, in giving relevance to Lucius’s curiosity by making it timely. In this sense, we can say that Apuleius’s satiric strategy lies not in punishing curiosity *in toto*, but in making it relevant in terms of its place and occasion. This operative pattern of the punitive machinery against curiosity entails the satirist’s tactical device; although the satiric brunt grows less
The satiric effect of the substantive narrative gets under way with Lucius's transformation into an ass, but, instead of destroying the hero in the punitive structure, it brings the tale to a fulfilling conclusion in Lucius's spiritual metamorphosis—the purification of his curiosity—embodying the edifying scheme with which the narrative itself ends. In terms of the objects of curiosity, the transference from magic to the codified rituals of Isis and Osiris is in order, so that the ultimate purpose of the author may be accomplished. Without this metabolism of curiosity, Apuleius's tale could have been neither instructive nor amusing. It is no use attempting to discern the Swiftian bitterness in this Milesian story.

This halfway punishment is explicable by the realization that Apuleius's approach to truth involves more discipline than despair—the despair incidental to the discovery of truth. Magic may be interpreted as symbolic of Apuleius's perception of the delusion into which the seekers of truth tend to fall, but magic is to be considered at the same time as the beginning of his punitive-disciplinary program. Apuleius need not advance his delusion to the point of the irrevocability as is Gulliver's case. This is the distinction between Apuleius the entertainer and Swift the vexer. And this distinction has more to do with the forms adopted by the writers than with the difference of their personal characteristics.

The punitive scheme works quite differently in Gulliver's Travels, but Swift's scheme, too, relates to his dealings with the pursuer of truth. What he depicts in the fourth voyage of the Travels is the disappointment that the lover of truth encounters. In the Travels, metamorphosis occurs in the intellectual and spiritual world of the hero. The transformation is anything but physical. The satiric punishment becomes ultimately effective in almost all but physical ways. The punitive machinery is complete in the Travels. This completeness can be a clue to the understanding of the hero's
characterization which remains almost untouched by critics of Swift in the course of their strangely univocal grappling with the satirical implications.

It is almost a commonplace in eighteenth-century travel literature that a hero senses his hardships as the punishment against his own inexhaustible curiosity. Robinson Crusoe, for instance, repeatedly laments his inadvertence in disobeying the warnings of the experienced. This is part of the convention of the genre consciously employed by the writers, say, of philosophical voyages. *Gulliver’s Travels* is no exception. On a surface level, this conventional forewarning of the hero is prognostic of troubles that, as the reader later sees, face the protagonist.

Yet the punitive patterns of the *Travels* are multifarious; the correspondence between the initial self-warning and the final collapse of the protagonist does indeed dominate the whole narrative, but there are a number of instances showing the punitive scheme working without the provocation by curiosity. Especially, what happens to Gulliver in Lilliput as marks of the emperor’s suspicion is remote from conventionality. The emperor’s abortive punishment, intended for Gulliver ironically as a piece of *His Majesty’s leniency*, is not related to the satiric strategy functioning against curiosity. The unconventional quality of the punishment is unconsciously recognized by Gulliver himself. His reaction to the articles of impeachment drawn by the emperor and his council is very suggestive:

Yet, as to myself, I must confess, having never been designed for a Courtier, either by my Birth or Education, I was so ill a Judge of Things, that I could not discover the Lenity and Favour of this Sentence; but conceived it (perhaps erroneously) rather to be rigorous than gentle. I sometimes thought of standing my Tryal; for although I could not deny the Facts alleged in the several Articles, yet I hoped they would admit of some Extenuation.¹¹

As is implied in the parenthesized phrase of the passage, Gulliver believes
himself not to deserve the projected punishment. Here the satiric butt is the punisher, not the victim; the conventional hero of travel literature, more or less conscious of the incorrigibility of his own adventurous spirit, is made to reflect upon his disastrous voyages as the due fruit of his intractable curiosity, but Gulliver, in spite of his inability to "deny the Facts," holds himself to be rather innocent.

