The Japan Hands:
China’s People’s Diplomacy towards Japan, 1949-1972

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Introduction

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the new republic was immediately recognized by only a handful of countries, mostly from the communist bloc. While in the next few years a few more countries outside the communist sphere like the UK did establish official diplomatic ties with the PRC, the number remained small. This was due largely to pressure from the US; with an intensifying Cold War battle lines were drawn between allies of the US and those of the USSR, and with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan considered the true representative of the whole of China by the US, Washington would pursue a strategy to isolate the PRC internationally as much as possible. Another aspect contributing to the PRC’s diplomatic isolation was its own ideology, which insisted on sole recognition of Beijing and non-recognition of Taipei, adhering to a “One China” principle. After its defeat in the Second World War, Japan was occupied by the allied powers until 1952, after which it regained its independence as a sovereign nation. Immediately upon regaining sovereignty, Japan signed a peace treaty with the ROC on April 28, 1952, formally ending the war between Japan and China. This was the Treaty of Taipei (日華平和条約) and by signing it Japan established formal diplomatic relations with the ROC, at the expense of the PRC. In fact many in Japan, both among the ordinary people and in government, had favoured establishing relations with Beijing, but it was US pressure that prevented this. Among many progressive Japanese the struggle for real sovereignty and freedom from American control would come to determine their political stance in the next two decades, and improved relations with and official recognition of the PRC had growing support among not only the left but among many mainstream Japanese as well. The Treaty of Taipei was finally abrogated by the Japanese government on September 29, 1972. This was in the wake of US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to the PRC in February of that year and the beginning of the process of rapprochement between Washington and Beijing. This came as a shock to the Japanese government (and in Japan this event is actually referred to as the “Nixon Shock”) and led to strong domestic pressure to follow the American example and to establish relations with the PRC. Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (田中角栄) and Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi (大平正...
then visited the PRC in September 1972, establishing diplomatic relations immediately. From an outsider’s point of view this seems like a rapid sequence of events; after having no relations for over twenty years Tokyo and Beijing established diplomatic ties after one visit, while Washington and Beijing would not achieve diplomatic normalization until January 1, 1979. In reality there had been much more interaction between China and Japan in the twenty years from 1952 to 1972 than there had been between China and the US, or between China and any other country from the western bloc for that matter. In these twenty years the Chinese government, faced with many countries with which it did not have official relations, had developed its so-called “People’s Diplomacy” (人民外交) or “People-to-People Diplomacy” (民間外交) that was aimed at improving ties with people sympathetic to the PRC within these countries, ties that would hopefully become so strong that they would lead to official relations. People’s Diplomacy with Japan was especially important for the Chinese leadership because of Japan’s strategic importance since it was not only a neighbouring country but an important US ally as well. Nudging Japan away from the American embrace and convincing Tokyo to forgo relations with Taipei in favour of Beijing would be of great benefit to the PRC’s strategic position in East Asia, and make a significant dent in the Cold War strategy of the US. Also, economic cooperation between Japan and China would be of great benefit to both counties, something the Japanese business community was well aware of. This meant that Japan was fertile ground for Beijing’s People’s Diplomacy; in addition to the business community that wanted to trade with China there were many Japanese who were wary of being locked in on the American side in the Cold War conflict, and who could see the various benefits that would come from establishing relations with the PRC. Simply speaking, the core strategy of China’s People’s Diplomacy aimed at Japan was to increase the number of Japanese who felt this way. Throughout the 1950s, China slowly developed a framework or mechanism for bringing this about, at first through targeting influential people close to the levers of power and as contact increased, through cultivating ties with as wide a variety of Japanese as possible. As will be shown in Chapter 4, some see the period from 1952 to 1962 as a time of People-to-People Diplomacy, while after 1962 with more involvement from the Japanese government this gave way to “half governmental, half civilian” (半官半民) diplomacy. This is
because in the 1960s, the gradual process of building a transnational network of people sympathetic to the PRC began to bear fruit, with tangible results like the establishment of the “LT Trade” organization in 1962 and the establishment of trade liaison offices in each other’s countries in 1964 and 1965. In comparison, the US and China would only establish such offices in 1973, as a prelude to diplomatic normalization. In addition to this, Japan and China also agreed on a Journalist Exchange in 1964, adding to the number of Japanese in China and Chinese in Japan present on a permanent basis. This process of establishing firmer ties from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s was far from straightforward however. The success of China’s aims at any given moment was always dependent on who was in power in Japan, and in these years both countries would also go through some periods of great instability. China would see varying mass campaigns that would lead to a waxing and waning of radicalism, often with dire consequences for ordinary people such as during the late 1950s with China experiencing an unprecedented famine as a direct result of the disastrous policies of Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward. Japan experienced great civil unrest and polarization between left and right in the 1950s, culminating with large protests against the amendment of the Japan-US Security Treaty signed in January 1960, and the murder of opposition leader Asanuma Inejirō in October of the same year. And China’s real aim in these years would remain elusive; namely the establishment of official diplomatic relations. While there was much hope for a swift rapprochement when the government of Yoshida Shigeru gave way to the successive governments of Hatoyama Ichirō (鳩山一郎 In office: December 1954-December 1956) and Ishibashi Tanzan (石橋湛山 In office: December 1956-January 1957), especially after the Hatoyama government normalized relations with the USSR in 1956, this was not to be. After resigning due to ill health, Ishibashi Tanzan was succeeded by Kishi Nobusuke (岸信介 In office: January 1957-July 1960), who was a pro-ROC conservative heavily opposed to any improvement in relations between Tokyo and Beijing. The pendulum switched back again when Kishi was succeeded by Ikeda Hayato (池田勇人 In office: July 1960-November 1964) who was again much more inclined to pursue relations favourable to the PRC. Ikeda was still beholden to the large pro-ROC faction in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
however, so while this was a period of rapid improvement in relations, rapprochement remained unattainable. Ikeda was again succeeded by Satō Eisaku (佐藤栄作 In office: November 1964-July 1972), who was at best lukewarm about relations with China, although the relationship would not again deteriorate as much as it had done during the reign of his brother Kishi Nobusuke. It was these ever shifting circumstances that comprised the ground over which the Chinese waged their campaign of People’s Diplomacy towards Japan. Compared to the Japanese leadership, the Chinese leadership was more stable, at least in the years prior to 1966, and the main person responsible for People’s Diplomacy was without a doubt Zhou Enlai (周恩来); Prime Minister of the PRC from 1949 to his death in 1976 and Foreign Minister from 1949 to 1958. Although he was succeeded as Foreign Minister by Chen Yi (陳毅) in 1958, he remained the person responsible for Japanese affairs. The Cultural Revolution in China that started in May 1966 thoroughly upended most of the efforts that were made until that time in Sino-Japanese relations, and most of the Chinese Japan hands were purged. Out of necessity they were largely reinstated prior to Sino-Japanese rapprochement in September 1972. Since the Sino-Japanese relations during the Cultural Revolution and the process leading up to rapprochement would require research entirely different to that engaged in for the writing of this dissertation, the period it covers will be the years from 1952 to 1966. The year 1952 saw the first visit of a group of Japanese parliamentarians to the PRC, and was the start of post-1949 relations. These 14 years are the years characterized by People’s Diplomacy, the nature of which will be explored here.

The aim of this dissertation is to trace the development of the “mechanism” that those working on Japanese affairs under Zhou Enlai put in place to implement his strategy of a People’s Diplomacy towards Japan. This mechanism took on various shapes in reaction to the often changing circumstances in the 1950s and 1960s, and it is characterized by its informal nature, with the most important contacts taking place using backchannels. Backchannel negotiations have been defined as “officially sanctioned negotiations conducted in secret between the parties to a dispute. These extraordinary negotiations operate in parallel with, or replace, acknowledged front-channels of
However, the People’s Diplomacy mechanism only partially utilized backchannels in this way. The circumstances in which Sino-Japanese relations were conducted in the 1950s and 1960s were unique in that the Japanese government was not able to officially acknowledge the PRC, and therefore had to use proxies when negotiation was absolutely necessary. This was the case in the 1950s when both sides had to find a resolution to the issue of the many Japanese that had been stranded in China since the end of the war, and both countries’ Red Cross organizations were charged with conducting the negotiations. In the same way the Japanese business community took the initiative to create several associations dedicated to establishing trade links with the PRC, which lead to a number of “nongovernmental” trade agreements, often with tacit approval from the Japanese government. In a way these types of negotiations were backchannel negotiations because they served as a replacement for official front-channel negotiations endorsed by the Japanese and Chinese governments. However, the significance of People’s Diplomacy was altogether different, in that its aim was not to make a success of the particular negotiation at hand, but to craft an informal network that transcended any immediate concern about repatriation or trade. This informal network had to draw Japan and China closer together via a cultivation of people-to-people relations, leading to the ultimate goal of diplomatic normalization. It is the crafting of these kinds of backchannels that was the core strategy of People’s Diplomacy and that is the focus of this dissertation.

Research questions

As we will see in the literature review below, many of the negotiations that took place between China and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s have received academic attention in the west. These negotiations were aimed at resolving the issues of repatriation of Japanese citizens in China and vice versa.

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2 Kurt W. Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 1945-83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990), 104-106.
versa; of Japanese war criminals still in China; and most of all on trade. The angle of this dissertation will be different in that the focus will not be on the proceedings of particular negotiations or their outcomes, but on the underlying framework and the strategy that informed the people engaged in People’s Diplomacy. Although Zhou Enlai did not articulate this strategy in detail, by focussing on the conduct and statements of people from both sides, I hope to shed light on the strategic craftsmanship that informed China’s Japan policy. Chapter 1 will introduce two of the most important Japanese allies of the PRC, both were what the Japanese call a “pipe” (パイプ). Chapter 2 will lay out the underlying mechanism that had to provide the long-term continuity in the work of China’s Japan hands. Two concrete questions at the heart of the dissertation are: how exactly did the Chinese go about establishing a connection with a Japanese “pipe”? And; what kind of Japanese person would they target and why? Broadly speaking, in all 4 chapters the aim will be to uncover the motivations behind China’s Japan strategy in the years from 1952 to 1966. One type of relations the dissertation will not focus on is the manifold ties the Chinese government maintained with the Japanese left. For an outsider it will be no surprise that there were strong ties and active exchange with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), as well as with trade unions and other labour organizations. This is what would be expected from a communist country, and has little to do with what made People’s Diplomacy unique. As noted earlier, the main aim of People’s Diplomacy was to increase the number of Japanese sympathetic to the PRC and to the idea of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. The broad hypothesis explored by this dissertation is that this meant a cultivation of channels with Japanese outside the leftist circles.

Roughly there were three groups targeted by the Chinese in Japanese society as particularly useful for widening the reach of the PRC: the business community; the mainstream intelligentsia; and mainstream politicians. To bring into sharper focus the long-term continuity of People’s Diplomacy, the dissertation will include a closer look at two phenomena in this period that have so far not received sufficient academic attention. While Sino-Japanese trade in the 1950s and 1960s was arguably the most important arena of interaction, as we shall see below this is also a topic that has
been covered extensively elsewhere, and need not be rehashed in this dissertation. Instead we will have a closer look at cultural relations in Chapter 3, which can hopefully shed light on the use of the Japanese mainstream intelligentsia for People’s Diplomacy. Finally in Chapter 4 we will look at the Journalist Exchange; an excellent example of one of the great successes of People’s Diplomacy in the 1960s. Throughout the dissertation the prominent role of Japanese mainstream politicians, especially in the LDP, will come to the fore. The following will be a brief overview of the different chapters.

In Chapter 1, the focus will be on the needs and uses of the so-called “pipes” by looking at the establishment of the connection between the Chinese and two highly significant Japanese allies: Saionji Kinkazu (西園寺公一) and Matsumura Kenzō (松村謙三). Both these connections were made in the latter half of the 1950s at a time when Sino-Japanese relations were in dire straits. Sino-Japanese relations had deteriorated steadily after Kishi had come to power in Japan and generally these years are seen as a low point in relations. By looking at how Zhou Enlai’s strategy of creating “pipes” with influential Japanese increased in importance exactly during this time we can gain an understanding of the nature Zhou’s long term vision of creating a network that was not dependent on the prevailing political winds in Japan. Naturally the end goal in making these kind of people-to-people connections was to engage directly with the Japanese government, a strategy the Chinese described as “using the people as government officials” (以民促官).

Chapter 2 will be an in-depth look at the network of Japan hands the Chinese created to manage People’s Diplomacy: the so-called Japan Group (日本組). This was an informal group of people drawn from different branches of the Chinese government. The core members of the group all had a background in Japan related work; they had often studied in Japan and many had been involved in intelligence work aimed at the Japanese during the second Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945). The group was also in charge of recruiting and training the younger generation of Japan hands. Since the Japan Group would be involved in all interaction with Japanese, they were essential in providing the continuity that was necessary for the cultivation of long-term ties. This networking process will be looked at closely, in order to determine how and why they targeted certain Japanese “pipes”. The
group members did this having absorbed the exact principles informing China’s Japan policy, and their prime task was to widen China’s network in Japan. Therefore they did not only carry out policy, but were themselves an embodiment of the policy by engaging in people-to-people exchange. The person who Zhou Enlai put in charge of the Japan Group was his close confidant Liao Chengzhi (廖承志), who was without question the most prominent Chinese Japan hand during the first three decades after 1949.

Chapter 3 will be devoted to one particular avenue that was targeted by the Chinese in the campaign to widen their reach within Japanese society; cultural relations. While other avenues like Sino-Japanese trade have received considerable academic attention, the steady increase in cultural exchange between China and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s is usually overlooked. The focus will be on Nakajima Kenzō (中島健蔵) and the Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange (JCACE, 中日文化交流協会) that he headed. Ideally taking a closer look at cultural relations will not only shed light on this area of exchange that has hitherto not received due attention, but also clarify further how the Chinese Japan hands went about establishing connections among a particular group within Japanese society, namely the intelligentsia, and why this was considered important. At the same time this will allow us to get a grasp of how exactly the Japanese intelligentsia viewed the PRC and what factors contributed to their support or rejection of official relations with China. Furthermore, by situating the JCACE in the context of other progressive nongovernmental groups (民間団体) in Japan, the importance of these groups within People’s Diplomacy will be explored as well.

Chapter 4 will focus on one of the great breakthroughs of Sino-Japanese People’s Diplomacy in the 1960s, namely the Journalist Exchange that started in 1964. While the major advances in trade between the two countries in the 1960s are quite well-known and the subject of a recent book, the concurrent Journalist Exchange is a subject that has so far been neglected by the scholarly community. Looking at the process by which the agreement to exchange correspondents was achieved as well as at the principles with which both sides went about covering the other country in their media, we can

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hopefully determine what the place and function of the media within People’s Diplomacy was. Especially the extent to which the Chinese journalists were trained in the principles that also underlay the activities of the Japan Group, and contrasting this with the Japanese journalists, should shed light on exactly what China hoped to achieve from the exchange. Another unique interaction dealt with in this chapter is the so-called “Breakfast Meeting” (朝飯会) held on a monthly basis for the first year that the Japanese journalists were in Beijing. These meetings took place in the Japanese restaurant Hefeng (和風) and consisted of a frank exchange between Liao Chengzhi and the assembled Japanese journalists. This was a unique instance of Sino-Japanese interaction and no other foreign correspondents were afforded this treatment, showing the value the Chinese placed on the Journalist Exchange. These meetings have received no academic attention and will be analyzed using memoirs of participants and more importantly interviews with the last two surviving Japanese journalists that have taken part in these meetings.

Sources

A major handicap in tracing the evolution of China’s Japan policy in this era is the restrictions in accessing the Foreign Ministry archives in Beijing that have been in place since 2013. However, this is offset somewhat by the numerous publications by those involved in China’s people’s diplomacy towards Japan, most notably the memoirs of Japan Group members Sun Pinghua (孫平化),6 Xiao Xiangqian (肖向前),7 Zhang Xiangshan (张香山),8 Wu Xuewen (呉学文),9,10 and Zhou Bin (周斌).11 Note that for all these works the original has been consulted, meaning that the books by Sun Pinghua and Xiao Xiangqian in Japanese are original publications and have no Chinese equivalent. Since these

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were some of the key players, a lot of the activities that were central to conducting China’s People’s Diplomacy towards Japan in the 1950s and 1960s are described in these works in firsthand accounts. As for Chapters 3 and 4, the books by Nakajima Kenzō1213 and Tagawa Seiichi (田川誠一)1415 have provided these type of firsthand accounts of the events described. Also, where firsthand accounts were unavailable, as was the case for example with a lot of activities related to cultural exchange, Chinese and Japanese newspapers have been used copiously. In addition to this I have attempted to interview as many of the main participants of Sino-Japanese People’s Diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s as possible. While most of the prominent people at the time have passed away, several of the younger participants were consulted for this study. Below is a list of interviewees, including the date and place of each interview.

Wang Taiping (王泰平); Tokyo, September 13, 2013.

Wang Taiping was correspondent for the Beijing Daily in Tokyo from 1969. He was very active in the period immediately after Satō Eisaku when he informed Beijing about the new leadership and how the push for Sino-Japanese rapprochement gathered steam. For the purpose of this research, his involvement with the Japan Group as a young member on the mid-1960s has been of most use.

Lin Liyun (林麗韞); Beijing, August 23, 2014.

Lin Liyun was one of the most important interpreters of Japanese for the Chinese leadership and served as chief interpreter at the meeting between Mao Zedong and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in 1972. She was based at the Foreign Ministry. She is originally from Kobe in Japan but of Taiwanese descent. Lin moved to the PRC in 1952, at age 19. While at Peking University she was recruited by Liao Chengzhi to work as an interpreter thanks to her fluency in Japanese. From 1953 she took part in many of the exchanges between China and Japan in the context of People’s Diplomacy. Her insights on the recruitment of Japan hands in the 1950s have been used in Chapter 2. This is the

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only interview not done by the author; Lin was interviewed by Kato Chihiro (加藤千洋) on the author’s behalf.

**Liu Deyou** (劉德有); Beijing, August 25, 2014.

Liu Deyou was well-known as an interpreter of Japanese for both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai from 1952 onwards. In his varied career he was also stationed in Tokyo as Xinhua and Guangming Daily correspondent from 1964 to 1978; he published widely on Japanese language studies in Chinese; and he would become Deputy Minister of Culture in the 1980s. His views were particularly useful as an insight into the Japan Group mechanism and the Journalist Exchange, referred to in Chapters 2 and 4.

**Zhou Bin** (周斌); Shanghai, August 27, 2014.

Zhou Bin was interpreter for the Chinese leadership, based at the Foreign Ministry and especially close to Zhou Enlai. At the talks on Sino-Japanese rapprochement in 1972 he was in charge of interpretation at the meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei (姫鵬飛) and Japanese Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi. Involved with the Japan Group from the late 1950s onwards, his views have been incorporated heavily in the analysis of China’s Japan policy making in Chapter 2.

**Saionji Kazuteru** (西園寺一晃); Tokyo, January 29, 2014.

Saionji Kazuteru is the son of Saionji Kinkazu, the so-called “People’s Ambassador” in Beijing from 1958 to 1970. Saionji Kazuteru moved to China with his family in 1958 when he was in his teens and would stay there until 1966, attending high school and Peking University. He was close to the families of both Liao Chengzhi and Zhou Enlai and provides a unique insight into his father’s activities in the 1950s and 1960s, used in the analysis of the use of ‘pipes” in Chapter 1. Saionji Kazuteru moved back to Japan in 1966 and became an Asahi Shimbun journalist, and is currently the director of the Confucius Institute at Kōgakuin University in Tokyo.

**Minamimura Shirō** (南村志郎); Yokohama, January 30, 2014.

Minamimura Shirō lived in Beijing in the 1960s and was secretary of Saionji Kinkazu. The latter urged him to manage the only Japanese restaurant in Beijing, Hefeng, a project that was backed by Liao Chengzhi and Zhou Enlai. The restaurant was the scene of the monthly “Breakfast Meeting” held
by Liao with the Japanese journalists in 1964 and 1965. The restaurant existed from late 1962/early 1963 to late 1966/early 1967, and Minamimura’s experiences have been incorporated into Chapter 4.

**Suga Eiichi** (菅栄一); Tokyo, June 20, 2014.

Suga Eiichi was Beijing correspondent for the Sankei Shimbun for two years from the start of the Journalist Exchange in September 1964. The fact that he was part of the first generation of Japanese correspondents in China after 1949 makes his experience especially interesting. Suga and Ōkoshi Yukio are the last two journalists who are still alive from this group, and Suga the only one who participated in every single “Breakfast Meeting” in Hefeng. His memories have been utilized in Chapter 4.

**Ōkoshi Yukio** (大越幸夫); Tokyo, October 27, 2014.

Ōkoshi Yukio was Beijing correspondent for Japanese commercial broadcaster TBS for one year from September 1964, and together with Suga is the last journalist left of his group. He took part in most of the “Breakfast Meetings” and this interview has been used as a source for Chapter 4.

**Kuwata Kōichirō** (桑田弘一郎); Tokyo, June 13, 2015.

Kuwata Kōichirō was a Asahi Shimbun journalist from 1952 onwards, focussing on politics. He gradually became close to Matsumura Kenzō and became part of his network via Tagawa Seiichi, who was also an Asahi Shimbun journalist before becoming a Diet member and member of Matsumura’s inner circle. Kuwata witnessed Matsumura’s increasing involvement with China from the latter half of the 1950s and accompanied him on two of his historic visits to China, in 1962 and 1964. Kuwata’s unique firsthand experience of the development of the Liao-Matsumura “pipe” has been incorporated mainly in Chapter 1, and to a lesser extent in Chapter 4.

**Satō Junko** (佐藤純子); Tokyo, June 13, 2015.

Satō Junko worked for the *Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange* (JCACE) for no less than 53 years from 1957 to 2010. She worked closely with Nakajima Kenzō as his secretary until his death in 1979. With the scarcity of information on Sino-Japanese cultural relations and the activities of Nakajima, her firsthand account was invaluable information, used in the writing of Chapter 3.
Literature review

As for scholarly work in English; it has already been mentioned that some aspects of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s and 1960s have already received significant scholarly attention, especially trade. The great breakthrough in trade relation with the establishment of “LT Trade” in 1962 received a lot of international attention at the time, resulting in at least one scholarly study on the subject.\textsuperscript{16} The most thorough monograph on Sino-Japanese trade in this period is probably Yoshihide Soeya’s *Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, published in 1978.\textsuperscript{17} Approaching the subject mostly from the Japanese side, Soeya gives an exhaustive overview of the many nongovernmental trade associations in Japan that endeavoured to promote trade with China, as well as an overview of the concrete dealings of the trade liaison offices that were established in Tokyo and Beijing in 1964 and 1965. A recent book tackling the subject of the “LT Trade” organization and the establishment of the liaison offices is Mayumi Itoh’s *Pioneers of Sino-Japanese Relations: Liao and Takasaki*, published in 2012.\textsuperscript{18} Avoiding a repetition of the facts already made clear in Soeya’s work, she approaches the subject from a more political angle, focussing on the “pipe” between Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke (高碕達之助) that made the establishment of “LT Trade” possible. She also manages to avoid rehashing information about Liao Chengzhi already covered in the only monograph on Liao Chengzhi in English; Kurt Radtke’s *China’s Relations with Japan, 1945-83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi*, published in 1990.\textsuperscript{19} Radtke’s book gives an overview of Liao’s entire career and deals with the post-1949 negotiations with the Japanese in detail. For a chronological overview of Sino-Japanese interaction in the first three decades after the founding of the PRC, and especially the painstaking process of negotiation on various issues, this is the most thorough work. The angle of this dissertation will be different however, in that not the specific negotiations will be looked at but the

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\textsuperscript{16} Sun, Norman. *Trade Between Mainland China and Japan Under the “L-T” Agreements*. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1968.
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long-term cultivation of ties, as explained above. A well-known scholar of Sino-Japanese relations focusing on war memory and its ramifications for postwar relations between the two countries is Caroline Rose. Her books on the issue give a thorough overview of the history issue, though they focus largely on the post-1972 period.22 In one insightful article she sheds light on the Japanese efforts to re-establish relations in the 1958 and 1959 period, focusing on the nongovernmental aspect.22 A recent book dealing with war reconciliation between the two countries was published by Yinan He; The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II, published in 2009.23 This book has a long section on the 1949-1972 period that provides useful insights into how the subject of reconciliation was dealt with by both governments as well as by Japanese nongovernmental associations. The issue of Japanese war criminals still remaining in China in the 1950s was the subject of two recent articles by Adam Cathcart and Patricia Nash.24 Another work that deserves mention as perhaps the most thorough overview of Zhou Enlai’s career in foreign policy is Ronald Keith’s The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, although not focused on Japan in any great detail, it is a useful work that traces the developments in Chinese foreign policy from the perspective of Zhou.25

As for scholarly work in Japanese, there is no shortage of research on the topic of Sino-Japanese relations. A standard work for the 1949-1972 period is Okabe Tatsumi (岡部達味)’s Chūgoku no tainichi seisaku (Japan’s China policy)27 from 1976 and this and his Chūgoku gaikō- seisaku kettei no

kozo (Chinese Diplomacy: The decision making structure)\textsuperscript{28} from 1983 serve as a thorough basis for any study of Sino-Japanese relations. Other standard works consulted for this dissertation are Tanaka Akihiko (田中明彦)'s \textit{Nicchū kankei: 1945-1990} (Japan-China relations: 1945-1990)\textsuperscript{29} from 1991 and most of all Furukawa Mantarō (古川万太郎)'s \textit{Nicchū sengo kankei shi} (History of Postwar Japan-China relations)\textsuperscript{30} from 1981. These standard works aside, until recently little research had been done in Japan from on People’s Diplomacy from the angle that this dissertation aspires to do. However, on the subject of China’s Japan hands and key players of Japan policy a group of Japan-based scholars has recently conducted groundbreaking research. The most tangible result of their efforts has been the collection \textit{Sengo Nicchū kankei to Ryō Shōshi: Chūgoku no chinichiha to tainichi seisaku} (Postwar Japan-China relations and Liao Chengzhi: China’s Japan hands and Japan policy) edited by Wang Xueping (王雪萍) and published in 2013.\textsuperscript{31} Especially contributions by Wang Xueping herself, Ōsawa Takeshi (大澤武司), and Sugiura Yasuyuki (杉浦康之) provide a thorough analysis of the organizational structure behind China’s Japan policy conducted in the postwar period, and Liao Chengzhi in it. This dissertation takes their research as a starting point, especially so in Chapter 2, to analyze People’s Diplomacy and its principles.

As for scholarly work in Chinese, it is no exaggeration to say there is a tremendous amount of articles available on Sino-Japanese relations in the 1949-1972 period, many focussed on Zhou Enlai’s policies, or on Liao Chengzhi’s role, and often dealing with different aspects of People’s Diplomacy. While quantity is not the issue, quality is harder to discern. Many articles repeat the same facts, and most do not state their sources. Some more general studies on Sino-Japanese relations do have value though, and especially the work of Liu Jianping (劉建平), for example his book \textit{Zhanhou Zhongri gaikō kettei no kozo}.

guanxi (Postwar Sino-Japanese relations)\textsuperscript{32} has proven useful in the course of conducting this research, and well as several of his articles.\textsuperscript{33} From this sea of information the most useful sources are have proven to be firsthand accounts by someone involved in the events described. Especially the aforementioned memoirs of most of the important Japan hands provide invaluable information, and to this can be added such articles as Liu Gengyin’s “Wang Jiaxiang yu Zhonggong zhongyang guoji huodong zhidao weiyuanhui” (Wang Jiaxiang and the Central International Activities Leading Committee),\textsuperscript{34} interesting and valuable because Liu was a member of the Committee described. Of the prominent Japan hands Wu Xuewen’s work is probably the most valuable; he combines his extremely detailed recollections of meetings and discussions with a thorough analysis of China’s Japan policy structure, and the role of both Liao Chengzhi and the Japan hands therein. This is an angle that neatly corresponds to this dissertation’s, and has Wu’s work has therefore been consulted frequently.