Gulliver's claim for innocence against the Lilliputian emperor's impeachment in the first voyage turns into his boastful criticism against the philosopher-king's narrow-mindedness in the second. He simply fails to perceive the rashly destructive quality of his "Proposal of much Advantage":

As for himself, he protested, that although few Things delighted him so much as new Discoveries in Art or in Nature; yet he would rather lose Half his Kingdom than be privy to such a Secret; which he commanded me, as I valued my Life, never to mention any more. (p. 135)

In this incident, Gulliver's proposal for the use of gunpowder as a means of exerting arbitrary power over the subjects earns a semipunitive refutation of the sage-king. Gulliver's guilt seems unrelated to his own curiosity, but the king's anger lies in Gulliver's inhuman temptation aiming to titillate the royal curiosity.

The king, on the other hand, is totally exempt from the satirist's thrust on account of his continent curiosity. The giant-king, probably the most accomplished of Swift's characters, is an instrument for the justification of the hideous punitive trap into which Gulliver is ultimately driven. The emperor of pigmies is attacked by the satirist for his obnoxious inquisitiveness and ill-grounded suspiciousness, while the king of Brobdingnag is free from such satiric assault; he is adequately emblematic of wisdom buttressed by scrupulous curiosity. From Gulliver's angle of vision, the first scene shows how he is made the target of the pigmies' guilt-ridden curiosity, and
the second reveals how he could become the source of a vicious curiosity to victimize many truly innocent subjects and to debase the philosophic sage-ruler.

Except in the Struldbrugg episode, the major segment of the third voyage is filled with the wrongly curious perpetrators of absurdities, and Gulliver's position as an objective observer seems to be certified in consequence of his impartial judgmental skill. The stargazing inhabitants of Laputa focus their speculations on music and mathematics; the insanely enthusiastic projectors of Barnibarbi are immersed in the phantasmal misdirection of their curiosity; and the reason-forsaken scientists of the Academy of Lagado busy themselves in generating folly after folly. They are all exposed to satiric broadsides, and the validity of these attacks seems to be secured by the objectivity retained by Gulliver as a fair judicial critic.

However, the Struldbrugg episode serves to reverse the scale. Gulliver's divergence from an objective standpoint immediately leads him to the surrender of his critical privilege. When his curiosity is set at large, his commonsensical world begins to collapse. His future projects that he would achieve in his supposed Struldbrugg-ship lower him to the world of the satiric victims, as the mad plannings of the "Reformers" do the same to them. The episode is an ominous prelude to Gulliver's spiritual decline.

Obviously, there is a coincidence between Gulliver's maniacal adoration for the Houyhnhnms and his would-be life-design as a human being provided with immortality. Though he is set right by some eminent Luggnaggians, the imbecility of human nature he models remains uncured to the end of his peregrination. The episode is significant for our discussion in that the satirist sets up preliminary stage to test the true nature of Gulliver's curiosity. Figuratively, the gap between Gulliver's idealization of the Struldbruggs and their actual state corresponds to the discrepancy between magical craft and the divine mysteries in the *Metamorphosis*. There seems also
to be at least a superficial similarity between Apuleius and Swift in satiric tactics—both attempt to pave the way for the further development of their schemes concerning curiosity except in the concluding sections of their works.

Yet the diametrical discord between the last parts of these satires is crucial from the perspective of the punitive mechanism against curiosity. Apuleius, after teasing his protagonist with persistence, brings him to attain access to the divine world as if to reward Lucius’s tireless pursuit of truth. Swift, on the contrary, precipitates Gulliver into spiritual inanity to complete his punishment. Part of this distance can be explained away by the distinction between an entertaining tale and a vexing sort of satire as noted earlier. But Swift’s case merits a more thorough exploration with reference to the connection between Gulliver’s characterization and the intended satiric strategy. My thesis is inextricably linked to this exploration.