\textbf{Note on the text}

Chinese names of people and places are in principle shown in the modern spelling based on the pinyin system. However, where people or institutions are generally known in an older or alternative standard of spelling, as is the case with for example Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石), Sun Yat-sen (孙中山), or Peking University, this form will be used. All Japanese names and places will be given using the standard Hepburn romanization, with macrons, unless a word is known in English without macrons, for example in the case of Tokyo, Kobe, and so on. For all Japanese and Chinese people characters will be provided in the text when first mentioned. As the dissertation will be presented in Japan, only Japanese characters will be given. When Chinese characters are deemed necessary for enhanced understanding, these will be provided not in the text, but in a footnote. Names of both Chinese and


Japanese people will be given with the surname first, with the exception of scholars working in English and therefore using the reversed order in English, such as Yinan He, or Yoshihide Soeya, and for whose names no characters will be provided. All translations from the Chinese and Japanese are the author’s.
Chapter I- Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s: the first connections of People’s Diplomacy

Throughout the first half of the 1950s the PRC then sought to establish ties with a number of non-communist countries, both inside and outside the region. Relations with Japan were seen as a priority from the start, and a friendship offensive was launched that was aimed at luring Japan away from the American embrace, and engage in official diplomatic contact with the Chinese. Already in the early 1950s the newly formed government of the PRC decided on prioritizing the achievement of diplomatic normalization in its relations with Japan. However, while Japan was ruled by the government of Yoshida Shigeru, both under U.S. occupation and after, there was little chance of rapprochement with the PRC. During the successive governments of Hatoyama Ichirō (December 1954-December 1956) and Ishibashi Tansan (December 1956-January 1957) there was much more chance of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, especially after the Hatoyama government normalized relations with the USSR in 1956. Policy in Beijing was crafted accordingly, and strengthened ties with Japan featured prominently in Premier Zhou Enlai’s East Asia strategy. Through nominally nongovernmental channels the Chinese tried to coax the officials of the Hatoyama government into direct interaction, with mixed results. Seemingly, the situation changed when Ishibashi resigned almost immediately after taking office due to ill health and he was succeeded by former “Class A” war crimes suspect Kishi Nobusuke (In office: January 1957-July 1960), who was a pro-ROC conservative and therefore less inclined to pursue policies favourable to the PRC. But this would not alter the importance Zhou Enlai placed on ties with Japan, and throughout the latter half of the 1950s Japan would maintain its central place in his strategic vision. How the Chinese would go about pursuing their goal would change radically however, since the strategy of pushing government officials into direct interaction was not feasible anymore under Kishi. With direct government ties a distant prospect, from the mid-1950s the Chinese focussed on cultivating ties with Japanese people from all walks of life, both inside and outside politics. In the new Cold War context of the early 1950s, forced by impossibility of official inter-governmental contact, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai developed his so-called “People’s Diplomacy”; a strategy of creating informal channels between China and
Japan that could serve to build a network of personal ties outside the immediate government sphere, ties that would ideally become so strong they would result in official government-to-government relations. Policy was to use these personal networks to further the government’s ends; to “use the people as government officials.” Taking a closer look at how relations with Japan were approached by the Chinese throughout the 1950s will help us gain a deeper understanding of Zhou Enlai’s strategic craftsmanship. This was an eventful decade that saw Zhou Enlai establish a distinct profile in international affairs and that ended with not only the start of the Great Leap Forward in China but also with a complete breakdown of Sino-Japanese relations after the Nagasaki Flag Incident in 1958, and it is the decade in which Zhou established the groundwork for his Japan policy in years to come. Central in his dealings with Japan was the cultivation of a “pipe” (as the Japanese like to call it) or backchannel; a direct personal connection between people of importance from both sides. These backchannels could be with anyone in Japan who shared the goal of improved relations with the PRC, both in the political realm and outside it. This practise, established in the 1950s, was to prove highly effective in the era before the 1972 rapprochement as well as after. A recent International Crisis Group report has linked the current troubles in Sino-Japanese relations to the disappearance of the last personal “pipe” between two influential politicians on both sides in 2008.35

While the creation of a network through the cultivation of various Japanese “pipes” already began when the first delegation of Japanese politicians visited China in 1952, this type of unofficial diplomacy increased in importance as the 1950s progressed and rapprochement remained elusive. Interestingly enough, while a whole framework to facilitate People’s Diplomacy was already in place in the middle of the decade, some of the most important connections with Japanese were made roughly around the year 1958. This is interesting because thanks to the “Nagasaki Flag Incident” (長崎国旗事件) in May 1958, this year is usually seen as a particularly bad one for Sino-Japanese relations. Two of the “pipes” that were cultivated around this time were the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politician Matsumura Kenzō and the aristocrat Saionji Kinkazu, who were

invited to live in Beijing and would stay there with his family until 1970 and was often referred to as the “People’s Ambassador.” On the Chinese side of the “pipe” the most important person was always Liao Chengzhi, who had grown up in Japan and was fluent in Japanese. He was one of Zhou Enlai’s most trusted aides and was charged with carrying out Zhou’s Japan policy. In addition to the establishment of the “pipe” between Liao and these two Japanese, Liao had set out on the orders of Zhou to establish the Japan Group; a group of talented Japan hands affiliated with different government organs who were to give shape to Zhou’s vision for a pro-active Japan policy. While this group had been meeting for years, its meetings were formalized and found their central position in Japan affairs in 1958. So while generally the year 1958 is viewed as a bleak one for Sino-Japanese relations, with China’s furious reaction to the Nagasaki Flag Incident taking the two parties back to square one, in fact Zhou Enlai’s long-term strategy of strong engagement with Japan crystallized in exactly this year.

**Growing Trade in the 1950s and the Nagasaki Flag Incident**

Though there were no official diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC, throughout the 1950s there were efforts by both sides to improve trade relations, culminating in several “private” agreements on trade, the first of which (the *Sino-Japanese Nongovernmental Trade Agreement*) was signed in 1952. These agreements were signed by trade groups formed especially for this purpose, and were independent from the government. In Japan many associations had been formed that were focussed on enhancing trade with China, largely by the business community.\(^{36}\) Trade associations were only nominally independent in the case of the Chinese, but on the Japanese side the government could have no direct influence, though they gave tacit approval, despite some trade groups consisting mostly of Diet members.\(^{37}\) From 1955 a regular trade fair was held in both countries, promoting mutual trade. However, a stumbling block was whether or not the PRC flag could be flown at such fairs in Japan, since the Japanese government did not recognize the PRC’s legitimacy. A major

\(^{36}\) For an overview of the many such organizations, see: Yoshihide Soeya, *Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978*, 24-33.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 32.
breakthrough appeared to have been made with the signing of the 4th Sino-Japanese Nongovernmental Trade Agreement on March 3, 1958. It was agreed trade liaison offices would be established in both countries, that trade representatives would have certain diplomatic rights, and that the PRC flag could be flown at China’s office in Japan. However, though the Japanese government stated that most of the agreement was acceptable to them, soon Prime Minister Kishi made a critical comment on the agreement in the Diet, saying the government could not agree to the flag clause. After threats coming from Taipei of economic repercussions, the Japanese government on April 9 again stated unequivocally that it did not support the PRC’s right to hoist its flag. Distrust of Kishi’s government was already running high in Beijing after Kishi had become the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Taiwan in 1957, where he voiced his support for Chiang Kai-shek’s recovery of the mainland. As Yoshihide Soeya has argued, the Chinese were very frustrated at this time because of their inability to influence Japanese government policy via these “private” trade agreements. Things were about to get worse at the trade fair that had been going on since early April in Nagasaki. According to Tanaka Akihiko, Kishi at this point still thought some of the agreement could be salvaged and the growing economic relationship protected, but the flag issue would prove too big a hurdle. Possibly many had hoped that the PRC flag could quietly continue to be present at the fair, as it had been at previous fairs, but forces beyond the control of the government were to prevent this. On May 2nd, the flag was taken down by force by a right-wing youth, who was then only briefly held in custody before being released. This mild reaction by the authorities could only be interpreted by the Chinese as that their flag was not seen as one representing a sovereign nation. Prominent Japan Group member Sun Pinghua notes in his memoirs that the ROC consulate in Nagasaki had already voiced its objection to

38 "Seifu shōnin wa kon’nan” Nicchū bōeki kyōtei kokki jōkō de shushō tōben” [“Government recognition is difficult” Premier’s reply to the flag clause], Asahi Shim bun, March 6, 1958.
40 Tanaka Akihiko, Nicchū kankei 1945-1990, 50.
41 “Ajia wa rentai seyo Taipe de kataru kaihatsu kikin, Amerika no kyōryoku o” [For solidarity in Asia: Talks in Taipei on American help for the development fund], Asahi Shim bun, June 4, 1957.
42 Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978, 39.
43 Ibid., 49.
44 “Chūkyō hata hikizuri orosu Nagasaki no kitte-ten de kōfian shita seinen” [Communist China flag downed at Nagasaki stamp stall by agitated youth], Asahi Shim bun, May 3, 1958.
the flag to no avail, and that the incident was probably no coincidence. While it is unclear whether Taipei was actually involved in the incident, the conclusion in Beijing seems to have been that it was. But the furious reaction that followed was more likely due to the careless reaction of the Japanese government. In short, Beijing decided to halt all trade. This became known as the “Nagasaki Flag Incident”; a historic event and low-point in Sino-Japanese relations. While Sino-Japanese trade had still been very modest, its symbolic value was significant, especially for the Japanese who saw in China an alternative to the US. According to Caroline Rose, the levels of trade prior to May 1958 were not particularly high when “compared to Japan-US trade volumes, but Japan’s China trade was nonetheless symbolic of a strategy which sought to resume trade with China as a means of developing some independence from the US as well as rebuilding the Japanese economy.” The fact that Beijing now pulled out of this process was sure to galvanize those sections of Japanese society in favour of improved Sino-Japanese relations, and in the two years to come the growing progressive movement opposing Kishi’s policies would adopt the cause of changing Japan’s China policy as their own. Meanwhile in China, despite the outward anger of the Chinese leadership, Zhou Enlai and his underlings remained busy as ever carving out the framework with which they wanted to improve relations and eventually achieve diplomatic normalization.

**China’s Evolving Japan Policy in the 1950s**

As Ishii Akira has pointed out, in the first years after the establishment of the PRC, most of the focus of the Chinese leadership’s Japan policy was concentrated on cultivating ties with Japanese left-wing civic groups and parties such as the JCP and JSP. Possibly this was done in the hope that there would be a future government led by the JSP, or at least a more progressive government. The exclusive focus on leftist groups did not last long however, and according to Radtke, “when this

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45 Sun Pinghua, *Zhongri youhao suixianglu*, 82.
46 Caroline Rose, ”Breaking the Deadlock: Japan's informal diplomacy with China, 1958-9,” 182.
approach not only failed, but was counterproductive, greater emphasis was laid of ‘peaceful’ moves to increase links with various groups in Japan who might influence public opinion in the PRC’s favour.” This was a slow process and we will see in Chapter 3 how Beijing’s ties with the Japanese nongovernmental groups were steadily increased. This widening of ties was largely born out of necessity, since the desired diplomatic normalization with Japan remained elusive throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Until the mid-1950s the hope was still for a rapid rapprochement and the Chinese actively pushed for more involvement from the Japanese government. During the Hatoyama era, from 1954 to 1956, there was a lot of improvement in Sino-Japanese relations with a great increase in exchange. By using this interaction with Japanese to press for direct contact with government officials, the Chinese wanted some kind of de facto recognition. This strategy was termed the strategy of “establishing contact with government officials via people-to-people exchange.” This was the principle that pervaded Chinese strategic thinking during the Hatoyama years. The hope was that intense interaction with a large number of people close to the government would eventually lead to rapprochement. This meant that negotiations on things like trade and repatriation of Japanese were used as a means to achieve ever more interaction with government figures. As we shall see in Chapter 2 however, this did not have the desired result when Hatoyama was in power and became even less effective under Kishi. It is roughly from the mid-1950s that we can begin to discern a change of tactic within People’s Diplomacy, towards an orientation on establishing a variety of people-to-people ties that could benefit China in the long-term. Zhou Enlai decided to cast a wider net, and place greater importance on the cultivation of ties with those from all sectors of Japanese society. In a way he was ahead of the curve with this, and after Kishi became Prime Minister in 1957 and diplomatic normalization was shelved, the new tactics of building ties with a wide variety of people seemed an appropriate framework for the new situation, as the Chinese could use friends in a variety of places willing to advance their cause. In the hostile climate of post-Hatoyama/Ishibashi Japan, the “pipes” cultivated by China became of vital importance to maintain a foothold in Japan and to stay focussed

48 Kurt W. Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 1945-83, 103.
of the goal of diplomatic normalization. The connections that Beijing intended to cultivate among mainstream politicians would be especially useful to “increase pressure on the government by causing a split between ‘hardliners’ in the governing party and groups prepared to actively oppose them.”

The evolution of China’s Japan policy in the 1950s took place against the backdrop of Zhou Enlai’s growing influence on the international stage. At the Geneva Peace Conference in the Spring of 1954 and the Bandung Conference a year later, Zhou Enlai had made a strong impression as the spokesman for the postcolonial Asian nations. Key to the PRC’s strategy in the East Asian region was the effort to counter American hegemony and therefore those countries aligned with the US like Japan would become a specific target for People’s Diplomacy. The goal was to entice Japan away from the American embrace and establish diplomatic ties with the PRC as an independent nation. The use of People’s Diplomacy for this actually predates the 1950s, since the CCP had already established its own brand of international diplomacy rooted in united front politics in the pre-1949 period. As Ronald Keith notes, even “after 1949 this notion of people-to-people contact remained important as a means of influencing international opinion and the policy of foreign governments.”

Throughout this process, Liao Chengzhi was the person under Zhou who was responsible for giving concrete form to Zhou’s evolving vision. Since he was born and partially raised in Tokyo, Liao was fluent in Japanese and well-versed in matters concerning Japan as well as Overseas Chinese affairs. Moreover, considering Liao was the son of KMT revolutionary and Sun Yat-sen confidant Liao Zhongkai and an early member of the CCP, he had an impeccable ideological pedigree. Clearly he was the ideal person to deal with Japanese affairs under Zhou Enlai, and to serve at the Chinese end of the desired “pipe” that Zhou was keen to construct with many influential Japanese. Already in 1952 or 1953 Liao, by then a member of the Central Committee was charged by Zhou Enlai to form a task force of Japan hands, which was to take different shapes until being subsumed

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50 Kurt W. Radtke, *China's Relations with Japan, 1945-83*, 103.
51 For a thorough overview of Zhou Enlai’s activities at the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, see: Ronald C. Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai*, 59-87.
under the Foreign Office of the State Council (国務院外事辦公室) in 1958. He began to connect Japan hands from different departments, for the execution of Japanese affairs. Concretely the Japan Hands were to be engaged in researching Japanese politicians as well as economic and cultural figures, and after 1955 they tried to establish connections with Japanese from all walks of life. Generally they were expected to keep a finger on the Japanese pulse by following the Japanese media, meeting with Japanese visitors and working with and within Chinese groups visiting Japan. Their activities will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 2, and now we will turn the importance of the cultivation of “pipes” among influential Japanese, by looking at two examples.

For finding the right kind of “pipe” or channel on the Japanese side outside of the obvious leftist circles, Zhou Enlai was interested in one person who was willing to move to Beijing and work from there, as well as in politicians in Tokyo on the right, obviously not be the usual allies for a communist regime to have. Yet another “pipe” was cultivated from 1956 onwards with Nakajima Kenzō, who would take charge of cultural exchange between Japan and China and endeavour to widen the reach of the PRC among Japanese intellectuals. His work will be dealt with in great detail in Chapter 3. From the late 1950s through the 1960s this strategy of cultivating “pipes” was to prove highly effective, and maintaining these kinds of channels worked well for the Japanese too. Chalmers Johnson has argued that this was “one of the most skilfully executed foreign policies pursued by Japan in the postwar era,” because it provided a separate backchannel to the mainland while the LDP leadership could continue to “take pro-Taiwan positions in order to placate the Americans.”

**Saionji Kinkazu**

Saionji Kinkazu, born in 1906, hailed from the prominent aristocratic Saionji family and was the grandson (by adoption) of the former Prime Minister, Saionji Kinmochi (西園寺公望 In office 1906-1908 and 1911-1912). Saionji Kinkazu was educated at Oxford and before the war he had been a

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moderate member of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s “Breakfast Club” of advisors. After the war he became a Diet member and peace activist. While his personal beliefs were clearly progressive and leftist, due to his very upper-class background he had plenty of connections in more conservative circles. In the mid-1950s Saionji Kinkazu was stationed at the Geneva office of the World Peace Council; a pro USSR peace organization within which there was a lot of contact between communists and fellow-travellers from different countries. It was in Geneva that Saionji regularly came in contact with many Chinese communists. However, the first connection between Saionji and Liao had already been made in 1952, when he was a delegate to the World Peace Conference in Vienna in December. The Chinese delegation was made up of prominent people such as Song Qingling (宋慶齡) and Guo Moruo (郭沫若), as well as Liao Chengzhi, who probably used the opportunity to discuss the PRC’s Japan policy with the Japanese delegates.\footnote{Kurt W. Radtke, \textit{China's Relations with Japan, 1945-83}, 101.} Here, at their first meeting, Saionji had already expressed a wish to visit China to Liao.\footnote{Saionji Kinkazu, \textit{Saionji Kinkazu Kaikōroku `Sugisari shi, Shōwa’} (Tokyo: IPEC Press, 1991), 305.} During the Hatoyama government in Japan, diplomatic normalization with the USSR had been achieved and with his successor Ishibashi Tanzan stating he sought improved relations with the PRC, many felt a Sino-Japanese rapprochement was but a matter of time. An obvious problem for the Chinese as they worked towards this goal, was that while there were no official relations the lines of communication were also extremely limited. The lack of proper information about Japan made preparation for possible negotiations difficult. It was roughly around this time, late 1956 or early 1957, that Liao Chengzhi approached Saionji in Geneva. Saionji Kinkazu’s son, Saionji Kazuteru, recalls it went like this:

Many changes were happening in Japan. Ishibashi became Prime Minister and the tide was turning in favour of Japan-China diplomatic normalization. Then one day Liao Chengzhi said he had to speak to my father, and they met in Geneva. Liao said he had a message from Premier Zhou Enlai. This is what my father told me.

Diplomatic normalization was imminent, but at the time there were absolutely no
relations between the Japanese and Chinese governments, so they wanted someone
to come to Beijing for preparations. They wanted someone with connections both
in the political and the nongovernmental realms. They really wanted someone to
move to Beijing. And they requested [Saionji] to find someone. Via Liao Chengzhi,
Zhou Enlai entrusted my father to find someone quickly.  

Zhou Enlai had thought deeply about this and had come up with three conditions for the kind of
person he wanted to move to China. Saionji was well connected in pacifist and progressive circles in
Japan, and especially close to politicians like the JSP’s Kazami Akira (風見章), who was particularly
trusted by the Chinese, as we will see in Chapters 2 and 3. This made Saionji a valuable asset in the
search for the kind of person the Chinese were looking for. According to Saionji Kazuteru, Zhou
Enlai’s conditions were for someone

(1) who was not connected to a particular political party and with friends not only
on the left but on the right as well
(2) who had a favourable opinion of the PRC
(3) who was without selfish motives

They requested Saionji to return to Japan in order to find this kind of person. My
father saw this as extremely important and he returned to Japan immediately,
mainly to discuss this with people like Kazami Akira. After many discussion
people suggested that [Saionji] should go himself. My father had not planned this,
and it took a while but in the end it was my father who moved to Beijing… Zhou
Enlai welcomed him and said he could come anytime with his family, and that his
living and security and so on were guaranteed.  

57 Interview by author, Tokyo, January 29, 2014.
58 Ibid.
In fact, Saionji had travelled to Japan from Vienna in March 1957 by way of China. While in Beijing he met Liao Chengzhi again and they discussed the issue further. Then Liao had already asked him directly: “Not just anyone would do. If possible, Mr. Saionji, would you like to come here?” Upon returning to Japan, Saionji sought advice on the future of Sino-Japanese relations from his many prominent contacts with an interest in the PRC, in addition to Kazami he consulted those in the Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA, 日中友好協会), and the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade, (JAPIT, 日本国際貿易促進協会). He described the general reaction as optimistic, and many thought a Sino-Japanese rapprochement was not far away now that diplomatic relations with the USSR had already been normalized. Saionji Kinkazu was in many ways a unique character because he was a leftist with sympathy for the PRC, but from a very upper class background. With his political beliefs quite palatable to the Chinese leadership and his background ensuring wide access, he was the perfect candidate for the role of unofficial ambassador, or “People’s Ambassador,” between the two countries. According to Saionji Kazuteru, Zhou Enlai had taken an interest in Saionji Kinkazu already around the middle of the 1950s, and thought he could play an important role in facilitating diplomatic normalization. Saionji knew that returning to Japan regularly would be hard and that, if he moved to China, he probably had to stay there until diplomatic normalization was achieved. In 1958 he decided to move to Beijing with his family and would stay for twelve years, until 1970.

Saionji Kazuteru, then in his early teens, would have the unique experience of growing up surrounded by families of the Chinese leadership, and the Saionji family was particularly close to the Zhou and Liao families. This gives Saionji Kazuteru a unique insight into Liao Chengzhi’s ideas about Japan:

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60 Ibid, 319, 320.
61 Interview by author, Tokyo, January 29, 2014.
Liao Chengzhi often came over with his whole family to socialize with us, so there was much opportunity to get close. Once Liao told me this: ‘My heart was very conflicted, and I struggled with a dilemma. I was born in Japan and grew up there. I have many friends there. Then during the revolutionary days, and after that when the relations with Japan worsened, it was not easy for me. I cannot say my relationship with Japan was good. So I had these kind of worries.’ It was Zhou Enlai and his wife who understood him, and told him to take care of enlarging the [number of] Japanese friends and the relations with Japan. They told him to deal relations with Japan from now on. I heard this from [Liao] himself. So he regained his focus and engaged wholeheartedly with relations with Japan. Until then he had felt uneasy about it.\[^{63}\]

While the initial recruitment of Saionji Kinkazu to move to Beijing had taken place during a time of unprecedented optimism for achieving Sino-Japanese rapprochement, by the time he actually arrived in Beijing the relations between the two countries had already worsened considerably. Under the Kishi government establishing connections with government figures was much harder than during the Hatoyama era. Less than half a year after Saionji’s arrival in Beijing relations broke down completely due to the “Nagasaki Flag Incident.” But even though Saionji Kinkazu was supposed to lay the groundwork for an imminent rapprochement, when that goal proved elusive Saionji moved seamlessly into a role of “People’s Ambassador.” This meant that he would serve as a channel for communication with various groups of Japanese, especially those from progressive nongovernmental organizations. Other backchannels the Chinese were eager to cultivate were those with favourable elements in the LDP. Saionji Kazuteru:

[Around that time] there was a big change; from a policy pursuing direct negotiations [with the Japanese government] to an ‘accumulation policy’ of

\[^{63}\] Interview by author, Tokyo, January 29, 2014.
nongovernmental exchange. After Kishi came to power, ties were cut and what my father came to do became impossible. Then Zhou Enlai instructed Liao and Saionji, explaining: ‘Unfortunately China has to reconcile itself with the fact that direct talks with the Japanese government are impossible. It is a sudden change, but we must widen nongovernmental exchange for the sake of ‘accumulation,’ and eventually this kind of pressure will have to lead to [ties with] the government. This is the change.’ My father accepted this and after this he worked on ‘accumulation’ of nongovernmental exchange.\(^{64}\)

From the late 1950s Saionji Kinkazu managed a lot of the communication with Japanese nongovernmental groups, largely from his home, which became a hotbed of Sino-Japanese friendship activity. Some communication could be done by phone, but most of it was by mail, via Hong Kong. This made Saionji the man was perhaps best informed on Japanese matters in Beijing, and core members of Liao’s Japan Group like Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian, and Wang Xiaoyun (王曉雲), would often visit his house to hear the latest developments. Saionji Kazuteru recalls:

Directly above them [Sun, Xiao, and Wang] was Liao Chengzhi. And above that Zhou Enlai, that was the line. [Sun, Xiao, and Wang] would come to the house. Because all kind of information arrived at my father’s place. This was information from the trade unions, and all kinds of Japanese organizations. What Zhou Enlai wanted to know about most of all was information about Japanese politics, as well as information about delegations that would visit China. For example, such and such a labour organization would be visiting, what kind of background did this group have, what kind of ideas did the people have. [Sun, Xiao, and Wang] would come to my father’s place to receive this information. If there was anything

\(^{64}\) Ibid.
important they would report it to Liao Chengzhi, and it might be send to Zhou
Enlai.\textsuperscript{65}

Saionji Kinkazu was at the centre of the majority of exchanges that took place between China and
Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, and at most of the meetings described in the next chapters, he was there.
As Ōkoshi Yukio recalls from his experience as correspondent in Beijing in the 1960s; for any
Japanese who wished to visit China, especially those from intellectual circles, contacting either
Nakajima Kenzō or Saionji Kinkazu was the surest route to success.\textsuperscript{66}

**Matsumura Kenzō**

Another target for a “pipe” that could be cultivated by the Chinese was a conservative politician,
preferably from the LDP. In fact several connections were made around the year 1957, and the most
obvious candidate for the job was the previous Prime Minister, Ishibashi Tanzan. These contacts
would eventually lead to Ishibashi’s visit to China in May 1959. In the end though, another LDP
politician was to prove an even more influential connection. Matsumura Kenzō had been a prominent
politician since the pre-war period and he had recently been Education Minister in the Hatoyama
government. His growing involvement from the late 1950s with China was representative of a perhaps
surprisingly pro-PRC attitude among many LDP conservatives. According to Chalmers Johnson, this
strain of thinking among Japanese conservatives can be traced back straight to Yoshida Shigeru, who
in 1952 was in fact opposed to the recognition of the ROC government in Taiwan and tried to resist it
in the face of pressure from the US, to no avail.\textsuperscript{67}

In the mid-1950s, Matsumura Kenzō and Ishibashi Tanzan were close and part of the same
progressive liberal faction within the newly formed LDP, a faction that was led by the latter.
According to Kuwata Kōichirō:

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Interview by author, Tokyo, October 27, 2014.
Until Ishibashi stepped down [as Prime Minister], Ishibashi and Matsumura were part of the same group. When the Ishibashi cabinet was established Matsumura was very enthusiastic, and Ishibashi had indicated that he wanted to develop diplomatic relations with China. They were both politicians and they both knew they needed power to accomplish anything. So when the government was established, they had a great chance. Hatoyama had established Japan-USSR relations, next would be Japan-China. Matsumura also wanted to do it. At first he was planning to enter the cabinet as Minister of Agriculture, but cautious as he was he decided not to and to embark on a trip to Southeast Asian as [Ishibashi’s] special envoy. From this time on Matsumura had set his sights on China. With the establishment of the Ishibashi government he had power on his side and as a politician his resolve to engage with China was strengthened. He had the opinion that to maintain an anti-PRC policy was a bad idea. He had been opposed to Yoshida, his Taiwan policy and support for the US. He was excited about Hatoyama’s negotiations with the USSR.\textsuperscript{68}

Already on the first visit of a delegation from the PRC, the Chinese Red Cross in 1954, Matsumura had met with the Chinese delegation members, including Liao Chengzhi. At the time Matsumura was Secretary-General of the Reform Party (\textit{改革党}). Though this was a routine visit, this contact would eventually evolve into a long collaboration between Matsumura and Liao and the Japan Group.\textsuperscript{69} During the difficult years ahead, Matsumura would become arguably the Japanese politician with the closest link to the Chinese leadership and a high profile advocate of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. A second meeting between Matsumura and a Chinese delegation would take place in November 1955, when Guo Moruo visited with a large delegation of scholars and cultural figures. By this time Matsumura’s interest in Chinese matters had been awakened and he took the initiative to meet with

\textsuperscript{68} Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
\textsuperscript{69} Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, \textit{Liao Chengzhi yu Riben}, 173.
Guo, and invited several people from his network along. Kuwata Kōichirō recalls that “Matsumura called me and Tagawa Seiichi to join him. There were about twenty people there, including Nakajima Kenzō. I believe this was the first time that Matsumura met with high level people from the new China.” Matsumura’s idealistic wish to improve Sino-Japanese relations while Ishibashi was in power was thwarted when Ishibashi had to step down a mere two months after taking office. Not only was Matsumura now once again with power, but also politically he became more isolated because his ties with Ishibashi were also weakened in the process. Kuwata:

Things changed for Matsumura after Ishibashi stepped down and he had no more support from the government. He did not like [leadership contenders] Kishi or Ishii Mitsujirō (石井光次郎), who were of the Taiwan faction. His alliance with Ishibashi was finished. After this he felt that he was alone, there was no one else. Ishibashi’s illness was the turning point. It is my personal impression but with the impossibility to establish diplomatic ties at once, he would engage in a step by step ‘accumulation’ by himself, engaging in diplomacy as a parliamentarian. He wanted to become a ‘pipe’ working for the realization of rapprochement.