The very first sentence of the controversial fourth voyage signals the hero-narrator’s inkling of the mental debacle:

I continued at home with my Wife and Children about five Months in a very happy Condition, if I could have learned the Lesson of knowing when I was well. (p. 221)

And when Gulliver realizes “the Lesson,” the meaning of being “well” undergoes a serious disfiguration. This “Lesson” reminds us of the famous definition of felicity in A Tale of a Tub. As the quality of felicity is reexamined, his poor wife becomes a detestable Yahoo-consort. The evaluation of Gulliver as a character has to be approached from the clear perception of his disfiguration.

There has been general agreement among critics of Swift that the mental, moral, and intellectual disfiguration of Gulliver is to be attributed to his pride or narcissism. At least during the past three and a half decades, critics
have been preoccupied with the task of describing the cause of Gulliver's dementia. For instance, Samuel Monk was acute enough to point out the barrenness of critical outcries against the fourth voyage, denying Swift's identifying of human beings with the Yahoos, and questioning the easy-minded stance which regards the rational world of the Houyhnhnms as Swift's ideal. He was the first to call serious attention to Gulliver's pride-swollen stance, but all he sought was to defend his brilliant author from the charge of misanthropy. In a word, Monk's essay is more personal than literary-critical in so far as he misses the link between Gulliver's characterization and the satirical machination of punishment.

Some critics have probed the possibility of identifying Houyhnhnmland as the specification of Swift's ideal. This kind of exploration involves the question of whether the sin of pride is exclusively Gulliver's. Richard Dircks and Martin Kallich, despite their disagreement about the interpretation of the satiric signification of the Houyhnhnms, agree on assigning pride to the horses. W. B. Carnochan, on the contrary, exempts the Houyhnhnms from the implication of pride, declaring that the horses, in their state of being gifted with emotional susceptibility, approximate the author's vision of an ideal world. Even Gulliver's most sympathetic critic cannot free him from the epithet of pride; utmost compassion is expressed for Gulliver by implicating the rational horses in pride. Christopher Fox goes as far as to observe that Gulliver's last rejection of human contact is an emblem of his narcissism combined with self-love and hard pride.

Whether critics identify Gulliver as the author's self-image or not, and whether they regard Houyhnhnmland as the embodiment of Swift's utopia or not, something essential is apparently lacking in almost all of the above studies—something with respect to Gulliver's full characterization. Gulliver's banishment from the society of the inimitable horses entails the mechanism of satiric punishment as an element far more central than his hard
pride. Gulliver's tragic rationalism has to be replaced by the term Gulliver's tragic pursuit of truth; in contrast to Lucius, he is driven from the privileged position of an observer into the miserable stage of an exile in consequence of his curiosity-possessed peregrination. And this change of our angle of vision may hint at a certain emergence from the no longer fruitful discussion of the idealistic or the non-utopian quality of the Houyhnhnm world.

This shift may be attainable when our critical focus turns from the controversy centering round the authorial ideal to the author's method of victimizing Gulliver as an unfortunate case in which the pursuit of a curious life ends in absolute failure. We find that Gulliver's love/hate relation to human surroundings is attributable to something quite alien to pride. We are, as it were, required not to see Gulliver satirized, but to attend to Gulliver disfranchised—his tragedy, if we can call him a tragic character, derives its depth from the impact effected by this dichotomy. We are, therefore, expected to admit that Gulliver can be considered as living without losing his role as the satirist's artifact. And, as long as we are concerned with Gulliver's final collapse—or with his happy dehumanization—our argument ought to be put in order with reference to Gulliver's living magnitude. (Even the pride-oriented criticism of Gulliver does not make sense when we cease to see him as a living character.) Swift's satiric mechanism is exalted in the end to the almost apathetic response to the act of pursuing truth per se.