The real start of Matsumura’s concrete engagement with China came in late 1957 or early 1958. By this time the Kishi government had been in power for a little under a year and the relations between Japan and China were rapidly deteriorating. The push for more contact with government officials had to be abandoned for the more long-term approach that involved connecting with politicians from the mainstream. Ishibashi Tanzan was a politician who had been on the Chinese radar already from the time before he became Prime Minister. According to Kuwata:

70 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
71 Ibid.
At first, the person who the Chinese had singled out to become a key person with whom they wanted to intensify relations was Ishibashi Tanzan… His liberal stance since before the war had come to the attention of the Chinese. Clearly they wanted to get closer to him and his group, and their influence. At the time they did not focus on Matsumura yet. But around the time the Ishibashi cabinet was established Matsumura had risen to the surface as one of Ishibashi’s inner circle. Until then the Chinese did not know about him I think… They got to know him because of his connection to Ishibashi. Because the Chinese did not know, they asked Miyazaki Ryūsuke (宮崎龍介) if he knew a Japanese politician they could put their trust in. At the time Miyazaki’s secretary, Horiike Tomoji (堀池友治) a businessman from Toyama [like Matsumura Kenzō] suggested Matsumura to Miyazaki. As a result Liao Chengzhi did some research on Matsumura and learned that they had both studied at Waseda University, after which he made contact with Matsumura. Horiike was also a financial backer of Matsumura.  

The first meeting between Liao Chengzhi and Matsumura Kenzō took place in late 1957 or early 1958. From December 5 to January 9 a delegation of the Chinese Red Cross visited Japan; the delegation was full of members of the Japan Group and headed by Liao. As Kuwata describes, Liao requested two of his Japanese confidants, Miyazaki Ryūsuke, a JSP politician who had been close to Sun Yat-sen) and businessman Horiike Tomoji to arrange a meeting with a conservative politician. Miyazaki and Horiike suggested both Ishibashi Tanzan and Matsumura Kenzō, but since the former was still plagued by the health issues that had forced him to resign as Prime Minister a year earlier, they focussed on the latter. A meeting took place in a restaurant in Akasaka, Tokyo, Liao and Matsumura exchanged ideas about the Sino-Japanese relationship and Matsumura’s potential future. 

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72 Ibid.  
role. But at this stage Beijing was still very interested in cultivating the ties with Ishibashi as well as with Matsumura, and logically they would have made quite a good team. So, in all likelihood, Liao Chengzhi in 1958 also saw them as a duo that could work together as his “pipe.” In the end, both politicians were to make important visits to China, but separately. Urged on by China as his health improved slightly in the spring of 1959, Ishibashi invited Matsumura to go together, but the latter declined. Kuwata:

In 1959 Matsumura visited China for the first time in the postwar period. After Ishibashi’s illness, China had shifted its focus from Ishibashi to Matsumura. However, Ishibashi’s health had improved and he then also wanted to visit China. He received an official invitation and suggested to Matsumura to go together. But Matsumura declined. The two men had completely different ideas on the China issue. One difference between the two men was their view on agriculture… But the China issue was an ever bigger difference between them. Ishibashi agreed with the principle of ‘non-separation of politics and economics.’ Communism, socialism, political systems and so on, he did not think these really mattered. So he had no problem with the principle of ‘non-separation of politics and economics.’ Matsumura was different. He believed in the ‘separation of politics and economics.’ Ishibashi was idealistic, Matsumura was pragmatic.

Furukawa Mantarō has argued that since the two were in very different stages of their career, with Ishibashi a retired Elder Statesman free to say what he liked while Matsumura was still heavily involved in LDP factionalism with an eye on the post-Kishi government, Matsumura felt that they were better off pursuing ties with Beijing separately. Both would make important visits to China in 1959. At the end of the year, Matsumura took a large group of Japanese people to China for 40 days

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74 Ibid, 81.
75 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
76 Furukawa Mantarō, Nicchū sengo kankei shi, 174.
and travelled there extensively, and in this period he met Chinese leaders such as Zhou and Liao of course, but also Zhu De (朱德) and Foreign Minister Chen Yi. He was accompanied by several Japan Group members such as Sun Pinghua, Wang Shaoyun and Wu Xuewen.\textsuperscript{77} His efforts are generally seen as essential for the progress that was made in the following years, such as the establishment of mutual Trade Liaison Offices and the exchange of journalists in 1964. There had already been a lot of contact in the 1950s between the Chinese and Japanese politicians, but the connections made with Ishibashi and Matsumura took this to a whole new level. According to Saionji Kinkazu:

After the exchange began in 1952, there had been many ‘friendly’ Japanese who had visited China, but these two were from a totally different background. Ishibashi had been Japan’s Prime Minister for a short time, and Matsumura was very senior in the LDP and the leader of a faction of a small number of people, with a background as a bureaucrat as well. Both of them were real veterans of Japan’s politics.\textsuperscript{78}

The visits Matsumura would make to China in 1959, 1962, and 1964, were pivotal for achieving the breakthroughs that were made in the 1960s, and he is the best example of a “pipe” of the PRC in Japan, and a testimony to the success of this tactic of cultivating Japanese friends. In Chapter 4 the machinations undertaken by Matsumura and his network to achieve the Journalist Exchange will be analysed in detail.

In a simplistic interpretation of history, the year 1958 can only be seen as a detrimental one for Sino-Japanese relations. While China was swept up in the fervour brought on by Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, the little progress that had been made in the previous decade to bring the two countries closer together again was seemingly undone when Beijing broke off all contact following the

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid, 179, 180.

\textsuperscript{78} Saionji Kinkazu, \textit{Saionji Kinkazu Kaikōroku ‘Sugisari shi, Shōwa’}, 338.
Nagasaki Flag Incident in May. Japanese Prime Minister Kishi was the most pro-Taiwan of all Japanese Prime Ministers to date and he won another election in the same month. Yet around this time a process was set in motion that would lead to considerable success in the first half of the 1960s, with the establishment of trade liaison offices and the exchange of journalists. These successes were not just a result of there being a new Japanese Prime Minister but were the fruits of hard labour by people on both sides dedicated to building personal bridges in service of advancing mutual relations, regardless of prevailing political winds. Zhou Enlai’s strategic vision was essential for bringing this about and around the year 1958 he pushed on with the construction of the backchannels that were to prove so vital later on. Of course this was a process that did not start suddenly in 1958, but rather one that took years to take shape and only crystallized around this time. As we will see in the following chapter, the formation of the Japan Group had already started in the early 1950s. Contacts with Japanese willing to work with the Chinese like Saionji, Ishibashi and Matsumura were gradually enhanced, after first meetings in 1952 and 1954. The importance of the cultivation of a “pipe” like this in Zhou’s strategic vision can be surmised by the fact that these efforts continued unabated during the turbulence of the year 1958. It should also be noted that this strategy would prove a perfect fit for the Japanese leadership who could remain in good standing with the US by being pro-Taiwan while condoning expanding contacts with Beijing. These ongoing contacts meant that both sides were well prepared when rapprochement was finally realized in 1972. The “pipe” would continue to be of use until well into the 2000s, by now maintained by different people of course, and the apparent lapse in maintaining such connections among leadership figures in recent years might actually have contributed to the current tensions.
Chapter II- The Japan Group: Managing China’s People’s Diplomacy towards Japan in the 1950s.

A central position in Zhou Enlai’s strategy of People’s Diplomacy was reserved for the Japan Group; an unofficial network of people, drawn from different branches of the Chinese government and the CCP, that was to manage Zhou’s Japan policy from the early 1950s onwards. This group, many of whom had a background in intelligence work, was charged with training the Chinese government’s Japan specialists, managing all interactions with Japanese, as well as with actively cultivating ties with a wide variety of Japanese, especially outside of the usual leftist circles.

This chapter explores the establishment of the Japan Group “mechanism,” particularly in the early years of People’s Diplomacy, a mechanism that was largely in place by the middle of the decade. Most important was the core of the group, made up of a small number of trusted Japan hands, around whom the larger Japan Group, which consisted of others who had dealings with Japan within the government, would coalesce. Since this same core group of people was involved in all interaction with Japanese, they provided the continuity necessary for cultivating the informal personal ties that had to lead to the long-term goal of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. In addition to the establishment and inner workings of the group, this networking process, which transcended the immediate concerns of particular negotiations and exchanges, will be explored.

The central figure in the Japan Group was Liao Chengzhi, and he served as a direct channel between Zhou Enlai and the Japan hands working on People’s Diplomacy. Probably he was considered the person most suited for coordinating Japanese affairs after 1949 because of experience in Japanese matters as well as his impeccable revolutionary credentials and his prominence in communist international front organizations.79 He maintained a large network of acquaintances and friends in Japan from various backgrounds and, as one Japan Group member has pointed out, it was this network that would form the basis for People’s Diplomacy between China and Japan.80

79 Kurt W. Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 1945-83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi, 95.
80 Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben, 120.
The main sources for this chapter have been the numerous publications by those involved in China’s People’s Diplomacy towards Japan, most notably the memoirs of Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian, Zhang Xiangshan, Wu Xuewen, and Zhou Bin. These have been used as sources for this chapter, as well as interviews with surviving members of the Japan Group.

The Origins of the Japan Group

The first group of Japan hands in the CCP had already formed in the communist stronghold in Yanan during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), where there was a sizeable community of Japanese POWs, as well as Japanese communists like the founder of the Japanese Communist Party, Nosaka Sanzō (野坂参三). The CCP leadership strongly emphasized that only the Japanese military leaders and not the ordinary Japanese people were their enemies, and there had been widespread fraternization between the Chinese and Japanese. Nosaka and the many Japanese who had been “converted” to communism were very active in aiding the CCP in the Sino-Japanese war as well as in the later civil war. The responsibility for Japanese Affairs in this period lay with the political section of the Central Military Commission (CMC), headed by Wang Jiaxiang (王稼祥). Under the CMC, Wang had established the “Enemy Army Work Department,” (敵軍工作部) for streamlining policy towards the Japanese enemy, headed by Wang Xuewen (王学文) and Li Chuliang (李初梁), both of whom had studied in Japan and were well-versed in Japanese affairs. Regardless of institutional affiliation, the person among the leadership who encouraged the study of Japan the most was Zhou Enlai, who had studied in Japan briefly in his youth and would continue to take a strong interest in Japan for the rest of his life. As for Nosaka’s activities in Yanan, he is most known for organising

82 Ibid., 511, 512.
85 Shō Közen [Xiao Xiangqian], Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite, 20.
propaganda efforts aimed at the Japanese enemy. From 1940, he also took the lead in the first structural education of the CCP’s Japan hands, with a “Japanese Issues Study Group” (日本問題研究会), mainly for Chinese students who had studied in Japan and wanted to continue their studies. This group can be seen as the first incarnation of the Japan Group. They met every week, studying Japan from a wide variety of angles, and soon its members would produce articles on Japanese issues for dissemination among Chinese communists. Several future diplomats and Japan hands were educated in Yanan, most notably for this article; Zhao Anbo (趙安博) and Wang Xiaoyun (王曉雲), who were to become prominent Japan Group members in the 1950s. In Yanan, Zhao especially was close to Nosaka, often serving as his interpreter, and together they ran the Japanese Workers’ and Peasants’ School (日本工農学校) for the re-education of Japanese POWs and education of Chinese communists in Japanese language, with Nosaka as principal and Zhao and Li Chuliang as vice-principals. Zhao Anbo, before arriving in Yanan, had studied in Japan for three years until 1937, after which he returned to China, joined the CCP, and became active in the Eighth Route Army where he was very welcome because of his Japanese proficiency. He did intelligence work aimed at Japan in the Central Department of Social Affairs (CDSA, 中央社会部), the intelligence and counter-intelligence organ of the CCP that from 1955 would become the Central Investigation Department (中央調査部). Wang Xiaoyun had arrived in Yanan in his late teens and received his Japanese training there under the guidance of Nosaka Sanzō and Zhao Anbo at the Japanese Workers’ and Peasants’ School.

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87 Nosaka Sanzō, Nosaka Sanzō senshu (Senjihen) (Nihon kyōsantō chūōinkai shuppanbu, 1962), 239.
School. From 1951 both Zhao and Wang would work in the International Department of the Central Committee.

After Japan’s defeat in 1945 many of Yanan’s Japan hands, including Zhao Anbo and Wang Xiaoyun, were transferred to the Northeast to manage the large number of Japanese soldiers and civilians that remained in the area. Other communist Japan hands had already been active in that region during the Sino-Japanese war, unconnected to the group in Yanan. Two of these were also to become core members of the Japan Group in the 1950s; Sun Pinghua and Xiao Xiangqian. They were both doing intelligence work in the CDSA. Both Sun and Xiao were from the Northeast and had therefore had been exposed to the Japanese occupation there for many years. Sun Pinghua had worked in the economic department of the Manchukuo puppet government for three years until 1939 and had gone to study in Japan from 1939 to 1943, where he became involved with CCP underground activities, and upon returning to China he joined the CCP and became involved in intelligence activities aimed at the Japanese in Harbin. Xiao Xiangqian had been a student in Japan from 1937 to 1942, where he became involved in Chinese students’ groups opposing the war, and was recruited to return to China and do underground work for the CCP in Shenyang from 1942. His house would soon become a hotbed of anti-Japanese intelligence activity, and by the end of the war Xiao had officially joined the CCP and in the winter of 1946 was hosting the famous spymaster Pan Hannian (潘漢年) who was sent there by the CCP to coordinate underground activity in the Northeast in the Civil War. After 1949 Sun would be officially based at the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) and Xiao at the United Front Work Department and the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA).
In the early 1950s, these two different lineages, from Yanan and the Northeast, would come together under Liao Chengzhi to make up the core of the Japan Group. In later years Zhao, Wang, Sun, and Xiao were often jokingly referred to as Liao’s “Four Great Diamonds”, signifying their high profile in Japanese affairs.\textsuperscript{101} While these four men were the most prominent of those working under Liao on Japan from the 1950s onwards, there was one other prominent Japan hand who deserves mention here. Zhang Xiangshan had also studied in Japan in the 1930s, spent years working in the Eighth Route Army, and from 1951 would be based at the International Department. Zhang was very close to its director Wang Jiaxiang, serving as his secretary.\textsuperscript{102} At the instigation of Foreign Ministry and the International Department, he would take charge of formulating the core principles of Japan policy in 1955 as we will see below, and from then on would play a pivotal role in Sino-Japanese relations, especially leading up to the negotiations for rapprochement in the early 1970s.

Keeping in mind the background of Zhao Anbo, Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian, as well as Liao Chengzhi, in intelligence work aimed at the Japanese during the war, it is surprising that they did not fall victim to the large scale purges in China’s intelligence community of the mid-1950s, ordered by Mao. Especially the many agents who had been in touch with the Japanese during the war became a target, with the most high profile victim being Pan Hannian.\textsuperscript{103} As seen above, Xiao Xiangqian had sheltered Pan in 1946, while Liao had also worked with him in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{104} We can speculate that Liao’s status and proximity to Zhou Enlai, and perhaps the importance of the Japan related work of Liao, Zhao, Sun, and Xiao by the mid-1950s, kept them safe from persecution.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[101]{Wang Junyan, \textit{Zhongri guanxi juejingren}, 183.}
\footnotetext[102]{Ibid., 178.}
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Japan and People’s Diplomacy

After the founding of the PRC in 1949 the Chinese government intended to establish official diplomatic relations with Japan, so the natural thing was for the Foreign Ministry to be in charge of Japanese affairs. Indeed, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, together with prominent figures in the Foreign Ministry like Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu (章漢夫) and Zhang Wentian (張聞天), had held meetings concerning a possible peace treaty with Japan in May 1950. However, due to the intensifying Cold War, official relations with Japan were out of the question for the time being and therefore Japanese affairs gradually came to fall under the responsibility of the International Department of the Central Committee, headed by Wang Jiaxiang. This department was founded in January 1951 to manage relations with foreign communist parties. Notable here is that its two Deputy Directors were Liao Chengzhi and Li Chuliang, both of whom were very experienced Japan hands from the United Front Department, a possible indication of the importance of Japan in the PRC’s foreign policy outlook. With the lack of official recognition of the PRC in this era, People’s Diplomacy became the strategy by which the Chinese government hoped to enhance their ties and influence within non-communist countries, and this was coordinated from the International Department, going beyond the usual scope of inter-party relations. While connections between the Chinese and the Japanese left were strong as one would expect, what was significant about People’s Diplomacy was the much wider network it managed to cultivate. Much more than the Japanese left it was the connection with these non-traditional allies, especially the pro-China conservatives in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that led to major breakthroughs in the 1960s, for example in the realm of trade.

To further the coordination and development of People’s Diplomacy, the Central International Activities Leading Committee (CIALC, 中央國際活動指導委員會) was formed within the International Department on April 24, 1953, with Wang Jiaxiang as head and Liao Chengzhi as

105 Ōsawa Takeshi, “Nihonjin hikiage to Ryō Shōshi,” 53.
106 Ibid., 52, 53.
107 Ibid., 52.
Deputy. Unsurprisingly, an important role for this Committee was to bring nominally nongovernmental exchange under strict control of the Central Committee. The order from (at the time Vice Chairman of the CCP) Liu Shaoqi for the formation of the committee stated clearly:

Concerning the plans for international activities of nongovernmental groups and issues concerning the policy principles, as well as the evaluation of work reports and notable experiences and so on, everything must be carried out under the orders of the Central Committee, or if the [Central International Activities Leading] Committee puts forth a proposal it can be implemented after the Central Committee has ratified it.  

This group, which consisted of people drawn from different departments, was to meet in the International Department office once a fortnight from 1953 to 1958, in order to coordinate the international exchange of nongovernmental groups; with different members responsible for exchange with different parts of the world. In 1958 the group would morph into the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council (国務院外事辦公室) headed by Foreign Minister Chen Yi and with Liao Chengzhi as Deputy. It was under the banner of these institutions that the Japan Group operated.

In reality the activities of the Japan Group were aligned with the guidance and vision of the Chinese leadership because of the connection between Liao Chengzhi and Zhou Enlai, regardless of what Liao and the Japan Group’s institutional affiliation happened to be at any time. This provided continuity in Japanese affairs, for example when the Foreign Ministry, instead of the CIALC, became involved in pushing for official diplomatic relations in 1955 and 1956, and the role of the Japan Group remained central. Already in the middle of May 1952, when a group of three Japanese parliamentarians visited the PRC for the first time, Liao had a meeting with Zhou in which the latter

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110 Ibid.
112 Ōsawa Takeshi, “Nihonjin hikiage to Ryō Shōshi,” 60.
informed him that the Central Committee would entrust Liao with the management of Japanese affairs from now on, and that he could assemble a “Japan Small Group” (日本小組).\textsuperscript{113} There is some doubt as to where most meetings were held; it seems like to a large extent the group was run from Liao’s home while some activities were coordinated from Liao’s office in the Beijing Hotel.\textsuperscript{114,115} Arguably relations with Japan became the most successful example of People’s Diplomacy, with Japanese visitors to China exceeding those from any other nation during the 1950s.\textsuperscript{116} During this decade the number of Japan hands around Liao Chengzhi who managed the contacts grew commensurate with the increasing amount of exchange with Japan. Japan Group member Wu Xuewen summarizes Liao’s vision for the management of Japanese affairs as follows:

For the advancement of People’s Diplomacy, Liao’s core focus was on two things: The first was to form the basic ranks of several cadres who had studied in Japan or knew Japanese, and then to add those responsible for Japanese affairs from the different departments, in order to form a group to work on Japanese affairs and to educate and train them. The second was, through receiving Japanese groups that visited China and through [Chinese] groups that visited Japan, to make a lot of Japanese friends. He himself had many Japanese friends and he wanted [us] to make Japanese friends too.\textsuperscript{117}

The core of the group was to consist of Japan hands like the “Four Great Diamonds” and specialists in other fields added to their meetings when the situation demanded it. Those participating in these meetings came to be referred to as of the Japan Group. While from the mid-1950s the exchange of cultural figures, youth and women’s groups, and so on would become more frequent, in the early

\textsuperscript{113} Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, \textit{Liao Chengzhi yu Riben}, 127.  
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{115} Ō Setsuhei [Wang Xueping], “Ryō Shōshi to Ryōben no tainichi gyōmu tantōsha,” 34.  
\textsuperscript{117} Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, \textit{Liao Chengzhi yu Riben}, 117.
years when the Yoshida government was still in power in Japan, the opportunity for interaction was limited. Two of the main issues that called for negotiation between both countries in this period were those of Sino-Japanese trade and of the repatriation of Japanese still in mainland China (and also of overseas Chinese in Japan who wanted to move to the PRC). The Chinese resolved to use these negotiations as a pretext for meeting and befriending as wide a variety of Japanese as possible. Establishing trade links between the two countries was favoured heavily by the Japanese business community and several “nongovernmental” trade agreements were signed throughout the 1950s. Trade was on the agenda during the first visit of the three Japanese parliamentarians to the PRC in May 1952 and later Japanese delegations for improving trade were to follow in October 1952 and in the autumn of 1953. A large Chinese trade delegation headed by Lei Renmin (雷任民) of the Ministry of Foreign Trade visited Japan in March 1955, after Hatoyama had come to power in Japan. For the visit in May 1952, on the Chinese side the negotiations were led by officials from different government agencies such as the Foreign Ministry, the Chinese People’s Bank and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), who in all haste had formed a “Temporary Japan Affairs Group,” under the guidance of Zhou Enlai in order to prepare for the visit. \(^{118}\) While trade specialists were in charge of the negotiations, Sun Pinghua and Xiao Xiangqian served as interpreters. \(^{119}\) But Sun Pinghua has described how his role, while officially an interpreter, in practise meant he was in charge of “reception” (接待); managing the activities of and interaction with the guests, or as Sun himself describes it: “Eat together, live together, move around together.” \(^{120,121}\) This was a role that would foreshadow the work of the Japan hands in years to come.

The issue of repatriation was dealt with by the Chinese and Japanese Red Cross, but both organizations were basically acting on behalf of their respective governments, blatantly so in the case of the former. In March 1953 a Japanese Red Cross delegation visited Beijing to discuss the issue. Sun Pinghua and Xiao Xiangqian again focussed on “reception,” while Liao Chengzhi led the

\(^{118}\) Shō Kōzen [Xiao Xiangqian], Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite, 15, 16.
\(^{119}\) Ibid., 15-18.
\(^{120}\) Sun Pinghua, Zhongri youhao suixianglu, 5.
\(^{121}\) Son Heika [Sun Pinghua], Chūgoku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko, 78.
negotiations.\textsuperscript{122} This was in place of the head of the Chinese Red Cross, Li Dequan (李徳全), who was said to be ill.\textsuperscript{123} Sun Pinghua at one point saved the day when upon agreeing on the contents of the Joint Communiqué panic had broken out because in the whole of Beijing there seemed to be not one Japanese typewriter, and he took the initiative to write out the contents by hand together with Japanese Marxist Hirano Yoshitarō (平野義太郎).\textsuperscript{124}

In October 1954 a Chinese Red Cross delegation of ten people visited Japan, headed by Li Dequan but with Liao Chengzhi and several other Japan Group members (Zhao Anbo and Xiao Xiangqian among them) making up half the group.\textsuperscript{125} Behind the scenes, these negotiations provided an opportunity for the Japan Group to forge ties transcending the immediate concerns of trade and repatriation. The focus of this article is on these informal interactions and not on the actual outcomes of the negotiations; those are dealt with sufficiently elsewhere.\textsuperscript{126}

With Liao beginning to take centre stage from 1952, a recognizable mechanism for the management of the interaction with Japanese delegations slowly began to take shape. Based on his research in the Chinese Foreign Ministry archives before 2013, Ōsawa Takeshi identifies February 15, 1953 as the first time Liao Chengzhi took the initiative to call a meeting of his Japan hands, together with selected members from different departments, in this case to discuss the repatriation issue in preparation for the coming Japanese Red Cross delegation in March.\textsuperscript{127} He did this in consultation with Zhou Enlai and reported directly to Mao about the results of the meeting.\textsuperscript{128} This mechanism came to be used in dealing with all the numerous Japanese delegations visiting China and Chinese delegations visiting Japan. With the negotiations concerning trade in 1953 and 1954, different trade-related groups and departments would form a “Trade Small Group” (貿易小組) that would then meet with Liao’s Japan hands for preparatory meetings that were always headed by Liao.\textsuperscript{129} An example of the central

\textsuperscript{122} Shō Közen [Xiao Xiangqian], Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite, 22.
\textsuperscript{123} Kurt W. Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 100.
\textsuperscript{124} Son Heika [Sun Pinghua], Chūgoku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko, 85.
\textsuperscript{125} Shō Közen [Xiao Xiangqian], Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite, 39.
\textsuperscript{126} Kurt W. Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 99-125.
\textsuperscript{127} Ōsawa Takeshi, “Nihonjin hikiage to Ryō Shōshi,” 55, 56.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 57.
position the Japan hands already occupied by late 1953 is when the Japanese trade delegation, which was led by Ikeda Masanosuke (池田正之輔) of the Liberal Party (自由党) and consisted of a large group of 23 parliamentarians from different parties, visited to discuss trade in October of that year. Liao had put Zhao Anbo in charge of “reception,” while he himself was to focus on making political connections and Nan Hanchen (南漢宸) of the CCPIT was to focus on the trade talks. But Nan had no less than three Japan hands seconding him; Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian, and Wu Xuewen. Apart from Ikeda, some other Japanese parliamentarians on the delegation were the JSP’s Hoashi Kei, independent Kazami Akira and the Liberal Party’s Matsuda Takehiyo (松田竹千代) who would later become a minister in the Hatoyama and Kishi governments. This was a significant initiative that would continue the pattern for political engagement with China, where the Japanese side would be made up of politicians who opposed their government’s official China policy. As reported by the Asahi Shimbun, before his departure Ikeda criticized the government, saying that the “Yoshida cabinet is exclusively devoted to the interests of the US. A country like Japan needs a broader foreign policy.” The Second Sino-Japanese Nongovernmental Trade Agreement was signed on October 29. Although the delegation’s dealings in China regarding trade were mostly with economic specialists like Nan Hanchen, they also met with leadership figures like Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Peng Zhen (彭真). Interestingly, Liao Chengzhi served as interpreter at the talks with Zhou Enlai; this is a surprising role for a Central Committee member, and Radtke suggests that this was because Zhou wanted him to make an analysis of Ikeda’s behaviour, and in fact Liao was to perform this role frequently at meetings of Mao and Zhou and highly placed Japanese visitors from now on. Liao, with his native level Japanese and many years of experience living in Japan, was of course in an excellent position to perform this task, and he and his group of Japan hands were just beginning to make their mark in this way. Already during the Red Cross negotiations on repatriation Liao had

130. Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben, 149.
131. Ibid.
133. “Shin Niechû bôeki kyôtei no Shôtên,” Asahi Shimbun, 30 October, 1953.
134. Kurt W. Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 103.
135. Ibid.
taken on a leadership role and other members of the Japan Group would do so in other negotiations in years to come. By around 1955 Liao’s network was largely in place; with a core group of Japan hands providing continuity and a collection of specialists in other fields from different departments who would attend group meetings when required.136

**Policy Principles for Japanese Affairs**

The establishment in Japan of the government of Hatayama Ichirō in December 1954 raised hopes in Beijing for a breakthrough in relations and perhaps even diplomatic normalization, because Hatoyama had expressed a wish to improve Sino-Japanese relations. At this moment people in the Chinese Foreign Ministry also began to take more of an interest in the correct management of Japanese affairs and in a correct understanding of the Party line among the Japan hands. Increased interaction meant that the work of China’s Japan hands had to become more streamlined to let these interactions take place in a controlled manner. One of the first tasks of those new to the Japan Group was to acquire a good understanding of what the Japan policy of the CCP and the government actually was. A lot of the education of the group members was therefore aimed at understanding the principles of the Central Committee on Japan, and for this reason they would study the transcripts of any meeting that Zhou Enlai had had with visiting Japanese delegations.137 Originally this had been an idea of Wang Jiaxiang. Wang realized the potential for rapid improvement in Sino-Japanese relations with the incoming Hatoyama government and was aware many Japanese were keen to visit the PRC, a great chance for people-to-people exchange.138 With this in mind he wanted to clarify China’s stance on Japan policy and for that reason he took the initiative to let the Xinhua news agency publish the contents of several recent meetings Zhou Enlai had had with Japanese visiting delegations (one consisting of Diet members and cultural figures in October 1954 and one with business leader Murata

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136 *Wu Xuewen, Fengyu yinqing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuozhe*, 56.
137 Ibid., 57.
Shozo (村田省蔵) in January 1955) in which Zhou had discussed China’s Japan policy in detail.\textsuperscript{139}

Zhang Wentian, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and close confidant of Wang, in turn thought these two talks gave an incomplete picture and he suggested that Wang Jiaxiang should draft a document setting out China’s Japan policy in detail.\textsuperscript{140} With the approval of Zhou Enlai, Wang set out to gather those responsible for Japanese affairs in different departments and after a month the document was drafted and approved by Zhou and the Politburo, on 1 March, 1955.\textsuperscript{141} In this process it was another Japan hand who played an important role, namely Wang Jiaxiang’s secretary Zhang Xiangshan. While somewhat separate from the group around Liao Chengzhi, Zhang Xiangshan was to play an important role in Japanese affairs in the future as the most important Japan specialist in the International Department, first as close associate of Wang Jiaxiang and later serving as an important advisor to both Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping during the diplomatic normalization process in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{142} In early 1955 Zhang Xiangshan was the person most involved with the drafting of this document, it was to be the most complete articulation of the PRC’s Japan policy to date, and it is in his memoirs that he describes the document in detail. The document, called \textit{The CCP Central Committee’s Principles and Plans concerning Policy and Activity towards Japan}\textsuperscript{143} was the first of its kind, and meant for internal circulation.\textsuperscript{144} Though unable to access this document, we can consult Zhang Xiangshan’s memoirs. First of all, the document dealt with these 5 points, quoting Zhang Xiangshan directly:

\begin{enumerate}
\item An analysis of the causes for the downfall of the Yoshida cabinet
\item Differences and similarities in the foreign policy of the Hatoyama and Yoshida cabinets
\item The basic principles of China’s Japan policy
\end{enumerate}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 225, 226.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 226.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Wang Junyan, \textit{Zhongri Guanxi Juejingren}, 179.
\item \textsuperscript{143} In Chinese: 中共中央关于对日政策和对日活动的方针和计划; In Japanese: 中共中央の対日政策活動について方針と計画.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Zhang Xiangshan, \textit{Zhongri Guanxi: Guankui yu Jianzheng}, 226.
\end{enumerate}
4. The principles and plans of [China’s] Japanese policy and activities toward Japan from now

5. Predictions concerning the situation from here on

Zhang then continues, saying that “this was the first document issued by the Party that dealt with Japan policy in its entirety. It dealt not only with foreign policy towards Japan but with the relations with Japan in all aspects. For example it clearly set out the basic principles of the country’s Japan policy.” Which were:

1. Insistence on a withdrawal of the US army from Japan and opposition to the construction of US military bases in Japan.
2. A desire to improve China-Japan relations based on the principles of equality and reciprocity, and to move gradually toward the normalization of diplomatic relations.
3. Gaining the support of the Japanese people; establishing friendship between the Chinese and Japanese people; expressing sympathy for the plight of the Japanese people.
4. Putting pressure on the Japanese government to be independent from the US; we must force the Japanese government to reconsider its relations with China.
5. Indirectly we will try to influence and support the Japanese people’s movement against the US and for Japanese independence, peace and democracy.

This was a clear articulation of the principles behind Chinese engagement with Japan, and the document went on to identify the avenues through which Sino-Japanese relations could be advanced:

1. China-Japan trade

2. Issues regarding fishery

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145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
3. Cultural and friendship exchange

4. Exchange between Chinese and Japanese parliamentarians

5. The issue of those [Japanese] left behind in China and of the Japanese war criminals

6. The issue of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Emphasized here was that the issues of war reparations and conclusion of the war were not to be dealt with at this stage, but rather after diplomatic normalizations had been achieved

7. The work regarding public opinion

Zhang Xiangshan goes on to explain that “concrete plans were drawn up regarding these 7 tasks. In my understanding this document was the first document after 1949 that dealt with all aspects of Japan policy, gaining the approval of the Politburo.” The ideas put forward in this document were an early basis for the Japan hands’ interaction with the Japanese, and were based on how the leadership thought People’s Diplomacy should be conducted. In his training of the Japan hands, Liao Chengzhi urged them to closely follow the vision of Mao and Zhou for how Sino-Japanese relations were to develop, and to act from that understanding using their own words.

**The Recruitment of Young Japan Hands**

From 1952 Liao and the “Four Great Diamonds” started recruiting those with sufficient Japanese ability, as well as specialists in other fields from different parts of the government, a process that would take roughly until 1958 when the Japan Group was placed under the Foreign Affairs Office. Since it was the Japanese speakers who were most influential in terms of establishing continuity in the interaction with Japanese, it is useful to focus their experience in depth.

Realizing that there was a shortage of (ideologically suitable) Japanese speakers readily available, Liao recruited people from different backgrounds, the three main groups being (1) those who had

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147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., 226, 227.
150 Ō Setsuhei [Wang Xueping], “Ryō Shōshi to Ryōben no tainichi gyōmu tantōsha,” 31.
studied in Japan before 1949 or had had their training in Yanan, like the “Four Great Diamonds” and Zhang Xiangshan (2) overseas Chinese who had returned from Japan, and (3) students who had studied Japanese at Chinese universities after 1949.\textsuperscript{151}

Many young members started as interpreters but would gradually take on more various diplomatic tasks related to Japan. Among the interpreters an example of the second group, those drafted from the overseas Chinese community, was Lin Liyun, who was to become an interpreter for the Chinese leadership and served as chief interpreter at the meeting between Mao Zedong and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in 1972. Apart from his Japan-related activities, Liao Chengzhi was very active in overseas Chinese affairs and naturally knew many ethnic Chinese who had moved from Japan after 1949. The Lin family were of Taiwanese descent living in Kobe, and Lin had moved to Beijing in 1952, where she, then 19 years old, enrolled in Peking University to study biology. Her father was active in overseas Chinese affairs in Japan, and in that context he visited China occasionally, where he would meet Liao Chengzhi. It was through Liao’s acquaintance with Lin senior that he met Lin Liyun in 1953. Noticing her fluent Japanese he recruited her on the spot. As she recalls:

\begin{quote}
At the place where my father was having a meeting with Liao I was sitting demurely in the back. Then Liao Chengzhi remarked: ‘Ah, there are girls at Peking University with such an understanding of Japanese?’ At this time there was a shortage of Japanese interpreters, and because Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou were determined to improve Sino-Japanese relations quickly and stimulate people-to-people exchange they were looking for Japanese interpreters. But there were not enough. Then Liao said forcefully: ‘You should leave [Peking University] and quit your studies; we are in need of Japanese interpreters.’ But I liked biology and wanted to study more, so I requested a night to think it over. There were 400 million people in China and I felt [biology] could be of value in people’s lives.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
Thinking it over for one night, I decided that while biology was important, I would work on building friendly relations between China and Japan.\footnote{152}

Most young recruits belonged to the third group however; those who had learned Japanese in China after 1949. Liao and the “Four Great Diamonds” managed to attract many highly talented young people. One example was Wang Xiaoxian (王効賢), who had entered the Japanese department of Peking University in 1951 and had a chance meeting with Sun Pinghua there when he took the three Japanese parliamentarians on a tour of the campus in May 1952; hearing her Japanese he remarked that they were lacking in interpreters, which was the start of Wang’s career. Since this was the first visit of a Japanese delegation after 1949, she notes that “Sino-Japanese friendship and my life as an interpreter started at the same time.”\footnote{153} She would begin work as an interpreter for important delegations from 1953, while still an undergraduate, and from around this time the older Japan hands like Sun and Xiao would not be serving as interpreters anymore but free to focus on “reception.”\footnote{154}

Another important interpreter for the leadership was Zhou Bin, who also came to Liao’s attention because of his Japanese proficiency while still a student at Peking University in the mid 1950s.\footnote{155} He would go on to interpret for the Chinese leadership, most famously at the meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and Japanese Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi in 1972. Recruitment among Japanese speakers was not only aimed at potential interpreters; an example of a journalist who was recruited because of his Japanese ability was Wu Xuewen of the Xinhua news agency, who had studied abroad in Japan and had an intelligence background in the CDSA before 1949.\footnote{156} He was told in his first meeting with Liao Chengzhi that “work on Japan is a long-term affair; be prepared to dedicate your whole life.”\footnote{157} But probably the most famous recruit at the time was Liu Deyou (劉德有). From Liaoning province, he moved to Beijing in 1952 as a graduate in Japanese studies and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{152} Interview by Kato Chihiro, Beijing, August 23, 2014.
  \item \footnote{153} Gifu Shimbun, September 1, 2015.
  \item \footnote{154} Shō Kōzen [Xiao Xiangqian]. Tokoshi no rinkoku to shite, 22.
  \item \footnote{155} Interview by author, Shanghai, August 27, 2014.
  \item \footnote{156} Ishii Akira, “Chūgoku no taigai kankei soshiki,” 143.
  \item \footnote{157} Wu Xuewen, Fengyu yinqing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuoche , 16.
\end{itemize}
would go on to make the Japanese language magazine Jinmin Chūgoku (People’s China, 人民中国) with Liao Chengzhi; spend 15 years in Tokyo as the Xinhua and Guangming Daily correspondent in the 1960s and 1970s; publish numerous studies in China on Japanese language; and finally become Deputy Minister of Culture in the 1980s. 158

The success of People’s Diplomacy from the mid-1950s resulted in an increase in the number of delegations going both ways and this made for a dynamic learning environment for the young Japan hands. An important part of the training of the Japan Group members came through rigorous analysis of the incoming and outgoing visits through reports written by the members detailing the content of their interactions; Liao Chengzhi would then comment and identify where there was room for improvement. 159 Liao also urged them to consult these reports in their future Japan-related work, as a growing body of reference. 160 Wu Xuewen recalls:

Both receiving delegations in China and taking part in delegations to Japan gave me an excellent work background and allowed me to come in contact with different levels of Japanese society, different kinds of people, all kinds of issues, greatly expanding and enriching my understanding of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations. At the time, the receiving of visitors and the visits to Japan created many close ties, strengthening the continuity of the work. 161

Young group members who started as interpreters were encouraged to get involved with various Japan related matters and to develop their skills beyond just the language; Liu Deyou recalls how as a young interpreter a senior Japan Group member told him that “to stay an interpreter forever would be a waste, if you continue your studies you can do all kinds of work.” 162

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158 Interview by author, Beijing, August 25, 2014.
159 Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben, 119.
160 Wu Xuewen, Fengyu yinquing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuozhe, 19.
161 Ibid., 20.
162 Interview by author, Beijing, August 25, 2014.
In his recently published memoirs, Zhou Bin stresses that it was precisely because of the variety of the work of interpreting for various nongovernmental groups, as opposed to interpreting only for Japanese diplomats, that the young interpreters could develop themselves further in all aspects of foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{163} This was also because Zhou Enlai seemed to have a rather unusual vision of the role of an interpreter:

\begin{quote}
[Zhou Enlai] asked of all those working on foreign relations, especially those often working with the leadership as secretaries or interpreters, to not only do a good job but to be like an officer in the military, offering advice and solutions to the leaders. To present their opinions and proposals on various unsettled important issues, both to help the leadership and for their own benefit, in order to correctly make policy and avoid dead ends and mistakes. Premier Zhou emphasized that this would benefit not only their work but also their own development.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

Zhou Bin points out that this made a career as an interpreter often a prelude to a successful career in diplomacy, something which remains common even now, with the last four Foreign Ministers of China (Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇), Li Zhaoxing (李肇星), Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪), Wang Yi (王毅)), as well as many Chinese ambassadors to Japan, all starting their careers as interpreters.\textsuperscript{165}

\textbf{The Japan Group Mechanism and Policy Making}

With the establishment of the Hatoyama cabinet, hopes were raised for a rapid improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. In this new era there was a lot more interaction between both sides, which called for a further streamlining of Japanese affairs management. Wu Xuewen recalls that from 1955 onwards it was a more and more fixed group of people from different government institutions that met

\textsuperscript{163} Zhou Bin, \textit{Wo wei Zhongguo lingdaoren dang fanyi}, 36.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
regularly when called together by Liao. According to Wu, the participants and their official affiliations were

*Foreign Ministry:* [Japan section chief] Chen Ken (陳坑), Ding Min (丁民) and occasionally Han Nianlong (韓念龍)

*International Department:* there were Zhao Anbo, Zhuang Tao (莊濤) and occasionally Zhang Xiangshan

*Ministry of Foreign Trade:* Li Xinnong (李新農), Wu Shudong (呂曙東) and occasionally Lei Renmin

*Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee:* Yang Chunsong (楊春松), Li Guoren (李國仁)

*China Council for the Promotion of International Trade:* Xie Xiaonai (謝筱迺) and occasionally Ji Chaoding (冀朝鼎)

*Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries:* Lin Lin (林林), Sun Pinghua, Jin Sucheng (金蘇城)

*Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs:* Wu Maosun (吳茂蓀), Xiao Xiangqian

*Communist Youth League:* Wen Chi (文遲)

*Federation of Trade Unions:* Chen Yu (陳宇)

*People’s Daily:* Xiao Guang (肖光), Pei Da (裴達), and occasionally the person responsible for international news

*Central Broadcasting Bureau (Asia department):* Zhang Jiming (張紀明), Wu Ketai (吳克泰), and occasionally Wen Jiduo (溫済沢)

*Xinhua News Agency:* Ding Tuo (丁拓), Wu Xuewen and occasionally Deng Gang (鄧崗), Li Bingquan (李炳泉)

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166 Wu Xuewen, *Fengyu yinqing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuozhe*, 55, 56.
Those who participated in the meetings would have a direct connection to the Japan related affairs in their own respective departments, and were responsible for carrying out decisions made by the heads of their departments. The decisions [made in the various departments] were not directly linked to the Japan Group, but via the Japan Group there was a channel with the leadership and the intentions and opinions of the leadership could be communicated quickly, and so the Japanese affairs conducted by the departments received the necessary guidance and authority.\textsuperscript{167}

There is disagreement among participants as to the separation between a “Big Japan Group,” which is basically the framework described above, and a “Small Japan Group” (not to be confused with the “Japan Small Group” mentioned earlier) of those members who were permanently based in the Foreign Office from 1958 and would take care of administrative matters related to the meetings of the Japan Group mechanism, headed first by Yang Zheng (楊正) and then by Wang Xiaoyun.\textsuperscript{168} Both can be seen as part of the Japan Group as generally understood and the confusion is probably due to the fact that the Japan Group was always an informal network with an informal name.\textsuperscript{169} A more useful distinction is between a core Japan Group of Japan hands, and a wider Japan Group, corresponding to Wu Xuewen’s description above, that would include occasional participants like Lei Renmin and Nan Hanchen who were not Japan specialists.

As far as policy making went, there is little doubt it was Zhou Enlai who was the central figure. Xiao Xiangqian maintains that while Mao was concerned mostly with large scale matters, it was Zhou who had direct control over setting out Japan policy and it was around him that those knowledgeable about Japan gathered naturally, a tradition that could be traced back to Yanan.\textsuperscript{170} Other Japan hands confirm this. For example, according to Zhou Bin:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 56.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} Ō Setsuhei [Wang Xueping], “Ryô Shôshi to Ryôben no tainichi gyômu tantôsha,” 32, 33.
  \item \textsuperscript{169} Wu Xuewen, Fengyu yinqing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuozhe, 56.
  \item \textsuperscript{170} Shô Kôzen [Xiao Xiangqian], Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite, 20.
\end{itemize}
All Japanese affairs took place under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, without a doubt. Basically no other leaders were involved. Chen Yi also was not involved. And these were not government-to-government but people-to-people relations. Or sometimes some were ‘half governmental, half civilian.’ We received orders from Premier Zhou and he made the policy decisions. He did however listen to the opinions of many different people.\(^{171}\)

This means that those Japan hands, from Liao Chengzhi on downwards, did not so much set out Japan policy but were to serve as a kind of taskforce and think tank on Japanese matters. The Japan Group mechanism came to facilitate a dynamic process of carrying out orders and drafting proposals. According to Liu Deyou, the process could go via two routes; down-up and up-down:

First, a proposal could be send higher up. For example, Sun Pinghua, or someone of lower rank, could make [policy] proposals to those higher up. Liao Chengzhi would collect [the proposals] and present them to Premier Zhou. Because Premier Zhou would read everything. Second, an order could come down from those higher up; ‘This issue needs to be examined, how can it be solved? Please let everyone look into this.’ The result of our research would again be send higher up. It was this kind of system. It was also possible that Liao would revise something before passing it to Zhou. Or that it was passed on to a group of leaders who would all view it before giving their approval. Possibly something would be discussed at Deputy Minister or Politburo level before a decision was made.\(^{172}\)

Zhou Bin gives an example of how this would work in practise:

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\(^{171}\) Interview by author, Shanghai, August 27, 2014.
\(^{172}\) Interview by author, Beijing, August 25, 2014.
For example there would be an order from Premier Zhou, saying: ‘Please make an analysis of how we should view the Ikeda Cabinet.’ Liao Chengzhi would gather us together and the research on the Ikeda cabinet would begin. We would collect all the statements made in the Diet [by cabinet members], and so forth. We would collect all our work, translate it and make it into a booklet. This would be collected by Liao and presented higher up.173

Wu Xuewen explains:

At first it was Liao who called together those cadres working on Japan from different departments, later the Japan Group gathered people themselves while meetings were still convened under the auspices of Liao. [The meetings would consist of] transmission of information, discussions, research, study of Japan policy and the current situation in Japan; at every meeting there was much to exchange on the subject of Sino-Japanese relations, and every participant would express their own view. After its formation, orders from above could quickly be relayed and messages from below could be quickly reported to the leadership. With this system, decisions at meetings could be quickly put into action; problems that occurred could be dealt with promptly. I feel that this kind of mechanism for dealing with Japanese affairs was extremely strong.174

The Cultivation of a Sino-Japanese Network

In the interactions behind the scenes of the negotiations, Japan Group members were keen to identify those Japanese who were most sympathetic to the PRC and willing to work towards Sino-Japanese rapprochement in the future. One example is when the trade delegation headed by Ikeda Masanosuke

173 Interview by author, Shanghai, August 27, 2014.
174 Wu Xuewen, Fengyu yinqing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuozhe, 55, 56.
visited China in the autumn of 1953, Kazami Akira especially came to the attention of the hosts. At the time Kazami was an independent Diet member (he would later join the Socialist Party), and had been a cabinet member in the Konoe cabinets of the 1930s and 1940s. It was Xiao Xiangqian who had become highly impressed with Kazami’s genuine regret over the suffering caused by Japan in the war and urged Liao to speak with him as well, and Liao and Kazami then struck up a lasting friendship.\textsuperscript{175}

Kazami would promote Sino-Japanese reconciliation and diplomatic normalization in the Diet for the rest of the decade, and was especially active in the restoring of trust between China and Japan after the breakdown of relations in 1958.\textsuperscript{176}

Sometimes specific Japan Group members were urged to focus on specific members in a Japanese delegation and to report whether a visitor was particularly suited as an ally in the future. An example is during the same trade visit in the autumn of 1953, a young Wu Xuewen was instructed by Liao to interact a lot with delegation head Ikeda Masanosuke, Kazami Akira, and Kawakatsu Den (川勝傳) because they, like Wu, had a background in journalism; and to “consult with them with an open mind on various issues” after which he had to report the conversations back to Liao.\textsuperscript{177} On both the 1954 and 1955 Chinese delegation visits to Japan, Wu Xuewen endeavoured to meet Japanese journalists, who then expressed the desire to visit China, as a result of which a large delegation of Japanese journalists visited in August 1955.\textsuperscript{178,179} This visit and its results will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4.

When the Chinese Red Cross delegation headed to Japan in October 1954 it was the first official PRC delegation to visit Japan. Throughout 1954 there had been increasing pressure on the Japanese government to allow a Chinese Red Cross delegation to visit Japan for further negotiations on the repatriation issue. The delegation that had visited China for this purpose in 1953 had extended this invitation. An additional demand was that the Japanese side of the negotiations would again be made

\textsuperscript{175} Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, \textit{Liao Chengzhi yu Riben}, 150.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 261-263.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 150.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 169.
\textsuperscript{179} Wu Xuewen, \textit{Fengyu yinqing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuozhe}, 162.
up not only of the Japanese Red Cross but also of the *Japan-China Friendship Association* and the *Peace Association*; in this way Japan would be drawn increasingly into exchanges with China by a wide variety of people.\(^{180}\) Permission was finally granted in October, and the visit would mark an important moment; as Radtke has pointed out, the presence of the mission in Japan showed the PRC had been successful in increasing tensions within the Japanese government and China policy was now a focus of intra-party dissent.\(^{181}\) The delegation set off on 30 October, and was to be led by Li Dechuan as she was head of the Chinese Red Cross. The delegation was full of Japan hands who should by now be becoming familiar to us, following Xiao Xiangqian’s memoirs: Liao Chengzhi was deputy head of the delegation; Zhao Anbo went as a nominal Red Cross member (and rather vaguely: “responsible for Japanese affairs”); Xiao Xiangqian as delegation secretary (and ‘Japanese affairs manager’); Wu Xuewen as Xinhua journalist; and Wang Xiaoxian served as interpreter despite still being an undergraduate at Peking University.\(^{182}\) From the vague job descriptions of Zhao (“responsible for Japanese affairs”) and Xiao (“Japanese affairs manager”) we can perhaps infer that their tasks were all-encompassing, after all on a trip to Japan there are few things that cannot be categorized as Japanese affairs, so that they were basically managers of the whole enterprise. Radtke points out that both Liao and Zhao were higher in rank than Li Dechuan, a non-party member, and served as the real leaders of the delegation (just like last time when she was supposedly ill), something which is reflected in the final Joint Communiqué on which Li’s signature did not even appear.\(^{183}\) The four Chinese signatories are Liao, Zhao, Xiao and Ji Feng (紀鋒).\(^{184}\) In other words, the Japan Group members were in control of the trip and were going to make full use of the opportunity to do their job; gather as much information and forge as many ties as they could.

Wu Xuewen recalls how Zhou Enlai personally instructed the ten delegation members before departure, impressing upon them the need to “talk only of friendship and nothing else, this must be a

\(^{180}\) Kurt W. Radtke, *China’s Relations with Japan*, 104.

\(^{181}\) Ibid., 105.

\(^{182}\) Shō Kōzen [Xiao Xiangqian], *Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite*, 39.

\(^{183}\) Kurt W. Radtke, *China’s Relations with Japan*, 105.

\(^{184}\) Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, 171.
good beginning and basis for later exchange between China and Japan,” he further instructed them to abide by the principle of “seeking common ground while reserving differences” (求同存異).

The party visited several places in Japan and many people wanted to meet with Liao, and Xiao Xiangqian as secretary of the delegation was in charge of fitting in as many visitors as possible in the limited time left after the negotiations and official dinner receptions had finished. These meetings were with a very large variety of people, most of them unrelated to the repatriation issue that was the official reason for their visit. Lamenting that Japanese evening receptions seemed to be never-ending, Xiao crammed in as many “unofficial” evening meetings as he could. Possibly the most significant unofficial meeting was with the China section chief of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and future first ambassador to China, Ogawa Heishiro (小川平四郎). As this is the only meeting Xiao describes in detail, it is worth quoting:

Ogawa, in front of me and Liao, suddenly said that the Chinese demand that the two groups should be added to the [Japanese] Red Cross delegation for the talks on the repatriation issue, went against international precedent and amounted to an interference in Japanese internal affairs. This statement expressed the diplomatic standpoint [of the Japanese]. The hosts had provided us with only a small space to meet in and we could hardly make out our faces and this took me by surprise. I knew Ogawa was the China section chief and could not be ignored, but we also could not speak frankly. I was seated next to Liao and was not in a position to answer, nor would I have known how to. As to how Liao responded; he did not look at [Ogawa] directly and he also did not answer, but he gave a big smile and laughed. I was impressed with Liao’s attitude and learned from his response.

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186 Shō Kōzen [Xiao Xiangqian], Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite, 40.
187 Ibid., 43.
As far as the negotiations were concerned, the Chinese refused to make any concessions on the issue of repatriation of the Japanese that remained in China. But this made no dent in the public relations success that this trip had become because the contents of the negotiations were secret.  

In the long run, Liao’s focus was on mainstream or rightwing politicians, and they would prove to be the most valuable assets for China in achieving their goal of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Wu Xuewen recalls:

[Liao Chengzhi] not only made progressive friends; he cared more about making friends with those of the center or center-right, or with anti-communist rightwingers as long as they were not anti-PRC, thereby isolating the diehard right-wingers.  

One example of a group of conservative politicians that the Chinese saw as potential allies were those in the Reform Party, formed in 1952. This short-lived conservative party advocated a more independent foreign policy, and its members would go on to various powerful positions while often continuing to represent a pro-PRC stance in the Japanese political establishment. The party would merge into the new Japan Democratic Party under Hatoyama Ichirō in November 1954, a party that would again merge into the LDP in November 1955. Three promising young Reform Party parliamentarians had visited China for the October 1 celebrations in 1954 and met with Zhou Enlai. They had met Liao Chengzhi at the Stockholm Peace Conference in September and were invited to visit China on the way back. They were future Foreign and International Trade Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio (桜内義雄), who would play a very important role in the promotion of Sino-Japanese trade; future Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (中曽根康弘); and future Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao

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188 Kurt W. Radtke, *China's Relations with Japan*, 106.
190 Son Heika [Sun Pinghua], *Chūgoku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko*, 87.
(園田直), who would be one of the signatories of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1978. \(^{191}\) The Chinese Red Cross delegation was to visit Japan later the same month as discussed earlier, and the ties with the Reform Party were strengthened further in Japan with several of their politicians visiting Liao to discuss their party’s ideas about Sino-Japanese trade and diplomatic normalization, and the need to change Japan’s relations with the US. Instrumental in arranging this meeting was Sonoda Sunao, who now introduced his fellow party members; the future Prime Minister Miki Takeo (三木武夫), and Kitamura Tokutarō (北村徳太郎) who was very active in the promotion of trade between Japan and the countries of the communist bloc. \(^{192}\) But by far the most important visit was by Matsumura Kenzō, then Secretary-General of the Reform Party. Though this was not more than a routine visit representing his party, it would eventually lead to a long collaboration between Matsumura and Liao and the Japan Group. \(^{193}\) During the difficult years ahead, Matsumura would become arguably the Japanese politician with the closest link to the Chinese leadership and a high profile advocate of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Also during this trip, former Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu (片山哲), who had been the first (and last) Socialist Party Prime Minister of Japan in the 1940s, paid the delegation a visit. He would visit China a year later and go on to play an important role in the promotion of cultural exchange between the two countries. \(^{194}\) Fujita Tōtarō (藤田藤太郎), leader of Japan’s largest trade union Sōhyō (総評) came to see Liao several times with other Sōhyō leaders. \(^{195}\) Sōhyō was later to play a vital role in re-establishing contact after the breaking off of all relations in May 1958. \(^{196}\)

Change was in the air in late 1954 since in December the new government of Hatoyama Ichiro took office, raising the possibility of a much more independent Japanese foreign policy. In the same month Murata Shozo, who had met the delegation in October, set up the Sino-Japanese Import-Export Association, which was in fact a front organization of the Ministry of Trade, and in January he would

\(^{191}\) Ibid.  
\(^{193}\) Ibid.  
\(^{194}\) Ibid., 174.  
\(^{195}\) Ibid., 169.  
visit the PRC.\footnote{Kurt W. Radtke, \textit{China's Relations with Japan}, 105, 106.} Also in December the Japanese government approved a PRC trade mission’s visit to Japan, to negotiate a Third Sino-Japanese Nongovernmental Trade Agreement.\footnote{Ibid., 106.} In 1955 the most important developments in Sino-Japanese relations were the signing of an agreement on fisheries in April and a new trade agreement signed in May, as well as many interactions between the two sides at the Bandung Conference in April. The PRC trade mission, headed by Lei Renmin, visited Japan in March 29, there was much hope on the Chinese side that with the new Japanese government in place, important ties with government figures could now be forged. Although Liao would be absent because he was set to accompany Zhou Enlai to the Bandung Conference in April, he still took charge of preparation. He assembled all those preparing for the visit, to research the new opportunities under the Hatoyama government in general and for trade in particular.\footnote{Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, \textit{Liao Chengzhi yu Riben}, 192.} The view was that the previous two trade agreements were limited by the lack of cooperation from the Japanese government and therefore it was essential to now let the Japanese government take more responsibility, so that Sino-Japanese trade could move to a higher level.\footnote{Ibid., 192, 193.} According to Sun Pinghua:

> The Chinese side took extremely serious a strategy where the delegation was to craft relations on a government level, in order to achieve a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relations. The delegation members had name-cards on which both their government rank and their nongovernmental position was stated, with the former listed first.\footnote{Son Heika [Sun Pinghua], \textit{Chūgoku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko}, 88.}

Already the ties between the Japan hands and Japanese politicians proved useful when the Japanese Ministry of Justice unexpectedly presented the delegation with a contract to be signed which demanded that the Chinese guests would refrain from any political activities. Unacceptable to the Chinese, it was Sonoda Sunao who had visited Beijing the previous year and was now parliamentary Deputy Minister...
of Foreign Affairs who managed to diffuse the situation. Another indication of just how much progress had been made and how much the atmosphere had changed under Hatoyama was the extent to which the delegation was able to interact with figures close to the centre of power. To widen the interaction with government officials this time, Liao had entrusted Sun Pinghua, deputy secretary of the delegation, to coordinate the cultivation of friendship connections on this trip. Using Liao’s connections, Sun managed to arrange a large meeting with many government officials and other politicians, in the famous restaurant Happō-en (八芳園) in Tokyo, most notably; future Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan, then Minister of International Trade and Industry; Takasaki Tatsunosuke who headed the government’s Economic Planning Agency (経済企画庁); and future Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, then Secretary-General of the Japan Democratic Party. From the late 1950s Ishibashi would become one of the leading advocates in Japan for Sino-Japanese rapprochement and visit China several times. Takasaki would become instrumental in advancing trade relations, especially in the 1960s with the establishment of the LT (Liao-Takasaki) Trade organization which led to the establishment of permanent trade liaison offices in both countries in 1964. Kishi however, during his tenure as Prime Minister from 1957 to 1960 would oversee a major deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. In fact, Kishi and Sun Pinghua’s paths had already crossed once years before when both of them lived in the Manchukuo puppet state:

Kishi said that he remembered me from my days as undersecretary for tax and tariffs at the Ministry of Economics in Manchuria. This was the first time we were in close proximity however, and Kishi would not bring up Manchuria again.