The distortion of critical attention which mounts pride to the pinnacle of Gulliver's attributes results from haphazardly mingling Gulliver as a satiric medium and Gulliver as a rather independent character. In this distortion, each of the two angles of vision lays claim to exclusivism in one scene, and is expected to abnegate its claim in another. Specifically, Gulliver is granted his title to characterization at some disadvantageous moments of his peregrination. (At the very last of the work, for example.) It is from this kind of critical opportunism that Gulliver's being swollen with pride derives its
apparent conviction.

To free us from this opportunism, it is necessary to draw a tight distinction between Gulliver's internal disturbances and his experience in the outer world. What he meets in his journey is to be considered in terms of the satirist's punitive strategy, but Gulliver's inner convulsion should be approached from the standpoint of its consequential influence on a punished soul. In other words, we cannot do him justice without stopping to think closely of this subtle but weighty distinction. This means to detach our critical concern from the conceptual yoke of the product of the long-standing controversy about Gulliver's last misfortune. Our critical liberty may be recovered by reexamining Gulliver's mental process in the course of his last voyage in the perspective of his ineluctable reaction to the mechanism of the punitive strategy forced on him.

It is not futile to note the fact that Gulliver's last tragedy begins with his habit, on arriving in an unknown land, of learning the language of its inhabitants. Gulliver's studiousness is motivated both by curiosity and necessity. On the master's part, the task of teaching him is almost the sole means of gratifying his own inclination to know the case history of the quasi-rational Yahoo. The great proficiency in mastering the Houyhnhnm language vastly conduces to familiarizing Gulliver with the rational life of the horses, and, equally important, helps lead the horses to make a decision about the banishment of the dangerous, anxiety-causing exerter of the appearances of reason. In this sense, we cannot distinguish curiosity from necessity; both drive Gulliver to conceptualize the practical rationality of the Houyhnhnms. The significance of this indistinguishableness can be seen by reflecting upon the Houyhnhnms' inability to separate Gulliver from the common Yahoos; they fail, with strange obstinacy, to see anything but the apparent resemblances between them. Of course, we get nowhere, however passionately we might attack the weak reasoning of the Houyhnhnms as
based on the appearances which they believe represent realities. The sole criticism useful in this discussion is concerned with the unteachableness not of the Yahoos but of the Houyhnhnms. They are impervious to teaching, if not to exhortation. And this unteachableness is instrumental in setting the satiric punishment working. As late as the third chapter, Gulliver still regards his native country as the place to which good fortune might restore him.

As far as Gulliver's inner mind is concerned, the enumeration of the causes of war serves as the turning-point in his evaluative attitude towards humanity. Ironically, his future banishment looms large in proportion to the reinforcement of his attacks on humankind. His ministering to the satiric purpose is therefore double-edged. This change takes the form, say, of the following passage:

But I freely confess, that the many Virtues of those excellent Quadrupeds placed in opposite View to human Corruptions, had so far opened mine Eyes, and enlarged my Understanding, that I began to view the Actions and Passions of Man in a very different Light; and to think the Honour of my own Kind not worth managing; . . . I had likewise learned from his Example an utter Detestation of all Falsehood or Disguise; and Truth appeared so amiable to me, that I determined upon sacrificing every thing to it. (p. 258)

Gulliver's freedom grows to the point that he enters on a resolution never to return to humankind.

The reader must be careful not to overlook the fact that Gulliver contracted such a love and adoration for the horses. This means that his tragedy in the "terminal days" among the Houyhnhnms is being prepared on the basis of love and veneration—not of his pride—growing on him in the course of his close contact with truth incarnated. In augmenting his hatred for humankind, Gulliver adds his experiential application to what the master
observes concerning Yahoo-nature; needless to say, the application is an extension of his peregrination towards truth. The traditional failure of critics lies in their incompetence to exercise judgmental skill on the implication of Gulliver's self-recognition "that I was a real Yahoo in every Limb and Feature" (p. 267). My scepticism about the pride-centered criticism of the *Travels* owns its justification to his realization that he is hardly immune from the master's accusatory comments on humanity.