One more incident that illustrates the usefulness of Japanese friends reaching high places after having hosted them in China occurred when the Chinese delegation had to send an urgent encrypted
message to China. Never before or after would the Japanese allow this, but at this moment Matsuda Takechiyo, who had visited China two years earlier on Ikeda’s trade mission, had become Minister of Post and Telecommunications and he granted them the rare favour.\(^{206}\) The Third Sino-Japanese Nongovernmental Trade Agreement was signed on May 4 and the delegation had made important strides in their goal of making connections.

Right after the Happō-en meeting Takasaki would travel to Bandung, where he was representing the Japanese government at the Bandung Conference. It was at China’s suggestion that the Japanese were invited at all and both sides were keen to exchange views.\(^{207}\) For this purpose Japan Group member Yang Zheng had been added to the Chinese delegation, while Liao Chengzhi and Xiao Xiangqian were also present.\(^{208}\) For Xiao Xiangqian the meetings with the Japanese delegates were also memorable because of his reunion with Okada Akira (岡田晃), the new China section chief of the Foreign Ministry who served here as interpreter, and who had been a fellow student of Xiao in Shanghai in the 1940s.\(^{209}\) An important part of the new trade agreement was the decision to allow trade fairs in each other’s countries and it was Xiao Xiangqian who went to Japan to prepare for this with a small delegation in September. Most delegation members were trade specialists with Xiao the only Japan hand, in charge of “propaganda and public relations.” While they were in Japan preparing the trade fair, the delegation received a lot of help from Ishibashi and Takasaki, something that Xiao explains by the goodwill of these two after their recent meetings with Lei Renmin and Zhou Enlai.\(^{210}\) So despite the trade fair being a result of a nominally non-governmental trade agreement, the Japanese government under Hatoyama was clearly becoming more and more involved in Sino-Japanese exchange.

\(^{206}\) Ibid.
\(^{208}\) Ibid., 187.
\(^{209}\) Shō Kōzen [Xiao Xiangqian], *Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite*, 52.
\(^{210}\) Ibid., 54.
After the Chinese delegations to Japan and to Bandung had returned home, the Japan Group met and discussed the results of the visits. As Sun Pinghua recalls, the general sentiment was that

Since we missed out on a meeting with Prime Minister Hatoyama, the delegation’s goal to establish contact with government officials was somewhat unsuccessful but the delegation met with many friends and with many professionals who would exert themselves for years in the work of [promoting] friendship between China and Japan.\textsuperscript{211}

Mainly because of Chinese frustration over the lack of progress in establishing official relations, the relationship deteriorated from the summer of 1955 onwards.\textsuperscript{212} And except for the interlude of the Ishibashi cabinet (December 1956-January 1957), when rapprochement had briefly seemed a possibility, things were to get a lot worse with the establishment of the Kishi government in February 1957. A complete breakdown in relations took place in May 1958 with the Nagasaki Flag Incident, after which the Chinese government broke off contact completely. While the latter half of the 1950s was therefore a bleak period in terms of official relations, the Chinese leadership in fact doubled down on People’s Diplomacy;\textsuperscript{213} using the mechanism they had put in place to continue cultivating their channels with influential Japanese, not least in the newly formed government party LDP. The Japan Group would hold many meetings analysing the workings of the Kishi cabinet, and Liao Chengzhi emphasized there were still members in the cabinet that China could potentially work with.\textsuperscript{214} But inevitably the focus had to shift to those politicians in the LDP opposed to Kishi, as well as to Japanese nongovernmental groups who were opposed to the Kishi government.

When the Chinese Red Cross delegation visited Japan for the second time in December 1957, they did so with even more core Japan Group members than usual (Liao Chengzhi, all the “Four Great

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{211} Son Heika [Sun Pinghua], \textit{Chūgoku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko}, 91.
  \item\textsuperscript{212} Kurt W. Radtke, \textit{China’s Relations with Japan}, 116.
  \item\textsuperscript{213} Ōsawa Takeshi, “Nihonjin hikiage to Ryō Shōshi,” 60.
  \item\textsuperscript{214} Wu Xuewen, \textit{Fengyu yinqing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuozhe}, 62, 63.
\end{itemize}
This was the second visit of the Chinese Red Cross and despite the unfavourable new situation under the Kishi government, the delegation members strove to continue building on ties already made. While the first visit was about making friends widely and entering a new phase, the second visit was about using that base to make a substantial step forward, in order to advance Sino-Japanese friendship in a more broad, more deep, and more dynamic direction. The common view of the Chinese and Japanese peoples was that for the development of Sino-Japanese friendship the two aspects of strengthening Sino-Japanese exchange and firmly opposing Kishi Nobusuke’s anti-China policy were both indispensable.

The last sentence makes clear that the Chinese now saw a need to invest in ties with a wide net of Japanese progressives. This is a change from the focus of for example the trade delegation of Lei Renmin that visited Japan in 1955, that was focussed on engaging government officials as much as possible, with the idea that rapprochement under Hatoyama was a distinct possibility. Apart from building ties with nongovernmental groups, Liao Chengzhi wanted to meet with pro-PRC politicians in the LDP. As described in Chapter 1, Liao consulted some of his closest associates in Japan, Miyazaki Ryūsuke (宮崎龍介) and Horiike Tomoji (堀池友治), about which conservative politician to focus on as a long-term ally. Although one option was Ishibashi Tanzan, who would indeed go on to visit China twice, considering Ishibashi’s ill health and semi-retirement from politics, it was suggested to Liao that he befriend Matsumura Kenzō. In late December or early January the two then had a fateful meeting in a restaurant in Akasaka in Tokyo, to discuss their future work on improving Sino-Japanese relations. In fact, another Matsumura associate, businessman Okazaki Kaheita (岡崎

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216 Ibid., 183.
218 Ibid., 80, 81.
嘉平太) also sought out the delegation. Xiao Xiangqian, in his memorable conversation with Kazami Akira in 1953, had been urged by Kazami to keep the name Okazaki in mind as the latter would be a valuable asset for improving Sino-Japanese relations, something he was very interested in. This time he visited Xiao in his hotel and the two had a long conversation about Sino-Japanese trade.\textsuperscript{219} Okazaki would accompany Matsumura on several trips to China and play an important role in the establishment of LT trade.

These types of new political connections were the way of the future, combined with more interaction with Japanese nongovernmental organizations. The need to focus on a wider variety of sectors in which ties could be cultivated, often with seemingly less political overtones was an aspect of People’s Diplomacy that had already come in vogue from the mid-1950s. Wu Xuewen describes:

\begin{quote}
The idea of the Japan Group was for all kinds of organizations to invite Japanese parliamentarians, business people, from culture and the arts, to encourage mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples and a good working relationship; this was needed to develop [the relations] in a broader and deeper direction and to increase the substance.\textsuperscript{220}
\end{quote}

In meetings evaluating the state of affairs in Sino-Japanese relations in 1955, the Japan Group decided that developing cultural exchange had to be a priority from 1956 onwards.\textsuperscript{221} To this end former Prime Minister Katayama visited Beijing in 1955, signing an \textit{Agreement on Japanese-Chinese Cultural Exchange} on November 27, which would lead to the establishment in Japan of the \textit{Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange} the following year.\textsuperscript{222} On cultural visits to Japan usually there would be one or more accompanying Japan Group member, for example on the trailblazing visit to Japan of Peking Opera legend Mei Langfang in May 1956, when Sun Pinghua accompanied him.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{219} Shō Kōzen [Xiao Xiangqian], \textit{Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite}, 68, 69.
\textsuperscript{220} Wu Xuewen, \textit{Fengyu yinqing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuozhe}, 59.
\textsuperscript{221} Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, \textit{Liao Chengzhi yu Riben}, 227.
\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Nicchū Bunka Kōryū} No. 716 (March 23, 2006): p.4.
\textsuperscript{223} Sun Pinghua, \textit{Zhongri youhao suixianglu}, 31-33.
This was not only for the sake of providing continuity in people-to-people exchange, but also because a battle-hardened veteran like Sun was needed to shield high-profile delegations like this both from harassment by Japanese right-wingers, as well as from overtures by GMD agents who sometimes tried to entice visitors from the PRC to defect.\textsuperscript{224} In Chapter 3 the JCACE will be discussed in detail.

While the numerous nongovernmental exchanges served the purpose of promoting a favourable image of the PRC in Japan and generally increasing China’s leverage, these kind of delegations also served as a convenient cover to send one of the Japan Group members to Japan to engage in semi-official negotiations while remaining somewhat under the radar.

The Japan hand who was employed like this most frequently was Sun Pinghua. On several occasions he was sent to Japan for meetings with political figures, often in preparation for breakthrough visits by people like Takasaki and Matsumura to China. For example, with the ongoing talks concerning LT Trade the Chinese sent Sun to Japan July 1962, as part of a Chinese delegation of Go players. The Chinese leadership took his mission very seriously, and Sun was instructed personally by Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi before his departure. Sun Pinghua:

\begin{quote}
Before leaving, I met Premier Zhou and Deputy Premier Chen Yi [and Zhou] instructed me like this: ‘If possible, meet with Matsumura and Takasaki in Japan; convey the regards of me and Deputy Premier Chen Yi, and convey that they are welcome to come to China to exchange our opinions on both the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations and the long-term development of trade.’ And concretely he added: ‘You are going with the delegation and apart from their activities you will have to do your own, but when doing these two tasks you must approach the latter in a natural way and not force it.’\textsuperscript{226}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{225} Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, \textit{Liao Chengzhi yu Riben}, 227, 228.
\textsuperscript{226} Son Heika [Sun Pinghua], \textit{Chūgoku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko}, 105, 106.
Basically Zhou Enlai is instructing Sun Pinghua to not attract attention and move around in a non-obtrusive way. Sun points out that this was easy because on previous visits of both Matsumura and Takasaki he had been “in charge of their reception and had accompanied them the whole time, so meeting the two of them in Tokyo was the natural thing to do, as Premier Zhou had thought.” Upon returning to China, Sun Pinghua rushed to the CCP leadership summer retreat of Beidahe (北戴河) to inform Zhou. The result was Matsumura’s visit with several associates in September and Takasaki’s visit with a large business delegation in October 1962. Needless to say, the fact that Sun Pinghua was not able to play Go had not impeded the mission. During the same period of intense negotiations concerning both trade and an exchange of journalists three Japan hands would be send to Japan again, when Matsumura and Liao decided a delegation of Chinese orchid specialists should visit Japan in April 1963. Matsumura was an orchid lover but the real reason for sending the five specialists from southern China was so that Sun Pinghua, Wang Xiaoyun and Wang Xiaoxian could come along to serve as, as Sun put it: “Orchid Envoys.” In Japan they met many important people from the business world, as well as the government. Sun had secret meetings with the Foreign Ministry’s China section head Hara Fujio (原富士雄) and Construction Minister Kōno Ichirō (河野一郎), the latter meeting set up by old friend Sonoda Sunao. The fact that Sonoda Sunao, who first visited China in 1954 with the small group from the Reform Party and had met with the Japan hands several times since, arranged the meeting is just one of the many examples of how much the Sino-Japanese network crafted by Liao Chengzhi had widened by now, and how effective it was in serving as a base from which ever more connections could be made. During the Ikeda era, interaction that was “half governmental half civilian” became more common and this was an important step towards the ultimate goal of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. About his secret meetings with Haru and Kōno in 1962, Sun Pinghua remarks that:

227 Ibid., 106.
229 Ibid., 111-115.
These two meetings were my first experience of unofficial interaction with government representatives. This kind of unofficial interaction would become more and more common from this time on. Interaction with government authorities was China’s original goal when going ahead with Sino-Japanese People-to-People Diplomacy.  

The outcome of these meetings will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3. These were not the only instances when Sun Pinghua was sent to Japan as secret envoy, and the probably the most famous case was in the summer of 1972 when he was added to the delegation of the Shanghai Ballet Troupe to Japan, in order to discuss a possible Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization with the Japanese leadership.  

One more organization that deserves mention in connection with the Japan Group is the China-Japan Friendship Association (CJFA, 中日友好协会), founded on October 3, 1963. This is much later than its Japanese counterpart (founded in 1950, as will be discussed in Chapter 3), and it was a result of the rapid increase in people-to-people interaction during the Ikeda years. According to Sun Pinghua the Chinese had resisted the creation of such an association because of the anti-China policies of successive Japanese governments.  

It was a new vehicle for Liao Chengzhi and the Japan hands to unify and coordinate Chinese nongovernmental “friendship” activity with Japan, but in reality it did not signal a shift in how things were run and the main aims and basic principles regarding nongovernmental contact remained in place. Its aim was mainly to serve as a bridge between those working with Japan and groups in China that might be interested in exchange with Japan. Xiao Xiangqian describes the association as “bringing together those in the frontline of Japan-related work with academics, cultural figures, and nongovernmental associations in Beijing. There were basically no other foreign friendship organizations [in China] were such a colourful collection of people would

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230 Ibid., 114.  
231 Ibid., 136-144.  
232 Ibid., 118.
be assembled.”

Its head was Liao Chengzhi, Zhao Anbo the secretary with Sin Pinghua and Wang Xiaoyun as assistant secretaries.

The highly experienced and well-trained Japan hands were able to take on a variety of roles, as the situation demanded; interpreter, analyst, policy wonk, journalist, host and guest, friend and spy. Generally they were fiercely loyal to the government’s aims, and devoted to facilitating and embodying Zhou Enlai’s vision of a People’s Diplomacy. Their legacy consists of their contribution to establishing a much needed bridge between the two neighbouring countries. By the mid-1950s a recognizable mechanism for the management of Japanese affairs, centred on the Zhou Enlai-Liao Chengzhi axis, was in place. By the time relations reached their first low point in May 1958, the Japan Group had succeeded in crafting an informal network linking both countries that could keep pushing towards the long-term goal of Sino-Japanese rapprochement, regardless of the prevailing political winds of the day. Through a strategic cultivation of ties with non-traditional allies like Matsumura Kenzō, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Ishibashi Tanzan, various cultural figures, and so on, the Chinese government was able to wield a certain degree of influence on the Japanese political establishment and public opinion. In the 1960s, the network would achieve an establishment of trade liaison offices in both countries, as well as an exchange of journalists. Chapter 3 will be a case study of one aspect of People’s Diplomacy, namely the cultivation of ties with Japanese cultural figures, a “pipe” that became important for broadening Chinese influence in Japan from the 1950s onwards.

233 Shō Kōzen [Xiao Xiangqian], Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite, 115.
Key to Zhou Enlai’s People’s Diplomacy was to establish stronger people-to-people contact aimed at the long term and transcending the immediate concern at hand. One avenue particularly suited to this was cultural exchange. Contact between cultural figures was a way to expand Chinese influence among a broad section of Japanese society also outside of leftist circles. This would ideally lead to more favourable views of China among the Japanese intelligentsia, thereby enhancing China’s soft power and paving the road towards eventual diplomatic normalization. The political importance of cultural diplomacy is hard to quantify since it is often the personal interaction itself that is the aim, more than an immediate political issue that the different parties try to resolve. William Prendergast has argued that this has frequently led policy makers and the general public to “consider cultural relations as an aspect of foreign policy which is an ineffective or harmless instrument with relevance primarily to small culturally attentive segments of the foreign and domestic population.”

In this chapter I will argue that in the context of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s and 1960s, with limited channels for interaction and a relatively small elite that got to interact with the other side at all, cultural interaction was a particularly effective channel for the broadening of people-to-people ties central to Zhou Enlai’s People’s Diplomacy. According to Prendergast, “cultural relations have instrumental value for foreign policy as well as symbolic and expressive utility for domestic politics”; and while the latter use of cultural relations might be less obvious in this context, especially for the Chinese government increased exchange with “Japanese friends” could indeed help to soften Japan’s image among the Chinese, something that was politically expedient. The focus will be on Nakajima Kenzō, one of the most important “pipes” of the Chinese in Japan and who, as the leader of the Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange (JCACE, 日本中国文化交流協会)

235 Ibid.
was the key person responsible for cultural relations within People’s Diplomacy. More than just managing cultural exchanges, Nakajima arguably became the leading figure of all the Japanese pro-PRC nongovernmental groups. Emphasis will be on the political position of Nakajima within the Sino-Japanese nongovernmental framework of this period, and on how he used his position to advance the cause of rapprochement while arguing for genuine Japanese repentance regarding the war. The story of the JCACE and Nakajima will be reconstructed using Nakajima’s writings; memoirs of Chinese Japan hands; Japanese and Chinese newspapers of the time; and an interview with Satō Junko (佐藤純子), a close associate of Nakajima’s who worked for the JCACE for 53 years from 1957 to 2010.

**Japanese Progressive Networks in the early 1950s**

Among progressive Japanese intellectuals in the 1950s there was widespread sympathy for the new Chinese government, as well as aversion to the U.S. government after they pressured the Japanese government to forego ties with the PRC in favour of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan in 1952. According to Yinan He, many progressives “believed that frankly acknowledging Japan’s war responsibility and genuine soul-searching were indispensible steps if postwar Japan was to reject the antidemocratic prewar politics and prevent the resurgence of militarism and a repetition of tragic history.”236 Beliefs like this lend a particular urgency to the need to normalize relations between Japan and the PRC, and formally end the war. With Japan becoming ever more locked in on the American side of the Cold War conflict, this led to the formation of several political groups from the late 1940s to the mid 1950s that attempted to mobilize segments of the mainstream intelligentsia to reverse the conservative and pro-US direction of the government, and sometimes support the PRC more openly. One factor exacerbating this polarizing process was the Treaty of Taipei of April 1952, whereby Japan officially established relations with the ROC instead of the PRC, thereby mobilizing certain segments of the mainstream intelligentsia to support the PRC more openly.

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236 He, Yinan, *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 128.
The advent of the Cold War led to a debate in Japan about whether the country should rearm, as well as to what extent Japan should follow US foreign policy. These questions were unresolved by the time Japan became formally independent from the US in 1952, leading to a polarization among intellectuals. Many of those on the progressive side of the spectrum were not necessarily radical leftists. When during the period of occupation the authorities had turned against the labour movement as part of the so-called “reverse course,” this had alienated not only the communists but many moderate liberals as well.²³⁷ By the late 1940s and early 1950s, the idea of Japanese neutrality in the Cold War, as well as of a comprehensive peace treaty (全面講和) that included not only the west but the USSR and China as well, had gained traction among intellectuals. On April 26, 1950 a large group of opposition politicians united in the Opposition Parties’ Conference for Foreign Policy (野党外交対策協議会) and released a statement calling for “peace, permanent neutrality, and a comprehensive peace treaty.”²³⁸

One broad progressive organization that was founded in 1952 was the Nichiyō Club (日曜クラブ, “Sunday Club”); it attracted many mainstream intellectuals and still exists today. Founded to facilitate the gathering of those interested in politics to hold lectures and exchange views without affiliation to any political party, it was more a networking club than an activist group, but many members would have central roles in progressive nongovernmental associations in the decades to come. The Nichiyō Club was the result of a coming together of three intellectuals in the autumn of 1952; Kazami Akira, Saionji Kinkazu, and Nakajima Kenzō. Soon joined by Kitamura Tokutarō and Sugawara Tsūsai (菅原通濟), the five founded the club on December 20, 1952.²³⁹ While Kitamura would work for the improvement of Japan’s relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe, Saionji and Nakajima were to focus on China, with Kazami active on both fronts. Other early Nichiyō Club members who would play a central role in People’s Diplomacy with the PRC were former Prime

²³⁷ Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation, 124.
²³⁸ Nihon Chūgoku yūkō kyōkai, Nicchū yūkō undōshi (Tokyo: Seinen shuppansha, 1980), 42.
Minister Katayama Tetsu and Shirato Norio (白土吾夫), both of whom would become leaders of the JCACE.

A different lineage of activists from those in the Nichiyō Club consisted of those who had founded the Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA) on October 1, 1950, the first anniversary of the PRC. This group had started meeting soon after the PRC was founded; meetings that were officially preparatory meetings for the founding of the association. The JCFA wanted to promote peaceful coexistence between the two countries and offer genuine repentance for the occupation of China. The association aspired to be an overarching group that, while striving for abstract goals like friendship and peace between the two countries, would pursue ties with China in a concrete number of areas, including Overseas Chinese affairs, promotion of trade and cultural exchange. They wanted to be a broad movement of politicians, trade unionists, academics, cultural figures, businessmen, and so forth. It managed to attract a wide range of politicians, and boasted conservatives like the Liberal Party’s Mizuta Mikio (水田三喜男) and progressives like former Katayama cabinet member Wada Hirō (和田博雄). Despite these promising beginnings, the timing of its founding was not on the JCFA’s side as Douglas MacArthur launched his “Red Purge” among communists in Japan in July 1950; ordering Prime Minister Yoshida to cleanse Communist Party members from public office. Even before it was an official organization, the meetings of what would become the JCFA came under suspicion, and it almost immediately got labelled as a “red” organization by the media. The most withering attack on the group came from the Mainichi Shimbun that on July 17, 1950 published an article describing one of the meetings of the group, accusing them of forming a spy network aligned with the USSR-controlled Cominform. This way the name JCFA became associated with communism from the start, despite some immediate damage control by the association. One of the prominent intellectuals associated with JCFA, author Toyoshima Yoshio (豊島与志雄), managed to 

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240 Nihon Chūgoku yūkō kyōkai, Nichū yūkō undōshi, 36.
241 Furukawa Mantarō, Nichū sengo kankei shi, 31.
242 “Nihon kakumei ni odoru supai mou” [The spy network creating Japan’s revolution], Mainichi Shimbun, July 17, 1950.
publish a response in the same newspaper nine days later, calling the accusation groundless.\(^{243}\) While some JCP members were in fact involved with the JCFA, overall this portrayal was unfair, but ironically this association with the radical left in people’s minds would lead to it becoming such an organization due to moderates leaving, and in the coming years the JCFA would indeed come to be dominated by the JCP and the JSP.

Regardless of whether the JCFA had the ambition to be the one overarching group for Sino-Japanese affairs, in the Japanese business world people had been observing developments in the Chinese civil war for some time and already before the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949 had started organizing their own groups. On June 20, 1949 a varied group of sympathetic people from the business community had founded the *China Japan Association for the Promotion of Trade* (中日貿易促進会), to pursue trade with China and serve as the counterpart of the Chinese *China Council for the Promotion of International Trade* (CCPIT).\(^{244}\) Their swift adjustment to the new reality was reflected in the fact that they placed China first in their name as a sign of goodwill. This association consisted of representatives of Japanese companies and deliberately kept a distance from leftist political parties and the unions.\(^{245}\) However, the insistence on separating politics and economics would severely handicap them when dealing with the Chinese, and this group would prove rather inconsequential. Twenty days later politicians from a variety of parties formed the *China Japan Diet League for the Promotion of Trade* (中日貿易促進議員連盟).\(^{246}\) It was these groups that were responsible for the first real trade agreements.

Several of the progressive figures from the *Nichiyō Club* were instrumental in setting up the nongovernmental groups that were to become so influential in the years ahead, both in promoting relations with China and in organizing popular opposition to the ruling establishment. One figure

\(^{243}\) “Nicchū yuko” [Japan-China friendship], *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 26, 1950.

\(^{244}\) Furukawa Mantarō, *Nicchū senso kankei shi*, 23.

\(^{245}\) Ibid.

\(^{246}\) Ibid., 24.
involved with several of the groups that were set up in 1954 was Kazami Akira, who had just returned from his trip to China in the autumn of 1953, where he had befriended Xiao Xiangqian, Wu Xuewen, and Liao Chengzhi, as described in chapter 2. Together with Katayama Tetsu, he formed the National Federation for Upholding the Constitution (NUFC, 憲法擁護国民連合) in January 1954, in opposition to possible rearmament and to safeguard the country’s new pacifist identity as enshrined in the constitution. In this same month Kazami was invited by Murata Shozo to take part in an informal group for the discussion of Sino-Japanese trade, a group that among others also consisted of Ishibashi Tanzan and Kitayama Tokutaro. The meetings of the group would lead to the founding of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT, 日本国際貿易促進会) in September 1954 that was headed by Murata Shozo. This group was a more successful successor of the China Japan Association for the Promotion of Trade and despite its name this association was focussed entirely on promoting trade with China. Due to the high status and progressive leanings of its main members this association was much more likely to gain favour with the Chinese leadership. Kazami did not limit his China related activism to the economic realm, but became politically involved as well when in October that year he and Katayama founded the National Congress for Japan-China and Japan-USSR Rapprochement (日中日ソ国交回復国民会議), with Kazami as director. This group was a collective of progressive politicians (mostly from the JCP and JSP), union members, academics and cultural figures, aimed at overturning the San Francisco Peace Treaty and achieve peace with the communist bloc countries.

Key figures in the nongovernmental movement like Katayama, Kazami, Ishibashi, and Murata had different political leanings and so could provide the progressive movement with a relatively mainstream image and gain a wide hearing in Japanese society, and hence they would become valuable assets for China’s People’s Diplomacy in years to come.

247 Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben, 150.
248 Suda Teiichi, Kazami Akira to sono jidai, 182.
249 Ibid., 183.
250 Furukawa Mantarō, Nicchū sengo kankei shi, 112, 113.
251 Suda Teiichi, Kazami Akira to sono jidai, 184.
252 Furukawa Mantarō, Nicchū sengo kankei shi, 75.
Nakajima Kenzō

The polarization regarding the future direction of the country and its place in the world was especially prevalent among the nation’s intelligentsia. Among writers, an association that was central in bringing together Japan’s postwar scene of writers, and facilitating debates on the role of intellectuals after the war, was the newly revived Japanese PEN club. When the debate over rearmament started, the PEN club members were divided like the rest of the nation. For those writers who were keen to preserve the country’s pacifist constitution and interested in reconciliation with its neighbours, this was somewhat of a wake-up call and the start of a more activist stance. A leading figure among the newly engaged writers in the PEN club was Toyoshima Yoshio, mentioned earlier as one of the founders of the JCFA in 1950. Today perhaps best known as a friend of Akutagawa Ryūnosuke in his University days, by the 1940s Toyoshima had become deeply interested in modern China and urged fellow progressive writers to take an interest in the PRC and the promotion of Sino-Japanese relations. Two people in the PEN club he had a profound influence on were Aono Suekichi (青野季吉) and Nakajima Kenzō, both of whom would become very active in the promotion of Sino-Japanese relations in the JCACE. While Aono Suekichi had been active in leftwing activism since before the war, Nakajima Kenzō was known as a relatively apolitical literary critic, originally a scholar of French literature. While Toyoshima had urged him to take an interest in China, the real trigger for Nakajima’s engagement and resolve to work for Sino-Japanese reconciliation can be found in his wartime experience. Like many Japanese intellectuals too old to fight in the war, he had been ordered to do propaganda related work and for that reason was stationed in Singapore during the Japanese occupation. There he had learned of the indiscriminate mass killings of the local Chinese population and was especially moved by the amount of mothers approaching him on the street because he was Japanese, asking whether he had seen their sons. This made him resolve to work for Sino-Japanese reconciliation in the future and he would describe his

253 Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei no shisō, 32.
wartime experience in detail in a book published in 1957.254 Already during the war years Nakajima was convinced of the need to face up to the war atrocities committed by the Japanese and that “without widening the scope of memory and letting it enter our minds, the morass that Japan and China’s relations are in cannot be truly understood.”255 Feeling frustrated with the failure of his anti-fascist stance before the war, after the war he resolved to divide this life “between the study room and the street, and to make the democratization movement my new aim.”256 But he carefully maintained an independent stance that he described as of “no party, no faction” (無党, 無派) and stayed clear of party politics, despite entreaties to join the JSP.257 By the mid 1950s Nakajima had become close to important figures in the progressive movement, especially via the Nichiyō Club, but remained somewhat in the background. By the mid 1950s Nakajima had become close to important figures in the progressive movement but remained somewhat in the background. He was making a living as a freelance journalist literary critic and teaching part-time at Tokyo University, had a wide network due to his various activities, and was highly respected. Perhaps his most important activity around this time was his involvement with TBS Radio, a radio station known for its social criticism and independent political debate, where he hosted two radio programmes in the mid-1950s. Other people involved with these shows were the journalists Aragaki Hideo (荒垣秀雄) of the Asahi Shimbun, Eguchi Eiji (江口栄治) and Furuya Tsunamas (古谷綱正) of the Mainichi Shimbun, and famous columnist and former Beijing correspondent Takagi Takeo (高木健夫) of the Yomiuri Shimbun.258 This meant Nakajima had a wide network among journalists with the three main daily newspapers in Japan, something that would prove very useful during his later activist career. Nakajima’s first interaction with China’s Japan hands came when the Chinese Red Cross delegation visited Japan in October 1954. It was Saionji Kinkazu who took the initiative to introduce Nakajima to the delegation and they met Liao Chengzhi, Li Dechuan, Xiao Xiangqian, while Lin Liyun served

254 Nakajima Kenzō, Shōwa jidai, 153-173.
255 Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei no shisō, 21.
256 Ibid., 21, 22.
257 Ibid., 64.
258 Ibid., 72.
as interpreter.\footnote{259} However, as described in the previous chapter, a large number of Japanese from the progressive movement came to see the delegation members and there was no indication as to the important role Nakajima was about to play in the future.

The CPAFC and the JCACE in People’s Diplomacy

Soon after the Central International Activities Leading Committee (CIALC) was formed within the International Department in April 1953, with the aim of enhancing the coordination and development of People’s Diplomacy, the idea arose to create an association under the CIALC focussed solely on cultural exchange. In July 1953 the CIALC put Chu Tunan (楚图南) in charge of setting up this association, the Chinese People’s Association for Foreign Culture (CPAFC, 中国人民对外国协会), of which he was to become the director, and it was inaugurated on May 3, 1954.\footnote{260} And as Zhou Enlai developed his vision for using backchannels to enhance ties while bypassing the Japanese government, he saw the need for an organization within Japan that would gather together a wide range of Japanese cultural groups and individuals sympathetic to China, thereby serving as the counterpart of the CPAFC. The natural candidate for this would have been the JCFA. In 1954 and 1955 there were several attempts to boost cultural exchange between China and Japan, and as mentioned earlier, the JCFA was interested in taking a leading role in cultural exchange with China. However, while Zhou Enlai’s vision of cultural exchange within the context of People’s Diplomacy was as a way to reach a wide variety of people in Japan beyond leftist circles, the JCFA had become a very politicized organization, suffering from factional strife. This is what led to the idea of forming a new Japanese association focussed on cultural exchange. Satō Junko describes the situation in the mid 1950s:

\footnote{259} Ibid., 67, 68.\footnote{260} Ma Xingfu, Chu Tunan nianpu, 64.\footnote{261} It would later be renamed the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC, 中国人民对外友好协会).
The Chinese People’s Association for Foreign Culture had been founded by that time… and it was considered a good idea to create a Japanese counterpart. The JCFA already been founded in 1950 and was considered its counterpart, for one or two years. However, this was an extremely political organization. Also, within the association there was an internal struggle between the JCP and the JSP. So it was very inflexible.262

With the establishment of the Hatoyama government mutual visits became much easier and the first cultural exchange took place when the Matsuyama ballet group visited China in the summer of 1955. In this year a large Japanese delegation of the Science Council of Japan (日本学術会議), consisting of academics and cultural figures headed by scientist Kaya Seiji (茅誠司) visited China in May, and a similar delegation from China of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学院) headed by author Guo Moruo visited Japan in December.263 These two delegations were intended as the start of an intensive interaction between academics and cultural figures from both sides and especially the visit of Guo Moruo’s delegation to Japan was seen as very significant both culturally and politically.264 The Japanese delegation to China in May however did not seem to live up to Zhou Enlai’s standards, something that according to Sato Junko was blamed on JCFA involvement in organizing it. Presumably this limited the appeal of taking part for many Japanese intellectuals, sabotaging the aim of People’s Diplomacy. This created a need for an organization better aligned with the Chinese vision of a broader variety of cultural exchanges. In Sato’s words:

[The delegation’s] usefulness was considered limited by the Chinese. So it is my opinion that China was not satisfied; it is strange to say but if the various [Japanese nongovernmental] associations had been neatly in sync with the

262 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
263 Furukawa Mantarō, Nicchū sengo kankei shi, 123.
264 Ibid.
thinking of the Chinese government, there would have been no reason for the existence of the Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange. 265

At the same time however, Kaya Seiji did make some progress in terms of planning future exchanges of scientists and in the next two years several delegations of scientists were to visit each other’s countries. 266 Then in November 1955 a delegation of the NUFC visited China, a high profile visit because it was headed by Katayama Tetsu and this was the first time a former Japanese Prime Minister visited the PRC. Unlike the JCFA, this organization had a varied membership despite a somewhat leftist reputation, and this must have made it a much more interesting group for the Chinese leadership, that now suggested the creation of a Japanese organization for cultural exchange with China. 267 The hosts convinced Katayama of the need for increased coordination in the field of cultural exchange and to that end the Agreement on Japanese-Chinese Cultural Exchange was signed between the NUFC and the CPAFC on November 27. 268 On the Chinese side the agreement was signed by a large group of prominent cultural figures who had been gathered there by Liao Chengzhi, among them were author Lao She (老舍) and dancer Dai Ailian (戴愛蓮). 269 Two other important members of the Japanese delegation were Kazami Akira and Senda Koreya (千田是也), the latter a famous stage director and activist and an old friend of Liao Chengzhi. According to Sato:

Senda Koreya was a key person in the founding of the Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange. Senda had befriended Liao Chengzhi in the 1930s in Germany. They were involved in union activities together and had grown close through their shared activism. Senda had fled to Germany escaping the Japanese...

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265 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
266 Furukawa Mantarō, Nicchū sengo kankei shi, 130.
267 Nakajima Kenzō, Köei no shitsū, 83.
269 Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben, 221.
authorities, the same as Liao. They had been active in Japan and when in Germany had been active in the Asian division of the German Communist Party.270 271

Both Kazami and Senda were close to Nakajima Kenzō. It is this connection that finally got Nakajima Kenzō involved with China related activism. When Senda visited, Liao was delighted and he and Senda spoke in detail about the need for increased cultural exchange and Senda’s potential role therein. Sato:

Liao wondered if Senda could not lead the effort. But the fact was that Senda was busy with theatre at that time, and moreover what was needed was someone with a broader scope. It was because of this that Senda realized Nakajima Kenzō was the ideal candidate for this. When he arrived back in Japan he approached Nakajima. Nakajima later said it was Senda who recruited him. Obviously they were very close friends.272

The main point here is that Nakajima was an ideal “pipe” for the Chinese because of his “broader scope,” compared to other leftists he had a wide network, among intellectuals and journalists, and his nonpartisan reputation could help attract more people from the mainstream. And since his sympathy for the PRC and genuine desire for reconciliation between Japan and China were presumably known to his friends, all these attributes must have compensated for the fact that Nakajima had no

270 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
271 Actually what Satō refers to here is the Japanese division (日本人部) of the German Communist Party (KPD) founded by Kunizaki Teidō (国崎定洞) in 1929. Both Liao and Senda were in Germany in the late 1920s/early 1930s and active together in several groups of East Asian communists aligned with the KPD. For a fascinating overview of this network see: Katō Tetsurō, Waima-ru ki Berurin no Nihonjin (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008), 155-211, 265-287.
272 Ibid.
Those who were involved with the creation of the new organization... took great
pains to avoid partisan politics and aimed for the participation of as wide a variety
of people as possible. The Japan-China Friendship Association and the National
Federation for Upholding the Constitution were seen by conservatives as leftist
organizations, and it was agreed by all that these groups should not be involved in
a leadership role and remain in the background. Therefore they decided to invite
Katayama and myself.273

This is belied somewhat by the fact that Katayama was the head of the NUFC, but presumably his
status as former Prime Minister made him enough of an asset to offset his left-leaning reputation.
Nakajima adds that another reason to preserve a neutral profile for the association was due to “the
need to get the cooperation of different newspapers like the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and
Yomiuri Shimbun, as well as those representing different sectors, including the conservative political
parties.”274

The association was founded on March 28, 1956 in Marunouchi, Tokyo, with about 80 people
present.275 Katayama was to serve as chairman, Nakajima as director.276 Nakajima made great efforts
to get his journalist contacts to cover the founding, and to have a very broad range of cultural figures
attend. Further contributing to the nonpartisan image were the mainstream politicians that attended;
four from the Liberal Party and one from the LDP, all old friends of Nakajima.277 As announced
ahead of time by the Asahi Shimbun, the association was made of people from “the political and

273 Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei no shisō, 84.
274 Ibid., 87.
275 Ibid.
276 “Kaichō ni Katayama Tetsu-shi Nicchū bunka kōryū kyōkai hossoku”[Chairman will be Katayama Tetsu:
The Japan China Association for Cultural Exchange founded], Asahi Shimbun, March 24, 1956.
277 Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei no shisō, 88, 89.
cultural realms, transcending political parties, in order to promote Sino-Japanese cultural exchange.\textsuperscript{278} Downplaying any political goal the association might have, the emphasis would be on cultural exchange on a broad scale between the two nations, something that was palatable to Japanese from many walks of life. In Nakajima’s own words:

\begin{quote}
Cultural exchange between Japan and China was not to be exchange just for specialists, but had to be exchange on a large scale. The \textit{Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange} would not be a so-called mass movement, but neither would it be a hermetic group of specialists. While being involved in this work, I would maintain the stance of ‘no party, no faction.’\textsuperscript{279}
\end{quote}

Compared to the other nongovernmental organizations, the JCACE was unique in that its founding was to fulfil a direct need for the Chinese, and did not arise spontaneously in Japan. According to Sato Junko:

\begin{quote}
Its founding was completely different from that of the \textit{Japan-China Friendship Association}. The idea for the founding of the JCFA and JAPIT and so on had come from within Japan. The suggestion to create the \textit{Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange} had been made in China. However, to speak plainly, this raises the question whether this means the association was a mere China proxy. But Nakajima Kenzō was unique in that he was extremely independent-minded,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{278} “Mazu kyōgeki enjo ya kaiga-ten: Nicchū bunka kōryū kyōkai hossoku” [First assistance with Peking Opera: The Japan China Association for Cultural exchange founded], \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, March 22, 1956.

\textsuperscript{279} Nakajima Kenzō, \textit{Kōei no shisō}, 146.
and able to provide that kind of grounding [for the association]. It is my opinion that had it not been for Nakajima than this would not have been the case.280

The early days of the JCACE: 1956-1958

Cultural exchange was to be interpreted broadly and would also include sports exchanges, and in light of later history it seems fitting that the first Chinese delegation travelling to Japan facilitated by the JCACE consisted of a group of Chinese table-tennis players who were to compete against their Japanese counterparts in March and April, 1956.281 Ping-Pong diplomacy avant la lettre. Visits to Japan by high profile cultural delegations from China were soon to follow, with Mei Lanfang (梅蘭芳) leading a Peking Opera delegation in May/June282 and Cao Yu (曹禺) with a group of playwrights in August.283 Then in September a delegation of 21 Japanese cultural figures, led by musicologist Tanabe Hisao (田邉尚雄),284 and in November a delegation of 11 Japanese writers visited China.285 Especially the Mei Langfang delegation garnered a lot of attention due to his fame, and behind the scenes the presence of Sun Pinghua added to its importance for the advancement of People’s Diplomacy. Due to the high profile nature of the visit, as well as the need for this to be a smooth beginning of the cultural exchange, the Chinese were very concerned about security, and for that reason it was decided to add Sun Pinghua, a Japan Group member with plenty of experience in underground work, to the delegation. As Wu Xuewen recalls:

Even though with the Hatoyama cabinet Sino-Japanese relations were making progress, there was the serious possibility of interference from the US as well as

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280 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
281 “Chūkyō takkyū senshu-ra tōchaku” [Communist China table tennis team arrives], Asahi Shimbun, March 30, 1956.
283 “Rainichi suru geikisakka Sō Gū” [Playwright Cao Yu comes to Japan], Asahi Shimbun, August 5, 1956.
284 Nakajima Kenzō, Köei no shisō, 105.
disruption from Chiang Kai-shek’s groups. Since it was the first time a Peking Opera delegation was to visit Japan, with heavy costumes and equipment, it was necessary to be on guard against special forces from the US or Chiang. So it was requisite to add a comrade with understanding of Japan as an accessory leader to the delegation.286

And sure enough, as the delegation arrived they were handed pamphlets from GMD agents urging them to defect, and these were collected quickly by Sun Pinghua.287 At performances at various places in Japan there were small groups of extreme rightwingers who took issue with the delegation, and Sun Pinghua describes how it took deft coordination between him, pro-PRC overseas Chinese and Japanese sympathizers, and the police to let everything go smoothly.288 Sun’s official position was in a shifting variety of the Chinese international friendship groups as the occasion demanded and here, aside from dealing with security, he was charged with discussing the future of the JCACE with Nakajima, as a representative of the CPAFC.289 During a one-on-one meeting between Sun and Nakajima, there was agreement on the two most important points, as the latter describes:

Firstly, the Chinese would give their complete backing to an association that could gather together as wide a variety of Japanese people from different fields as possible, as long as they were not anti-PRC, in order to promote friendship between Japan and China, and to make an effort to oppose an exclusive focus on liquidationism.290 Secondly, we were in compete agreement that trips should be undertaken with nongovernmental organizations, avoiding interference of the

287 Ibid.
288 Sun Pinghua, Zhongri youhao suixianglu, 33.
289 Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei no shisō, 100.
290 Liquidationists are those who oppose the class struggle in Marxist theory. Here it refers to contemporary debates in the JCP and JSP as to how to go about making revolution. The desire from both sides in this conversation to leave this debate aside attests to the fact that they felt the JCACE should not get bogged down in the type of factional struggles that the leftist parties, and with them the JCFA, were engaged in.
Japanese government. While not holding any expectation for diplomatic normalization, it was clear that this was in fact a necessity.\textsuperscript{291}

The rest of the meeting was a fruitful brainstorming session about what kind of cultural delegations could be dispatched in the near future, which led directly to the Japanese writer’s delegation that would visit China in November, and on which Aono Suekichi would serve as an envoy of the JCACE.\textsuperscript{292}

The initiative for the founding of the JCACE was taken at a time of optimism for improved relations between the two countries, but with the establishment of the Kishi government these hopes soon faded, with Kishi seemingly devoted to the U.S. alliance and loyal to the ROC government in Taiwan. While under the Hatoyama government the Japanese pro-PRC nongovernmental groups were frustrated at the pace of change, with the arrival of the new government they had to reorient themselves towards large scale opposition activism. Sato Junko recalls that she started working for the JCACE “in the same month that Kishi came to power, February 1957… This was a period where the policy was anti-China, and this meant that those working with China were seen as leftists. There was a big difference [in the work] depending on who was in the government.”\textsuperscript{293} With the new rightwing line of the government in the Kishi years it seemed a lot of the gains made since the end of the war were about to be reversed, and this led to a mobilization of progressive opposition voices. As far as China related activism was concerned, the new situation led to a close cooperation between different nongovernmental groups, with a handful of central figures who might appear under the banner of different organizations at different times. The first sign of Kishi’s hardline stance regarding the PRC came on his visit to Taiwan in June 1957, when he made a statement supporting Chiang’s retaking of the mainland. While Nakajima considered the need to maintain his nonpartisan image, he concluded a more activist stance was unavoidable, and this would be the beginning of his

\textsuperscript{291} Nakajima Kenzō, \textit{Kōei no shisō}, 101.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., 107, 108.
\textsuperscript{293} Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
more open advocacy for a pro-PRC policy. In reaction to Kishi’s statement on Taiwan, a group of 14 progressive activists, among whom were Kazami Akira, Nakajima Kenzō, Katayama Tetsu, and Nanbara Shigeru, took the initiative to form the broad National Congress for Japan-China Rapprochement (日中国交回復国民会議); an effort to bring together all the progressive nongovernmental organizations in opposing the Kishi government’s China policy. This group attracted people from all political parties, the unions, the cultural world, religious clergy, and so on, and had an especially large contingent of JCACE activists among them. As reported on the front page of the Yomiuri Shimbun, the first meeting on July 27, 1957 attracted over 400 people from all walks of life, calling for Sino-Japanese rapprochement. This initiative did not escape the notice of the Chinese and a delegation of the National Congress was invited to visit China for the October 1 celebrations of that year. A combined delegation of the National Congress and the JCFA consisting of Kazami Akira, Katayama Tetsu, Matsumoto Jiichirō and others arrived in China in late September. On October 10 the delegation released a Joint Communiqué with the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA). It affirmed a dedication to friendship between the two peoples; opposition to any “Two China” policy, and that the Taiwan issue was a domestic Chinese one; and a continuation of trade cooperation, with the goal not only to let the nongovernmental agreements develop into intergovernmental ones, but to strive for diplomatic normalization. These were the premises on which all interaction between China and Japan had to be based and to which all nongovernmental groups interacting with the PRC had to subscribe.

In November Nakajima visited China for the first time together with his wife, to coincide with a visit by a delegation of the Japan Writers’ Association not organized by the JCACE. The delegation ran into some difficulties that gave Nakajima a lesson in the challenges of this type of nongovernmental interaction. On November 10, a Joint Communiqué was signed between the Writers’ Associations of both countries, agreeing to further cultural exchange and a Chinese writers’

294 Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei ni shisō, 117.
295 Suda Teiichi, Kazami Akira to sono jidai, 95.
delegation that would visit Japan. Nakajima saw these kinds of agreements between nongovernmental groups as effective to the extent that the signatories represented the standpoint of their associations. Those Japanese writers who had travelled to China were not moving in step with developments in Japan however, where the increasing polarization in society between right and left was reflected in a struggle within the *Japan Writers Association*. Nakajima explains the problem that this caused:

Despite the Joint Communiqué being nongovernmental, it was a formal agreement. If the agreement was not honoured it would be ineffectual and if the signatories did not represent the will of their organization it would be meaningless. Because the social systems in Japan and China were different and there were no official relations, there was a discrepancy. The signatories on the Chinese side were [official] representatives and had not gathered as a group of individuals. On the Japanese side, regardless of the fact that it was an official delegation, there was a clear sense of having joined the delegation [at their own initiative]. So there was a difference in nature between the writers’ delegations from both countries...  

Back in Japan those writers that had been to China were disowned by the board of the *Japan Writers Association* which rendered the Joint Communiqué meaningless. Nakajima resolved to keep matters under his own control from now on and would organize several writers’ delegations in the years to come directly under the banner of the JCACE. After signing the agreement the writers travelled around the country while Nakajima stayed in Beijing to meet representatives from many national associations in the cultural and sports realms, to make plans for concrete future exchanges. This was


300 Ibid.
to become the standard procedure for his visits in the many years to come. Among others, Nakajima met with representatives of the China Writers and Artists League, the All China Sports Association, the Beijing Broadcasting Association, and the China Science Council.\(^{301}\) In Japan Nakajima had met extensively with the Japanese counterparts of these associations and therefore plans could be squared quite quickly, with a final meeting between Nakajima and Chu Tunan to go over and finalize all suggested exchanges.\(^{302}\)

On the way back Nakajima visited Guangzhou and there Liao Chengzhi visited him in his hotel room where they had their first long and wide ranging conversation. They dealt especially with the war issue and the extent to which the Chinese people still felt resentment over this, and Liao emphasized again that China’s enemy was the small number of Japanese imperialists and that the majority of the Japanese were their friends. One issue that Nakajima was concerned with was that in engaging in a wide range of exchanges, they would be faced with local Chinese, especially outside of the big cities, that still had a negative image of Japanese. Liao assured him that when a Japanese delegation was to visit an area that had not been visited by Japanese after the war, “an envoy from the government would be dispatched there first, to persuade [the locals]. If the persuasion was deemed successful, the delegation could visit.”\(^{303}\)

**The JCACE as a political association: 1958-1960**

The increasing tensions in Sino-Japanese relations came to a head with the Nagasaki Flag Incident in May 1958, followed by the breaking off of all trade relations by the Chinese leadership. The JCACE was at that time hosting a Chinese theatre group of 58 people, who had to return early.\(^{304}\) With faith in the good intentions of the Japanese government at an all-time low in Beijing, the backchannels cultivated by Zhou Enlai were to become increasingly influential in maintaining ties

\(^{301}\) Ibid., 143.

\(^{302}\) Ibid., 143, 144.

\(^{303}\) Ibid., 142.

\(^{304}\) *Nippon bunka kōryū* No. 716 (March 23, 2006): 8.
from this moment on. This was also the moment that the Japanese nongovernmental groups lost faith in the Japanese government’s dedication to improving relations with China, let alone move towards rapprochement. The new reality led to the JCACE taking the lead in crafting a more activist role for the nongovernmental groups in rousing the Japanese public in opposing Japanese government policy regarding the PRC. There were some indications that the Chinese kept open the possibility for cultural exchange to continue despite the downturn, and some two weeks after the incident the CPAFC released a statement, saying that Sino-Japanese cultural exchange was to continue, and that the Chinese people’s issue was with the Kishi government and not the Japanese people. Still, no Chinese delegations would visit Japan for the time being. From the Japanese side many exchanges planned for the rest of the year did go ahead as planned: with a group of Japanese calligraphers visiting China in May; buyo dancer Hanayagi Tokubei (花柳徳兵衛) with a large group of 46 people in June; and a Japanese delegation visiting China for painter Ogata Korin (尾形光琳)’s memorial exhibition in September. Especially the last delegation was made up of several key figures in the JCACE, such as Senda Koreya and Shirato Norio, and they would have a meeting with Zhou Enlai. The Chinese cancelled a planned delegation of writers to Japan, but this was not officially related to the Nagasaki Flag Incident. Compared to the previous period, the Japanese cultural delegations returning from China were met with indifference or coldness from the media upon their return to Japan. The same fate befell other delegations like the JSP delegation that visited China in July 1958 and was seen to have failed to make headway with the Chinese.

In reaction to the Nagasaki Flag Incident, Nakajima and leaders of six other nongovernmental associations released a statement together on May 14; calling for continued trade and cultural

307 Ibid.
308 “Nicchū bunka kōryū no kiki” [Crisis in Japan-China cultural exchange], Asahi Shimbun, August 4, 1958.
309 Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei no shisō, 164.
exchange between Japan and China, as well as for rapprochement.\textsuperscript{311} The statement was reported in both the Japanese and the Chinese press.\textsuperscript{312} As for the JCACE, Katayama and Nakajima decided to appeal directly to the Chinese leadership, preparing a long statement reaffirming their desire to continue cultural exchange and restating their feelings of repentance. They made clear they understood the gravity of the situation:

\begin{quote}
The friendship and goodwill that has been build up step by step through exchange until now has been completely reversed. Although we wish this will not have a negative influence on cultural exchange, we are not optimistic for the future… When formally trying to deal with these numerous problems, if we are in a hurry to solve single incidents while not looking to [relations as a] whole, we are in danger of losing sight of the essence of the problem.\textsuperscript{313}
\end{quote}

The essence of the problem is the unresolved war issue, painfully present due to the lack of official relations. It is clear that the Kishi government is to blame for this and the JCACE positions itself as a representative of the Japanese people open to reconciliation.

\begin{quote}
As for the worsening of relations between Japan and China, it is clear the [Japanese] people should not just follow the government but shoulder equal responsibility. We must admonish strongly against trying to resolve this problem without serious repentance. Knowing of China’s true intentions, we believe that
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{311} “7-Shi ga seimei Nicchû bôeki mondai” [7 people release a statement on the issue of Japan-China trade], \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun}, May 15, 1958.
\textsuperscript{312} “Huyu huifu Rizhong bangjiào” [Call for Japan-China rapprochement], \textit{Renmin Ribao}, May 14, 1958.
\textsuperscript{313} Nakajima Kenzô, \textit{Kôei no shisô}, 163.
the key to improving this unfortunate situation is a voluntary repentance by the
Japanese people.\footnote{314}

The statement was dated June 14, and signed by Katayama, Nakajima and Hayashi Hirotaka (林弘
高). It was passed on to the Chinese by the Hanayagi delegation that visited China in June, and not
published in the media. On June 25 the People’s Daily published a long editorial entitled; “It is
impossible for China-Japan cultural exchange not to be influenced,” and while Nakajima is not
entirely sure whether it was in direct response to their statement, this seems highly likely. Saionji
Kinkazu sent Nakajima a Japanese translation immediately.\footnote{315} The editorial states that continued
cultural exchange is the will of the people in both countries, and that many in Japan have asked the
question whether cultural exchange will be affected. It then explains the dilemma:

If the current situation was to have no influence on cultural exchange, Kishi would
see this as a sign of weakness of China, and this foolish arrogance will become
[his] China policy. But if cultural exchange is influenced by it they will shift the
responsibility for this onto China, and among the Japanese people dissatisfaction
with China will grow.\footnote{316}

What happened was that unlike Sino-Japanese trade, cultural exchange was not halted entirely,
however only Japanese delegations would visit China during the remainder of Kishi’s tenure, while
until the establishment of the Ikeda government in 1960 no Chinese delegation would visit Japan.