Gulliver's catastrophe begins just where Lucius's felicity puts an end to his pursuit of truth. The decree decided by the general assembly of the Houyhnhnms, though exhortatory to the master, is absolutely imperative to the Yahoo with "some Rudiments of Reason" (p. 279). When Gulliver is struck with the utmost grief and despair by the master's compliance with the *exhortation* of the general assembly, he experiences a momentary death. We should be conscious of what he says about the possibility of relapsing into his "old Corruptions, for want of Examples to lead and keep" him (p. 280). If Gulliver is *swollen with pride*, he could be convinced of his success in leading a virtuous life even among the Yahoos.

It is hard to place the satiric punitive strategy in the perspective of a certain causal relationship. The crucial difference between Lucius's fate and Gulliver's is concerned merely with the reception of the pursuit of truth undertaken by them. Lucius's explorative journey is accomplished in the form of his initiation into the ritualistic institution of the Egyptian deities, whereas Gulliver's love and veneration for the Houyhnhnms are tyrannically overruled. This distinction can be accounted for by the comparision between amusement intended by the Milesian tale and vexation meant by Augustan satire. But the connotation of the punitive schemes imposed upon those protagonists can better be grappled with from the angle not of the agent of punishment, but of its target. (It is worthy of note that Gulliver's livelihood after his return to England is a mere aftermath to which too much critical
attention has so far been directed.)

In *A Tale of a Tub*, Swift’s satiric thrust is not directed to the pursuit of truth; nor does he intend to maintain that human beings should be satisfied with the surface state of being well deceived, instead of being absorbed in the exploration of truth. What he ridicules in the *Tale* is an easy-minded idea that one could be happy by the very truth one discovers. According to Swift, one should risk one’s potential felicity and the peace of one’s mind by curiously attempting to flay one’s objects. The pursuer of truth ought to be ready to abandon the prospect of obtaining superficial felicity. It behoves him to endure the pains and disillusionment that naturally accompany what he recognizes as truth. In other words, a curious explorer must prepare himself or herself for the punitive retribution which Swift strategically forces upon Gulliver who is deported from Houyhnhnmland. He who cannot endure this kind of collapse should be satisfied with the extrinsic, even deceptive happiness.

Apuleius, whose principal motive is to divert his readers, uses the mechanism of punishment against his hero’s *curiositas* in such a manner that Lucius, disciplined in his adventurous apprenticeship to truth, sees the light of day. This is a subversion of the punitive machination operating on Socrates. Swift, on the other hand, victimizes his instrument as an example of how the curious might prepare themselves for the ultimate, instead of disciplinary, spiritual debacle. Apuleius finally approves of Lucius’s curiosity when it takes on a divine nuance, but Swift’s posture towards curiosity remains neither sympathetic nor antipathetic. He explores the bottomless disintegration into which curiosity precipitates truth-seekers with apparent parody. In a word, Gulliver is *Lucius excommunicated*—Swift, as a *middle man*, lets his protagonist have his own fate, without recourse to the authorial privilege of distributing *Deus ex machina*. 
NOTES

5 Ibid., p. 47.
8 Ibid., p. 276.
9 See, for instance, Tatum, Chap. 2, and Elizabeth H. Haight, *Apuleius and His Influence* (New York: Cooper Square, 1963), chap. II.
10 For the enumeration of the traits prerequisite to the making of the Menippean satire, see F. Anne Payne, *Chaucer and Menippean Satire* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), pp. 7–11. The author mentions twenty-one elements necessary for the genre, the first fourteen of which are, as Payne notes, proposed by Mikhail Bakhtin.
11 Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver’s Travels*, ed. Herbert Davis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), pp. 72–73. All quotations from *Gulliver’s Travels* are to be found in this edition, and page numbers are parenthetically indicated in the text.