\footnote{314} Ibid.
\footnote{315} Ibid., 164.
\footnote{316} “Zhongri wenhua wanglai buneng bushou jingxiang” [It is impossible for China-Japan cultural exchange
not to be influenced],\textit{ Renmin Ribao}, June 25, 1958.
In Japan, Nakajima and those in his circle took the lead in trying to influence public opinion regarding the government’s China policy. The cancellation of the Chinese writers’ delegation mentioned above triggered a fierce article in the Asahi Shimbun by JCACE member and author Aono Suekichi, describing his China trip and attempting to explain to his Japanese audience the anger of the Chinese people and its roots, as well as the friendship that he experienced and was urged to pass on to his fellow countrymen. He lamented the policies of the Kishi government that were “making an enemy of China” and stressed the importance of cultural exchange and friendship between the two peoples.\(^{317}\)

The JCACE was on the road to becoming a high profile pressure group opposing Kishi’s China policy and we can notice a much more political slant in the actual exchange taking place. In late 1958 and 1959 there was very little actual exchange between cultural figures,\(^ {318}\) but a lot of highly publicized political activities in both Japan and China by the nongovernmental groups and Nakajima, who gradually took on a role as their general leader. Needless to say, the nongovernmental groups were entirely in tune with the times; in Japan the progressive movement in opposition to the Kishi government and its close embrace with the U.S. was quickly gathering steam and would profoundly influence the political scene in the next few years. By aligning themselves with this sentiment, the call for Sino-Japanese rapprochement was to reach large portions of Japanese society, beyond just the radical left. For Nakajima, his two most important actions at the time were the preparation together with Kazami Akira of the *Repentance* (反省) statement which was largely aimed at the Chinese, and a mobilization of cultural figures in Japan urging them to oppose the government.

After the Nagasaki Flag Incident, Kazami Akira held several meetings with his closest associates to discuss the most beneficial way to voice their opposition to the Kishi government. This group consisted of Kazami Akira and Nakajima Kenzō, together with Hosokawa Karoku (細川嘉六, a former JCP parliamentarian) and Itō Takeo (伊藤武雄, a Sinologist active in both the JCFA and JCACE). What was the most pressing issue for them was that they felt the Japanese people had to

\(^{317}\) Aono Suekichi, “Nicchū bunka kōryū no kiki” [Crisis in Japan-China cultural exchange], *Asahi Shimbun*, August 4, 1958.

\(^{318}\) *Nicchū bunka kōryū* No. 716 (March 23, 2006): 10.
take responsibility for the war. On July 20, this group released a long statement entitled *Repentance*; a passionate plea for reconciliation between Japan and China and a call to arms for all those opposed to the direction in which Japan was moving under Kishi.

The development of friendly relations between Japan and China, that has overcome such difficulties, is facing a grave crisis today due entirely to the attitude of our government. We cannot forget the tremendous pain that we have inflicted on the Chinese people during the war of aggression. Without humanely taking our responsibility with serious repentance, the future development of the Japanese people is impossible. The Chinese people have let go of their grudge, and regardless of the fact that the two countries do not have official relations and are still technically at war, have extended their hand to our people in friendship.

The statement then lamented the Japanese government’s reliance on the US, its ties to Taiwan and the fact they tried to separate politics and economics. They called for a “Bandung spirit” in re-establishing ties based on equality between the Asian nations. This could be done by a joining of forces by like-minded Japanese:

In order to reset domestic politics and morality, we are at a key point where we must combine our strengths. More than just wishing for peace and prosperity, the most important thing is to abandon our small minded ego and take action from a place of deep repentance. When we unite with [people from] all fields with this as a basis for our efforts and activism, we will for the first time achieve a

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319 Suda Teiichi, *Kazami Akira to sono jidai*, 196, 197.
breakthrough in relations between Japan and China, and the people’s future will be bright and vast.\textsuperscript{321}

Perhaps as a sign of how polarized and anti-PRC the discourse in Japan had become, all major newspapers ignored the \textit{Repentance} statement.\textsuperscript{322} The Chinese were impressed however, and in early August they sent an invitation to its four authors to visit China for the coming October 1 celebrations.\textsuperscript{323} Due to a full schedule Nakajima was not able to come but the others went with a delegation of 13 people, under the banner of the \textit{National Congress for Japan-China Rapprochement} and officially invited by the CPIFA. Simultaneously a JCFA delegation would visit, headed by Matsumoto Jiichiro. Despite the CPIFA being officially in charge, in this crisis situation the Japan Group took the visit of these Japanese friends very seriously and would take care of “reception”; Zhao Anbo and Sun Pinghua of the JCFA, and Xiao Xiangqian and Wang Xiaoyun of the \textit{National Congress} delegation.\textsuperscript{324} The latter delegation arrived in late September and upon arrival Kazami denounced the “deadlock” in Sino-Japanese relations created by the Kishi government, according to the \textit{People’s Daily}.\textsuperscript{325} At the same meeting CPIFA head Zhang Xiruo (張奚若) emphasized that despite the current crisis “the Chinese people’s feelings of friendship for the Japanese people had not changed in the slightest,” something that was picked up by the Japanese media.\textsuperscript{326} Behind the scenes, Kazami received a visit from several core Japan Group members in his room in the Beijing Hotel; Liao Chengzhi, Zhao Anbo, Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian and Xie Nanguang. Back in Japan, Kazami published his recollection of the conversation with the Japan hands in January 1959, thereby relaying their message conveyed in the private and rather frank discussion:

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 172.  
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid., 175.  
\textsuperscript{323} Suda Teiichi, \textit{Kazami Akira to sono jidai}, 200.  
\textsuperscript{324} Shō Kōzen [Xiao Xiangqian], \textit{Tokoshie no rinkoku to shite}, 81, 82.  
\textsuperscript{326} “Nihon Jinmin to no yūkō kawaranai : Chō Keimo-shi kataru” [The friendship with the Japanese people has not changed, says Zhang Xiruo], \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun}, September 29, 1958.
The Chinese said, that they thought [Japan] was not able to stand without relying on China, but that they did not think that [China] was not able to stand without relying on Japan. However, for the sake of peace and prosperity in Asia it was good be in harmony, and it was good to engage in trade and necessary to engage in cultural exchange.327

The stern tone was no doubt a reflection of the current tensions and directed at the Japanese home front more than at Kazami. But the message that trade could be resumed at some point was a positive one, and it is interesting the Japan hands singled out cultural exchange as one avenue where a tentative resumption of contact could once again be considered. Apart from the JCFA/National Congress delegation there were actually seven delegations from Japan in China for the October 1 celebrations, among them a Sohyo delegation. The seven delegations had a meeting with Zhou Enlai on October 7, where in reaction to the Nagasaki Flag Incident they spoke at length about the Taiwan issue, with all of them subscribing to the “One China” principle.328

While the Kazami delegation was in China, Nakajima made strenuous efforts to mobilize his network in opposition to the Kishi government’s China policy. He set out to gather most of the cultural figures that had visited China in the years before and used his good contacts among journalists to avoid the media treatment that had befallen the Repentance statement. Together with Aono Suekichi, Nakajima Kenzō organized the widely publicised329 Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations（日中文化関係懇談会）on October 16 with around 30 representatives from all walks of cultural life: literature, fine arts, theatre, religion, the academic

327 Suda Teiichi, Kazami Akira to sono jidai, 201.
328 “Shū sōri to au Nihon 6 dantai daihyō no zen'in” [Premier Zhou meets with all the representatives of the 6 Japanese delegations], Yomiuri Shimbun, October 8, 1958.
world, dance and journalism. The gathering urged cultural figures to lecture and publish wherever possible on this topic, to appeal to as large an audience as possible, in order to bring into being a popular movement demanding a change in the country’s China policy. This gathering produced a statement that restated some of the core message of the Repentance statement, effectively tying it in with criticism of the government:

We come from a variety of cultural backgrounds and for the sake of peace in Asia and the morality of Japan, as well as from a position of repentance for the war of aggression waged on China, we have laboured for neighbourly and friendly relations between Japan and China. However, unfortunately we are facing great difficulties in achieving our aim because of Kishi’s mistaken policies. Moreover, it is clear that due to recent domestic and foreign policies, as well as Kishi’s statements, great harm is being done to Sino-Japanese friendship and we are moving in an extremely dangerous direction as far as peace in Asia and the future of Japan is concerned. The future of Japan will be deeply affected by improved Sino-Japanese relations and to this end we demand a change in the government’s China policy, and we will continue our efforts in the cultural community.

The timing of the Roundtable conference was auspicious because two days earlier on October 14, Kishi had, in an interview with NBC, for the first time stated unequivocally that diplomatic normalization with the PRC was out of the question, since it was an “aggressor nation” (referring to the Korean War), and he also stated the Taiwan issue was not a domestic Chinese issue, implicitly violating the “One China” principle. Aono Suekichi reacted to this in an article in the Asahi

330 “Nicchū no naka o waruku suruna bunkajin ga kokumin undō okosu” [Do not let the relations between Japan and China deteriorate- Cultural figures raise mass movement], Yomiuri Shim bun, October 17, 1958.
331 “Nicchū no naka o waruku suruna bunkajin ga kokumin undō okosu,” Yomiuri Shim bun, October 17, 1958.
Shimbun on October 23, emphasizing the need for the activism promoted by the “Roundtable,” as well as their support of the “One China” idea, especially in the light of Kishi’s latest positions. Most interestingly, he criticised the numerous press reports on the “Roundtable” for omitting that “those assembled on that day were first of all people who have visited China, have been able to witness directly the Chinese actuality and the present state of the country, and have the heartfelt wish to communicate to the Japanese the thoughts of the Chinese people.” 333 Important here is that Aono ties the legitimacy of the nongovernmental groups to espouse on Chinese matters to the fact that they, due to their direct experience with the country and its people, know what they are talking about. This was in marked contrast to those in the government holding anti-PRC views, and a point that was bound to resonate with the large part of the population already harbouring doubts about the Kishi government. In absence of official contact it was the nongovernmental groups that provided the vital link to contemporary China.

With relations still dire, the year 1959 saw a real flurry of activity by Nakajima and his sympathizers towards spreading their message within Japan and deepening the personal relationships with their Chinese counterparts. At Nakajima’s initiative, in January a meeting was held with the leaders of 11 different nongovernmental groups, the Roundtable Conference of the Heads of the Japan-China Relations Groups (日中関係団体首脳懇談会), chief among them the JCACE and JAPIT, calling for continued exchange, moves toward diplomatic normalization and criticizing government policy on Taiwan and the US. The gist of the statement was reported as follows by the Yomiuri Shimbun:

/First, ]the government should change its passive position and consider high-level talks [with the PRC], only in this way can the impasse be broken. Of course maintaining the resolution of the Japan-Taiwan Committee on Economic

333 “Bunka geinōjin wa kyōryoku shite iru: Nicchū bunka kōryū o mezashite” [With the help of cultural and entertainment figures: aim for Japan-China cultural exchange], Asahi Shimbun, October 23, 1958.
Cooperation and continuing the talks on the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty will have a negative effect on Japan-China relations. [Second, ] the government should refrain from statements opposing the goal of Japan-China diplomatic normalization. [Third, ] we urge the government to carry out the resolutions in both Houses of Parliament regarding breaking the deadlock in Japan-China relations.334

Then the second Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations was held on February 22, 1959, with about 100 people present, this larger number a result of the call to action the previous October.335 The assembly attracted attention from the press with a call for diplomatic normalization as well as a call to end the use of the term Chūkyō (中共, meaning “Chinese Communist Party” but roughly equivalent to the English “Communist China”) in Japanese media, of course in favour of Chūgoku (中国), China.336 According to Nakajima “this Roundtable, assembling active cultural figures who stood in contact with groups in various fields…was one of the waves joining in the surge in anti-Security Treaty activism in 1960.”337 At the time of the next “Roundtable,” held on April 4, the ranks had swelled to more than 470 people, and a series of questions to be put to Prime Minister Kishi was prepared. One set of questions dealt with the Japan-US Security Treaty, and another with the government’s relations with Taiwan and the Treaty of Taipei; the questions were reported on the front page of the Asahi Shimbun:

334 “Nicchū kōryū no sokushin o yōsei 11 dantai ga seimei” [Request for the promotion of Japan-China exchange: 11 groups make a statement], Yomiuri Shimbun, January 28 , 1959.
335 A fact that the media seem to have missed is that the “Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations” held in October 1958 was actually a preparatory meeting for the inaugural “Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations” that was held in February 1959. Therefore the February “Roundtable” was technically the first, but referred to here as the second. See: Nicchū bunka kōryū No. 716 (March 23, 2006): 8.
336 “Chūkyō no koshō yameyo Nicchū bunka kondankai sōritsu sōkai hiraku” [Stop using ‘communist China:’ inaugural meeting of the Japan-China Culture Roundtable], Asahi Shimbun, February 22, 1959.
337 Nakajima Kenzō, Köei no shisō, 188.
We consider the Japan-US Security Treaty in its current form, and the attitude towards the PRC as an imaginary enemy country, as a barrier to Japanese-Chinese diplomatic normalization.

A. From its current sovereign position, what concrete efforts is the government intending to make towards diplomatic normalization?

B. We consider that, with the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty and no moves to repeal it, we are moving towards being restrained militarily for the long-term. If this is not so, the people must be given grounds to be convinced of this.

C. The government has said the Japan-US Security Treaty will not negatively affect Japan-China relations, but on what is this based?

D. With the Japan-China Security relationship giving way to sovereignty, the PRC has indicated that it is prepared to drop the Japanese militarism clause in the Sino-Soviet Treaty, is the government then also prepared to drop the notion that Japan and China are enemy countries?

One obstacle obstructing improved Japan-China relations is the Treaty of Taipei.

A. Is our honour towards all of the Chinese people protected with the Treaty of Taipei or not?

B. Does the government, taking into account the actual situation in China, intend to revise its previous stance on which government represents China?

C. One of the main obstacles standing in the way of improved Japan-China relations is the suspicion that Japanese foreign policy is subservient to the US, is the government able to suspend such suspicions?
D. The number of countries supporting the PRC’s right to represent China at the UN is increasing every year. Regarding the PRC’s right of representation at the UN, would the government support a vote on this issue?338

The questions were delivered to the Prime Minister on the morning of April 17 and made the front-page of the major newspapers that same day.339 So the cultural figures were successful in getting their message out and attracting more to their cause, making the fact that Kishi would never answer hardly more than an afterthought.340

While official relations were at a low point in the year 1959, the various “pipes” of the Chinese leadership worked hard to maintain their channels, and where possible improve the situation. One high profile visit to China was the JSP delegation that visited in March headed by JSP leader Asanuma Inejirō, who was keen to achieve a breakthrough, but to no avail.341 At the request of the CPAFC Nakajima visited China in May and June with a combined delegation of the JCACE and JCFA. This was to be his second visit. He was the head of the delegation as a whole, which testifies to his now central position among the pro-PRC nongovernmental groups.342 Like during his previous visit in 1957, Nakajima met with a host of groups from the cultural sphere, and visited many exhibitions and performances. But this time clearly his status as a leading “pipe” had grown thanks to his activism, and he would have his first significant interaction with the Chinese leadership in the person of Foreign Minister Chen Yi. They had a long meeting in the Ziguangge (紫光閣) building inside the Zhongnanhai compound. Nakajima was taken aback by the official surroundings and by

340 “Anpo kaitei hantai sekkyokuteki undō e: Nicchū bunka kankei kondankai” [Towards active opposition to revision of the constitution: Japan-China Cultural Relations Roundtable], Asahi Shimbun, July 19, 1959.
342 Nakajima Kenzō, Köei no shisō, 193.
the fact that he and Chen Yi had a wide ranging discussion on various topics, with Chen Yi speaking at length about the People’s Communes for example. 343

On June 8 the JCACE and CPAFC signed a Joint Communiqué, which affirmed the commitment to further cultural exchange in the years 1959 and 1960, in order to “deepen mutual understanding and friendship between the two peoples;” stated the shared opposition to Kishi’s China policy; and affirmed the “One China” principle and shared commitment to rapprochement, thereby affirming Zhou’s “Three principles.” 344 While Nakajima had suggested name of the statement to be: Joint Communiqué on the Cultural Exchange between Japan and China, the Chinese suggested Joint Communiqué on the Cultural Exchange between the Japanese and Chinese People, to reflect the nongovernmental nature of the statement, something that was endorsed by Nakajima. 345 Interestingly, Saionji Kinkazu had contributed to the preparation of the draft on the Chinese side, showing his central role as “People’s Ambassador” of Japan in Beijing. 346 This was the first such statement by the two organizations, and six more were to follow until the Cultural Revolution put a halt to cultural exchange. The statement was reported in full in the People’s Daily, and on the same page a long article explained in detail Nakajima’s vision of the current state of the Sino-Japanese relationship, in which he framed the struggle of the Japanese against Kishi as one where the people of Japan and China stood united: “It is clear to everyone that Kishi is pursuing a very hostile China policy. If we want to improve relations between Japan and China, we must oppose the Kishi government. In Japan there are people who think that relations can be improved by changing the policies, but I think that the Kishi government is not able to change its policies and improve relations. In these unfortunate circumstances, the issue is not how we can move the Kishi government to change its policies, but the issue is how we can overthrow the Kishi government.” 347

343 Ibid., 195, 196.
344 “Guanyu Zhongri liangguo renmin wenhua jiaoliude lianhe shengming” [Joint Communiqué regarding China-Japan people’s cultural exchange], Renmin Ribao, June 9, 1959.
345 Nakajima Kenzō, Köei no shisō, 193.
346 Ibid., 194.
347 “Yao gaishan Rizhong guanxi bixu fandui An zhengfu: Zhongdao Jianzang zai wo duiwaiwenban jiangyanhui shang shuo” [For the improvement of Japan-China relations we must oppose the Kishi government: Nakajima Kenzō speaks at our Foreign Culture Association lecture meeting], Renmin Ribao, June 6, 1959.
In 1960, Katayama Tetsu would officially step down from his position in the JCACE, leaving Nakajima solely in charge, but in 1959 he made a last important journey to China. Representing many different nongovernmental groups, Katayama would head a delegation of 30 people. Katayama met with Mao and Zhou, and a Joint Communiqué was released on October 21 together with the representatives of 7 Chinese organizations. Like earlier statements, the demand was for an end to U.S. imperialism in the region and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, as well as for an independent Japanese foreign policy and respect for the “One China” principle. Also, the statement took a stance against nuclear proliferation in the region; a cause that the nongovernmental groups, in alignment with the Chinese government (as far as US nuclear bombs were concerned), were to adopt as their own in the coming years. The People’s Daily on that day, October 22, was for a large part dedicated to the many Japanese visitors that had visited China recently and expressed their solidarity with the Chinese government and opposition to Kishi. Apart from Katayama’s delegation, Ishibashi Tanzan and Matsumura Kenzō had made high profile visits, and the JCP was present with a large delegation led by Chairman Nosaka Sanzo. Zhou Enlai was even quoted as remarking, in a front page article on Matsumura’s visit, how many Japanese had recently visited China, expressing his joy at this development. A different large front page editorial was titled: “It is the joint responsibility of the Chinese and Japanese people to oppose the U.S.-Japan military alliance and secure peace in East Asia,” and on page 5 another article gave a comprehensive overview of all the major Japanese visits and stressing the need for further improvement of friendly relations with the ultimate goal of diplomatic normalization. It detailed the visits of JSP leader Asanuma in March, as well as the recent visits of the Katayama delegation, the delegation of the JCP headed by Nosaka, the visits by

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348 “Zujin Zhongri jianli zhengchang guanxi xieshou paichu shijie lengzhan wuyun: Woguo qi tuanti he Riben gejie daibiao tongtuan gongtong shengming” [By promoting regular relations between China and Japan we can together dispel the dark clouds of the Cold War: Seven Chinese associations sign Joint Communiqué with various Japanese delegations], *Renmin Ribao*, October 22, 1959.


350 “Shi Zhongri renminde gongtong renwu fandui Meiri junshi tongmei he baowei yuandong heping” [It is the common mission of the Chinese and Japanese people to oppose the US-Japan military alliance and protect peace in the Far East], *Renmin Ribao*, October 22, 1959.
Ishibashi Tanzan and Matsumura Kenzō. The article clearly strives to strike home the point that the Kishi government was isolated in its opposition to the PRC and that China had friends in Japan from all backgrounds that shared its ideals and goals, thereby again making the distinction between the Japanese leadership and its people necessary for People’s Diplomacy and common since Yanan.

The year 1960 was a year that saw increased political instability in Japan; with demonstrations against the renewal of the Security Treaty becoming more and more intense, as well as with the murder of Japanese Socialist Party leader Asanuma and the death of student activist Kanba Michiko that lead to Kishi’s resignation in July. As laid out in the joint statement of the previous June, many cultural exchanges took place; perhaps most notably a 45-day trip to China by the Zenshinza Kabuki Troupe in February and March and a Japanese writers’ delegation in May. More importantly, Nakajima Kenzō would play a central role in the organization of the opposition to the Security Treaty from early 1960 onwards. In January he started setting up the Security Treaty Criticism Association (安保批判の会) for a mobilization of intellectuals opposed to the treaty, as well as an effort to unite student groups and nongovernmental associations opposed to the treaty. For the next few months, Nakajima, with friends like Senda Koreya and Aono Suekichi, would gather as many cultural figures as possible, holding meetings and releasing statements criticizing the government, spreading the message with help from their journalist contacts. An example of how intertwined many of the nongovernmental associations were was when the Security Treaty Criticism Association organized a meeting with the Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations on April 4, which led to posing a series of questions to Deputy Prime Minister Masutani Shūji (益谷秀次) and Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichirō (藤山 愛一郎). While on the surface this gives the impression

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351 “Zhongri liangguo renminde youhao yiding yao fazhan” [Peace between the two countries China and Japan must definitely be developed], Renmin Ribao, October 22, 1959.
of a gathering mass movement of different groups coming together, in this case the joint exercise was made easy by the fact that the two associations largely consisted of the same people, with Nakajima the leader of both. The largest demonstration organized by Nakajima, together with Senda Koreya and others, took place on June 4 in front of the Diet with more than 20,000 people, mostly from the academic and cultural fields.\textsuperscript{356} This was followed by another demonstration of 7000 people from the cultural scene a few days later on the 14\textsuperscript{th}, with Nakajima one of the central figures and a message from Nanbara Shigeru.\textsuperscript{357}

**Cultural Relations in the 1960s**

While the political polarization of the Kishi years had clearly transformed Nakajima into an activist, the Ikeda years would prove to be a more stable period for the JCACE and Sino-Japanese relations in general. There were some major breakthroughs for People’s Diplomacy like the establishment of trade offices and the exchange of journalists, and in the background of this the JCACE could focus again on its main task of cultural exchange and the gradual expansion of the “pipes” between both countries. In this way the association adjusted its activities to the prevailing winds in Japanese society. A natural outcome of increased exchange of intellectuals from both countries was a kind of “ripple-effect” where Japanese participants of delegations to China would start writing about their experience, like Nakajima and Aono had urged in the call to action of the “Roundtable.” Nakajima would visit China yearly until 1966, meeting with leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, as well as with various cultures figures, and signing a Joint Communiqué on cultural exchange with the CPAFC every time.

From August 1960 Chinese delegations would visit Japan again, starting with two delegations visiting that month; a Union delegation and a delegation to attend the 6\textsuperscript{th} World Conference against

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{356 “2man yo nin kokkai demo/ anpo soshi kokumin kaigi” [More than 20,000 people at parliament demonstration: National Congress for repealing the Security Treaty], Yomiuri Shimbun, June 4 (evening edition), 1960.}
\footnote{357 “Bunkajin-ra 7000 nin ga atsumaru: minshushugi mamoru tsudoi” [More than 7000 cultural figures gather: to protect democracy], Yomiuri Shimbun, June 14 (evening edition), 1960.}
\end{footnotesize}
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, both headed by Liu Ningyi (劉寧一). Nakajima was in China at that time, where he spoke at length in support of the Chinese delegation to the Conference and for improved relations between Japan and China, framing the struggle against nuclear proliferation in the context of the Japanese people’s fight against U.S. imperialism in the People’s Daily. In the years to come Nakajima would get very involved with the nuclear non-proliferation movement in Japan, linking this with the struggle against US influence. That year Nakajima was treated to a large welcome party that was reported in detail in the People’s Daily and hosted by Chu Tunan, with artists Mei Lanfang and Xie Bingxin; Liao Chengzhi and Li Dechuan; as well as Saionji Kinkazu present.

In this improved atmosphere the Chinese leadership was keen to expand on and establish new connections with people from different sectors of Japanese society. In autumn 1961 a JCACE delegation visited China as usual but more importantly a CPAFC delegation also came to Japan for the first time, headed by Chu Tunan. The delegation, consisting of 9 people, was hosted jointly by the JCFA and the JCACE and included Sun Pinghua. Sun Pinghua explains that among the Chinese this was seen as an important new start since “many of the backchannels that had been shut after the Nagasaki Flag incident were gradually reopened,” and the Chinese leadership had selected movie director Cui Wei (崔嵬), painter Chang Shana (常沙娜), and engineer Zhang Youxuan (張有萱), among others, to re-establish a connection with Japanese counterparts in their fields. The JCACE was mostly focussed on introducing many people from the Japanese cultural scene to Chu Tunan and he was able to meet with a large selection of Japanese from the literature, film, theatre,
and so on. Among them were old friends like Senda Koreya and Hanayagi Tokubei, and prominent figures like Nanbara Shigeru. Still, the politically activist aspect had not disappeared entirely from these exchanges and the National Congress for Japan-China Rapprochement organized a manifestation welcoming Chu Tunan that was attended by some 3000 people from the different nongovernmental groups in Hibiya, Tokyo. Here Chu as well as speakers from the JCP, JSP, and the large union Sōhyō called on “reactionaries in Japan and the US to stop opposing Sino-Japanese friendship,” and on the Ikeda government to support China’s claim to a seat at the UN. Under the more moderate Ikeda the progressive movement seems to have lost some momentum however, with these statements having limited impact because while the manifestation was covered in detail in the People’s Daily, it was ignored by the Japanese media.

Nakajima continued to combine his pro-PRC activities with anti-nuclear activism; he had a prominent role in the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs of 1962 and 1963, for example. In China these yearly conferences in Japan were always widely covered in the press and the Chinese would usually send a heavy delegation, often with prominent cultural figures and the JCACE would be involved with their reception. For example in 1962, author Ba Jin (巴金) would lead the delegation and he and other members of the delegation received a welcome reception organized by the JCACE, hosted by Nakajima and Senda Koreya. This was the beginning of a long friendship between Nakajima and Ba Jin. Zhou Bin (周斌), the interpreter who would serve as Nakajima’s interpreter on most of his visits to China, recalls that Ba Jin had one of the closest connections to Nakajima among the many Chinese cultural figures who met him. Ba Jin would

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364 Chu Tunan, Chu Tunan riji (Diary of Chu Tunan), 241-298.
365 “Dongjing gejie sanqianren jihui yaoqiu huifu bangjiao” [3000 people from different fields demand rapprochement in Tokyo], Renmin Ribao, November 26, 1961.
366 “Ōare no gensuikin taikai konran no mama heimaku” [Unruly anti-nuclear conference ends in chaos], Yomiuri Shimbun, August 7, 1962.
367 “Chūso ronsō mochikomu gensuikin no kokusai kaigi” [Sino-Soviet dispute present at international anti-nuclear conference], Yomiuri Shimbun, August 7, 1963.
369 Zhou Bin, Wo wei Zhongguo lingdaoren dang fanyi, 261.
visit Japan again when leading a delegation of writers in November 1963. Exchange among literary figures was just one example of an area in which the JCACE was active, with several delegations of Japanese writers visiting China in May 1960 and June and November 1961, June 1963, with participants like Kamei Katsuichirō (亀井勝一郎), Shirato Norio, Ariyoshi Sawako (有吉佐和子), among others. The 1960 delegation even met with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Also, Nakajima visited China in September and October 1962 with Ariyoshi Sawako, where they discussed cultural exchange as well as the issue of nuclear non-proliferation with Chu Tunan, Liao Chengzhi, and others, before meeting with Mao Dun (茅盾) and Lao She for a discussion about literature and possible writers’ exchanges. Together with some members of the JCFA and JSP who were on a separate delegation, they then had a meeting with Foreign Minister Chen Yi. In March 1965 the JCACE would host a delegation of Chinese writers to Japan, a delegation led by Lao She who had an extensive meeting with Tanizaki Jun’ichirō (谷崎潤一郎), who was a JCACE member, shortly before the latter’s death. Similar exchange initiatives were facilitated by the JCACE in other fields. The participants would often gain a favourable opinion of China and share their experience with others in Japan. For example Kamei Katsuichirō would write a book about his two journeys to China.

By the end of the Ikeda era in 1964, Nakajima had become one of the most trusted allies of the Chinese in Japan, advocating diplomatic normalization at home and frequently appearing in the Chinese media as one of the “Japanese friends.” On his yearly visits it became standard that he would have a meeting with both Mao and Zhou. In 1964 many Japanese sympathizers visited China.

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371 Ibid., 14, 16.
372 “Huangying siwei Riben wenhuajiede pengyou” [We welcome four friends from the Japanese cultural world], Renmin Ribao, September 28, 1962.
373 “Mao Dun yanqing Zhongdao Jianzang deng” [Mao Dun receives Nakajima Kenzo and others], Renmin Ribao, October 4, 1962.
374 “Chen Yi fuzongli jiejian Riben pengyou” [Vice Premier Chen Yi receives Japanese friends], Renmin Ribao, October 1, 1962.
for the October 1 celebrations, and Nakajima arrived a few days earlier with a JCACE delegation of 8 people and was met by many of the Japan hands; Liao Chengzhi, Chu Tunan, Zhao Anbo, and Wang Xiaoyun among others.377 A large reception was held for all the Japanese guests that had come for the celebrations, hosted by Chen Yi and Guo Moruo. In many ways their sheer number, more than 500, was a testimony to the success of more than 10 years of People’s Diplomacy. There were politicians from the JCP, JSP and LDP; the mayor of the newly formed city Kitakyūshu Yoshida Michiharu (吉田法晴); and old friends like deceased JSP leader Asanuma Inejirō’s widow Asanuma Kyōko (浅沼亨子). Showing the status of both the JCFA and the JCACE within the Japanese nongovernmental associations was that their respective leaders, Matsumoto Jiichirō and Nakajima Kenzō, had a private meeting with Chen Yi before the reception started; and at the reception they were two of the three speakers, with the third being Liao Chengzhi.378 On October 8, both Matsumoto and Nakajima met separately with Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi, with Nakajima’s meeting also attended by Japan hands such as Zhao Anbo, Wang Shaoyun, Xiao Xiangqian, and others.379 In some ways this was the end of an era as the government of Satō Eisaku was established in November 1964, and politically there would be another period of coolness between the two countries as Satō, a younger brother of Kishi Nobusuke, was again more inclined towards open support for the ROC government. After the death of Matsumoto Jiichirō in November 1966, which contributed to the subsequent split of the JCFA into different branches, Nakajima was the most important among the long-term leaders of the pro-PRC associations still standing.

As far as cultural exchange was concerned, during the first two years under Satō the situation would never deteriorate the way it did under Kishi. The Japanese nongovernmental associations kept advocating Sino-Japanese rapprochement, but Nakajima and his network would not return to large scale anti-government activism. Exchanges continued unabated, as did Nakajima’s visits, on which

377 “Rizhong wenhua jiaoliu xiehui daibiaotuan dao Jing” [Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange delegation arrives in Beijing], Renmin Ribao, September 29, 1964.
he met Mao and Zhou in 1964, 1965, and 1966. A slightly more political tone can be discerned in the Joint Communiqués between the JCACE and CPAFC however, for example in 1965 with Nakajima and Chu Tunan denouncing the American escalation of the war in Vietnam and the new treaty and diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea. Throughout the first half of the 1960s, the JCACE became more involved with sports exchanges, and from 1966 the plan was to increase these exchanges even more. Until now there had been exchanges of table tennis, basketball, skating, and volleyball teams; and the idea was to gradually increase the number of sports. For this reason Nakajima Kenzō had a meeting with the Japan Sports Association in March 1966, where plans were made for the coming year, for Japanese delegations to China in tennis, table tennis, wrestling and cycling; and Chinese delegations to Japan of table tennis and handball. In July of that year Nakajima visited China and signed another Joint Communiqué with Chu Tunan, and met with the leadership. Unsurprisingly, the Cultural Revolution put a halt to all these plans. During the next few years, although the amount of exchange was reduced to almost zero, the JCACE worked hard to keep some kind of channel open, with Shirato Norio visiting with small delegations in May and December 1967 and September 1968. But with most cultural figures as well as Liao Chengzhi and his Japan hands largely purged or worse, there was no one left to exchange with. One of the few Japan hands who still active was interpreter Zhou Bin, and he recalls how Nakajima did make a brief visit in what was probably 1968, and how saddened Nakajima was by the fact he knew no one anymore. He returned to Japan sooner than planned, and urged Zhou Bin to pass on his regards to his many friends if Zhou ever saw them again, saying: “if you see them or their families, make sure to tell them Nakajima from Japan has not forgotten them.”

Nakajima was invited to China again in autumn 1970, at the first sign of things returning to normal and China opening up again to the outside world. Together with Matsumura Kenzō, Nakajima had

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381 “Jin yibu jiaqiang Zhongri renmin wenhua jiaoliu he youhao tuanjie” [Progress in strengthening China-Japan people’s cultural exchange and friendship], Renmin Ribao, December 9, 1965.
382 “Nicchū kōryū, sekkyokutekini: taikyō to Nicchū bunka kyōkai ga kakunin” [Active Japan-China exchange: Sports Association and Japan-China Association for Cultural Exchange collaborate], Yomiuri Shimbun, March 26, 1966.
384 Zhou Bin, Wo wei Zhongguo lingdaoren dang fanyi, 261.
become perhaps the longest serving and most loyal Japanese friend of China. This was reflected in the fact that he witnessed the October 1 parade of that year with Mao and Zhou in the leadership stands for the full 8 hours, a rare honour.\footnote{Ibid., 256.}

**The legacy of Nakajima Kenzō**

Nakajima Kenzō was a central figure in the Japanese progressive movement of his era and he and those in his circle were genuine in their struggle to change the direction in which the country was moving, and in their attempts to achieve reconciliation with China. By striving to facilitate personal interaction between the two countries, and calling for a different China policy in Japan, the JCACE placed reconciliation with China at the centre of the progressive struggle. It was therefore a very political organization, and cultural exchange was conducted in that context. In this way the association reflected its unique background in that it was in fact a brain-child of Zhou Enlai, and was very much aligned with the PRC. However it would be unfair to dismiss Nakajima as a mere puppet when clearly the association articulated the feelings of so many in the Japanese intelligentsia like Tanizaki Jun’ichirō, Nanbara Shigeru, Senda Koreya, and many more. Their sympathy for China was largely a reflection of the polarization of Japanese society and the larger Cold War, which meant they were denied the ordinary channels through which they could make amends after 1945. For the Chinese leadership the need to achieve diplomatic normalization with Japan was largely a strategic one, and People’s Diplomacy an effective way to mobilize the many Japanese that felt uneasy about Japan’s position in the international Cold War arena. Cultural relations were an important channel through which an influential elite in both countries could exchange ideas and align their goals, and since the “Japanese friends” were naturally inclined to be sympathetic to China, these goals would be largely aligned with China’s. Nakajima Kenzō was a great asset for People’s Diplomacy because he could reach Japanese from all walks of life, and not only from the leftist circles that China could already interact with via the JCFA or the leftist parties. While the constant trickle of Japanese
visitors to China served to illustrate the point to the Chinese that not the Japanese people but only some of their leaders were the enemy, the lack of official relations did mean that true reconciliation was always going to be limited. In many ways this is still a work in progress.
This chapter will deal with the media angle within People’s Diplomacy between China and Japan, by analyzing the exchange of journalists between the two countries that took place from September 1964. From the mid-1950s, when China actively embarked on its endeavours to pursue Sino-Japanese rapprochement, there had been attempts at achieving a permanent exchange of newspaper correspondents in each other’s countries. At the same time, occasional investigative reporting could be done when journalists were attached to delegations to the other country. The first delegation especially for Japanese journalists visited China in 1955, and there was keen interest on both sides to increase the interaction. With the arrival of the Kishi government in February 1957, this process was largely put on hold and it would require painstaking efforts by several media organizations, journalists like Wu Xuewen and Tagawa Seiichi (田川誠一) and most of all Japanese politician Matsumura Kenzō to finally achieve the mutual exchange of permanent correspondents in 1964. The focus of this chapter will be this process leading up to the 1964 Journalist Exchange, as well as the nature of the correspondents’ work in the early period as they established themselves in the next two years before the Cultural Revolution, in order to determine the position of the media within Sino-Japanese relations of this period. With basically no official permanent presence in each other’s countries before 1964, the exchange of journalists, and the establishment of permanent trade liaison offices in 1964 and 1965, were a significant breakthrough. In many ways this marks the period in which Sino-Japanese relations evolved from nongovernmental, or “people-to-people” to “half-governmental half-civilian.” In the words of Liu Deyou, who was one of the journalists involved in the exchange:

The agreement on LT Trade was an important step forward, a step into another era; going from a nongovernmental stage to a half-governmental half-civilian stage…

The ten years until 1962 were the first stage. It is my opinion that with the LT
The fact that correspondents were permanently based in each other’s countries from 1964 was a victory for People’s Diplomacy. Naturally this was the case with the trade representatives as well. Wu Xuewen notes that the first exchange of journalists was marked in two ways by the vision of Liao Chengzhi. First; in his instruction of the Chinese correspondents he stressed that they had to mix with Japanese broadly, moving beyond a reliance on “Japanese friends,” thereby following the template that had been developed for the Japan Group from the mid-1950s. Second; creating a unique space for an exchange of ideas with the Japanese correspondents in Beijing, he initiated a monthly “Breakfast Meeting” in the restaurant Hefeng during which he and the journalists could meet. Fortunately for this research the last two remaining participants in these meetings, Ōkoshi Yukio and Suga Eiichi, were available to be interviewed. This chapter will deal with the road towards the Journalist Exchange until 1964; the respective experiences of the first generation of correspondents from both sides; and with the monthly “Breakfast Meeting” in Beijing. One great contrast between the Chinese and Japanese journalists involved in the exchange was the fact that the Chinese journalists were clearly working in alignment with the PRC’s Japan policy, while the Japanese were of course much more independent, representing only their respective news organization.

**Sino-Japanese journalist interaction in the 1950s**

The Chinese leadership in general and Liao in particular were very concerned about reporting on Japan in China, as well as about how China was portrayed in the Japanese media. For this reason the journalists Wu Xuewen and Ding Tuo were involved with the Japan Group from the start, as were other people involved with foreign news at the Xinhua news agency. The vision for how the

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386 Interview by author, Beijing, August 25, 2014.
presentation of Japan in the Chinese media had to be aligned with the goals of People’s Diplomacy was clearly articulated. According to Wu Xuewen, Xinhua’s principles regarding reporting on Japan were to:

1. Emphasize the Sino-Japanese nongovernmental exchange and Sino-Japanese friendship activities
2. Support the Japanese people’s struggle for peace, democracy, and sovereignty
3. Expose the Japanese government’s hostility to China and pursuit of any ‘Two China’ scheme
4. Have a proper amount of reporting on Japan’s politics, economics, society, and international relations\textsuperscript{388}

As we have seen in Chapter 3, especially the protests in Japan against the Kishi government in the late 1950s received a lot of attention in the Chinese media, as did the many “Japanese friends” who visited China over the years and the Chinese delegations to Japan. This served to emphasize to the Chinese people the idea that the Japanese leaders and not the people were opposed to better relations with the PRC, something that was beneficial to the goals of People’s Diplomacy. For this reason one of the first tasks for journalists who were to focus on Japan was to get a grasp of who was who in Japan, and what their opinion on the PRC was. Liao Chengzhi gave the Xinhua journalists detailed instructions on who to focus on, and urged them to compile lists of important Japanese, thereby making them into “Japan-watchers” in the same mould as the members of the Japan Group were. Wu Xuewen recalls:

Liao’s order was to report widely on influential Japanese people from various fields, and he went so far as to rearrange the names or add new ones. From this moment onwards, the names appearing in Xinhua’s reports on Japan were often the

\textsuperscript{388} Ibid., 332.
same ones, and this was in close alignment with the policy of ‘People-to-People Diplomacy.’

There was a genuine interest on both sides to deepen mutual understanding via reporting, and the Chinese worked on this from the moment the nongovernmental visits started. As described in Chapter 2, during the 1953 visit of the Japanese Red Cross Liao would urge Wu Xuewen to interact especially with Japanese journalists who were present. When the first Chinese delegation visited Japan in 1954, the Chinese Red Cross delegation headed by Li Dechuan, Liao Chengzhi had assigned Wu Xuewen to take part in order to make the first ever dispatch from Japan on behalf of Xinhua. The idea was to send a dispatch about the historic delegation’s successful arrival, so when they reached Tokyo on October 30, Wu Xuewen wasted no time. But it was not so easy since a telegram would need to be send from the telegraph office for which Wu would need a press card. He contacted Li Tiefu (李鉄夫), a pro-PRC Overseas Chinese who ran the Asia News Agency (アジア通信社), and the latter than used his connections with Kyōdo, with which Xinhua of course had no official connection, to obtain a press card for Wu. All this took many hours, but Wu finally managed to send the first dispatch from Japan at 4:30AM on October 31, announcing their successful arrival.

On the next PRC visit to Japan, of the trade delegation headed by Lei Renmin the Spring of 1955, one aim was to make some concrete progress in the cultivation of ties with Japanese journalists. For this reason the journalists Wang Xi (汪溪) of the People’s Daily and Kang Dachuan (康大川) of the magazine Jinmin Chūgoku were added to the delegation. They focussed on what was the most obvious channel for interaction; the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association (NSK, 日本新聞協会), and invited representatives of the NSK to the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo where they were

389 Ibid., 333.
390 Ibid.
At the meeting the NSK members indicated that many journalists were interested to visit China and after consulting with Liao Chengzhi, an NSK delegation was invited to China in August 1955. The delegation was headed by Yokota Minoru (横田実), the deputy president of Sankei Shimbun and before 1945 correspondent in Beijing for the Dōmei (同盟) News Agency. Other journalists of the major newspapers and broadcasters made up the rest of the delegation, and one of the members was Yomiuri’s columnist Takagi Takeo, who was mentioned in Chapter 3 because of his connection to Nakajima Kenzō. Their reception in China was largely taken care of by Wu Xuewen. The delegation members had expressed a desire to meet with Zhou Enlai, and in case this was impossible they had prepared five questions for him in writing. But not only did Zhou provide answers to the five questions, he also agreed to meet them for a lengthy session on August 17. Liao Chengzhi and Lei Renmin, as well as several prominent Chinese journalists were also present, while Zhao Anbo and Liu Deyou served as interpreters. After dealing with the questions the journalist had prepared in writing, they could all ask another question to Zhou. As a next step after this trailblazing visit, the Chinese Journalists’ Association (中国新聞工作者協会) started proactively pursuing a permanent exchange of correspondents, via the mediation of their counterparts of the NSK. Perhaps due to its eventual failure, Chinese sources on these endeavours are scarce, but we can consult the self-published decennial history of the NSK of 1966, which describes the efforts in detail. In September 1956 the Chinese requested permission from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, mediated by the NSK, to send two correspondents to be stationed in Japan, namely Wu Xuewen and Ding Tuo. Since the NSK also wanted to exchange journalists they started negotiations with the Foreign Ministry. But because the government was cautious about deepening its ties with the communist world, especially once Kishi had come to power in February 1957, more than year went by without a decision. To speed up the process, Wu Xuewen and Ding Tuo were added to the Chinese delegation for the 3rd World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in August 1957 and again to the Chinese Red Cross delegation that visited in December of that year. They had meetings with the NSK

393 Ibid., 437.
394 Wu Xuewen, Fengyu yinqing: Wo suo jinglide Zhongri guanxi zuozhe, 164, 165.
on both occasions and discussed the journalist exchange. On their second visit Wu and Ding requested
to extend their stay in Japan so as to continue the talks, and with Yokota Minoru as their guarantor
they were allowed to stay until the end of January 1958. The talks were concerned with sending two
journalists each, even though from Japan many more news organizations wished to take part. In
reality Japan’s relations with China had already deteriorated heavily under the Kishi government and
this was the reason a permanent exchange of correspondents remained elusive despite the efforts from
journalists on both sides. What led to a sudden break between the Chinese and their counterparts in
the NSK however, was the fact that an NSK delegation visited Taiwan in February 1958. Clearly the
NSK’s and China’s principles were not aligned; as is written in the NSK history, “the position of the
NSK is that the freedom of the press is most important and it abides by the principle that the mutual
exchange of journalists should be separated from politics.”

While journalists like Wu Xuewen were occasionally able to visit Japan as a part of a delegation, of
course these visits were short and they could not visit Japan by themselves and conduct proper
investigative reporting. So a lot of the articles on Japan were a second-hand rehashing of foreign
media, both western and Japanese. This meant that in order for Xinhua to keep abreast with
developments in Japan, a journalist “pipe” with Japan was needed that would supply them with the
necessary reading materials. In his broad international activities, Liao Chengzhi had befriended
several progressive Japanese journalists, one of who was Sato Shigeo (佐藤重雄). Sato had been
stationed in Europe during the war as a correspondent for Dōmei news agency and upon returning to
Japan in 1946 he started working for Dōmei’s successor Kyōdo and became involved with
progressive activism. Because of this involvement he lost his job at Kyōdo in 1951, after which he
continued his activism and started several magazines with other progressive journalists. In 1956
Sato visited China and Liao ordered Wu Xuewen to meet him in the Minzu Hotel, where Wu and Sato
they had a meeting with fellow journalist Honda Ryōsuke (本田良介) also present. They swiftly

396 Ibid., 482.
agreed to cooperate and Sato and Hondo would set up a “Japan News Agency” (日本通信社) that would serve to gather Japanese newspapers and send them to the Xinhua offices in China. This small agency remained active for the next twenty years, and was particularly influential in keeping the Chinese up to date with events during the anti-Security Treaty demonstrations of 1959 and 1960.398

The Role of Matsumura and Tagawa

After the deterioration of ties between the Chinese and the Japanese journalist associations it was unclear via which avenue negotiations for an achievement of journalist exchange could be continued. At this moment the political “pipe” that Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi had cultivated within the LDP became of vital importance. Matsumura Kenzō would make three visits to China in 1959, 1962, and 1964. The 1962 visit came after Ikeda had come to power in Japan and the Prime Minister was eager to improve relations with China, especially in the realm of trade, culture, and journalists’ exchange, and for that reason had appointed Matsumura to act in his stead as a “pipe” with the Chinese.399 Tagawa Seiichi points out that on the 1962 visit Matsumura was accompanied not only by those in his own network but also by people of the Ikeda faction like Ogawa Heiji (小川平二), and that the trip was widely endorsed also by other factions in the LDP like those of Kōno Ichirō (河野一郎), Fujiyama Aiichirō, and Miki Takeo.400 While the topic of a Journalist Exchange was somewhat secondary to the goal of achieving a breakthrough in trade, Matsumura deftly tied the need for increased understanding by both countries’ media to several misunderstandings that had arisen in the Japanese media about China, about which Zhou Enlai had complained.401 During this visit Matsumura stated that an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations should be based on Zhou’s “Three principles” and the non-separation of politics and economics.402 This was a major breakthrough. An important

398 Ibid., 334.
399 Tagawa Seiichi, Nicchū kōshō hiroku, 32, 33.
400 Ibid., 33.
401 Ibid., 40.
difference between Matsumura’s people and other Japanese “pipes” with China was that they were not leftists naturally sympathetic to the PRC. It was of course exactly this that had attracted Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi to Matsumura. As Tagawa puts it, he and Matsumura thought a central problem in dealing with China was that in China the “information about Japan is biased, and this is because the information entering China comes from the Japanese left.”

It was their task to widen the Chinese perspective, and an important tool for that was a media presence in each other’s countries in the form of the Journalist Exchange.

In these years Matsumura would involve several people from his network in his dealings with China, people like Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Furui Yoshimi (古井喜実), Okazaki Kaheita (岡崎嘉平太, and Tagawa Seiichi. While Takasaki would become the person who via Matsumura would become involved with improving trade relations with China, it was Tagawa who was most influential in working for the establishment of the journalists’ exchange. Tagawa had been an Asahi Shimbun journalist, before he was recruited by Matsumura as his secretary and then himself got elected to the Diet for the LDP in 1960. After Matsumura’s 1962 visit, Takasaki visited with a large delegation from the Japanese business world to concretize the coming increase in trade, and on November 9, 1962, Liao and Takasaki signed the LT Trade Agreement. Trade would grow rapidly in the wake of the establishment of the LT Trade mechanism in 1962 and from 1963 the question was whether there could be a permanent representation in the form of trade liaison offices in each other’s countries. In the background of these developments Tagawa worked to achieve an exchange of correspondents. According to Liu Deyou:

By 1964 the amount of trade involved in LT Trade had reached one million dollars.

When this happened permanent offices became a necessity, and within that

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403 Tagawa Seiichi, Nippon kōshō hiroku, 41.
discussion Tagawa had been actively arguing for some time that a Journalist Exchange was also necessary. Looking at it now an exchange of journalists seems like nothing but at the time it was a political problem. Would it be permitted or not? Would permanent offices be permitted or not? This was one landmark decision. When it was permitted it was an important event in the preparation for a new era.  

With a Journalist Exchange becoming increasingly likely during the Ikeda years, news organizations on both sides were keen to place correspondents in each other’s countries. The Japanese at first still expected this to go via the NSK. But Wu Xuewen describes this was not an option:

The agreement clearly excluded the NSK. This was because the NSK maintained good relations with Taiwan. We relied on Premier Zhou’s ‘Three Principles’ and the principle of ‘non-separation between politics and economics,’ so of course we could not accept the NSK. While the Japanese at first wanted to participate in the negotiations via the NSK, when they learned of our stance they agreed to achieve the mutual exchange of journalists via direct negotiations between Liao and Matsumura.

Still this was a long process, and a lot of the negotiations took place in an informal capacity. Fortunately Wu Xuewen gives a detailed account of the process. He describes how at first many discussions were held by phone between Liao and Matsumura, on both trade and the Journalist Exchange, in April 1963. Together they decided that a Chinese delegation related to orchid flowers would be send to Japan. Matsumura was a connoisseur of orchids, but the real reason behind the sudden botanic exchange was that Sun Pinghua and Wang Xiaoyun could be added to the delegation. Sun and Wang were sent to Japan to have meetings with several government figures to iron out some

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405 Interview by author, Beijing, August 25, 2014.
issues, mainly related to trade. They had a meeting with Construction Minister Kōno Ichirō, who was seen by the Chinese as particularly invested in the promotion of Sino-Japanese trade, as well as with Takasaki Tatsunosuke. The former was seen as a potential successor to Prime Minister Ikeda and was likely seen by the Chinese as a potentially useful “pipe.” The latter had met Ikeda on behalf of the Chinese and he assured Sun and Wang that Ikeda could be relied upon to promote trade. Liao then sent Sun Pinghua to Japan again in January 1964 as part of a Peking Opera delegation, to discuss both trade and the Journalist Exchange. He had a meeting with Matsumura and Furui Yoshimi, where it became clear that both sides were resolved to achieve a breakthrough on both these fronts as soon as possible. He also had a meeting with Takasaki in the latter’s bedroom at home. Takasaki was suffering from stomach cancer and would die a few days later on February 24; Sun Pinghua heard this news when he was met by Wang Xiaoyun at Beijing Station upon his return. Following Sun Pinghua’s visit, Matsumura’s network came into action with Tagawa embarking a visit to Japan to negotiate on the details of Journalist Exchange in February 1964. The official reason for the visit was to have a meeting with the Chinese Red Cross about the right of Japanese to visit their relatives’ graves in China, but this was a cover to discuss the Journalist Exchange as well as the establishment of the trade liaison offices. Tagawa stresses that while he undertook this trip in an informal and individual capacity and was not an official envoy, he felt that he had the tacit but strong support from both the Japanese government and many in the LDP. The Chinese people involved with the exchange regard Tagawa’s input at this moment as highly significant. According to Liu Deyou:

Tagawa would accompany Matsumura on his visits to China from 1959. He also visited alone, with the aim of sounding out [the Chinese] and prepare for Matsumura’s visit to China. He made many connections in China. When

408 Son Heika [Sun Pinghua], Chūgoku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko, 119.
409 Ibid.
410 Tagawa Seiichi, Nicchū kōshō hiroku, 53.
Matsumura visited China for the third time in April 1964 and agreed with China on
the Journalist Exchange, Tagawa had visited 2 months earlier, in February.  

At the same time that Tagawa was negotiating the conditions for the exchange in China, in Japan the
NSK still expected to take the initiative in achieving the historic exchange. Encouraged by the PRC’s
international breakthroughs like the rapprochement with France, the NSK contacted their Chinese
counterparts with a concrete proposal for a Journalist Exchange in February 1964, the same month
Tagawa was in China. They received no response. Tagawa was now representing the Japanese news
organizations in their dealings with China. His first meeting in Beijing was with Xiao Xiangqian, as
director of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs. Xiao signalled to him that the image of
Japanese media in China had changed for the better, and that therefore the attitude to even the
Japanese “bourgeois” newspapers had changed:

Xiao told me: ‘The press commentary [on China] in Japan has improved
recently’… In relation to this I tried to persuade him of the importance of
newspapers and the necessity of a Journalist Exchange: ‘Isn’t a good way to work
for diplomatic normalization by fostering mutual understanding by exchanging
journalists?’ Xiao said enthusiastically: ‘With some effort we should be able to
realize this.’ When I heard his opinion I knew for certain I had to bring up the
subject of Journalist Exchange in the [following] meeting with Liao Chengzhi and
the people from Xinhua.

Of course the Chinese knew that Tagawa was the person who could discuss this topic with legitimacy
due to his connections in the Japanese media world and they trusted him because he was a confidant of
Matsumura. Liu Deyou:

411 Ryū Tokuyū [Liu Deyou], “Chūnichi kisha kōkan no kiroku,” in Wasuregataki saigetsu (Beijing: Wuzhou
Chuanbo Chubanshe/ TBS kyōryoku, 2007), 172, 173.
412 Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai nijūnen shi, 486.
413 Tagawa Seiichi, Nicchū kōshō hiroku, 54.
[Tagawa] met with Liao Chengzhi and Ding Tuo who was the head of the international desk at Xinhua, to exchange views for the first time on a Journalist Exchange. Many newspaper and broadcasting organizations in Japan had put their trust in him, and Tagawa actively put some proposals for a Journalist Exchange to Liao. It would be difficult to immediately let many newspapers and broadcasting organizations engage in mutual exchanges, so Tagawa suggested that at first one newspaper and one broadcaster from each country would both exchange one journalist. But Liao said unexpectedly that [exchanging] journalists from more organizations would be alright as well.\footnote{Ryū Tokuyū [Liu Deyou], “Chūnichi kisha kōkan no kiroku,” 173.}

After this meeting Tagawa had further talks with Ding Tuo and Wu Xuewen, working out the details. In Tagawa’s diary this entire conversation is relayed. One concern of Ding and Wu was about the non-involvement of the NSK, and the position of the Japanese government in this. Tagawa assured them that a nongovernmental exchange between newspapers and broadcasters would not be opposed. The Chinese said that there were currently eight news organizations (both newspapers and broadcasters) that had correspondents abroad, and that would likely want to participate in the exchange in Japan. As we will see below, actually the Chinese news outlets would only nominally send a correspondent and they were all working for Xinhua. Another topic that was discussed was the rights that the Chinese correspondents would have, with Ding and Wu insisting on the same treatment as other correspondents. Tagawa said this would be hard for practical reasons, due to the fact that Japan and China did not have official relations. The Chinese responded that in the case of France this had been no problem even though they had exchanged journalists before achieving rapprochement. Tagawa then assured them he would convey their views to the Japanese government and news organizations.\footnote{Tagawa Seiichi, \textit{Nicchū kōshō hiroku}, 57, 58.}
During his stay, Tagawa also conveyed a message directly from Ikeda, who requested the Chinese to invite Matsumura to China once again, implying Matsumura was basically his unofficial envoy.\(^{416}\) Upon returning to Japan Tagawa had meetings with the government and many news organizations, conveying China’s opinions.\(^{417}\) Matsumura and his associates were then invited to visit China in April. In the same month an important Chinese trade delegation led by Nan Hanchen would visit Japan, a delegation that would include Wu Xuewen. Unsurprisingly, all this progress in Sino-Japanese relations did not have the support of the pro-Taiwan Kishi faction in the LDP. And internationally, the relations between Taipei and Tokyo had been deteriorating steadily for some time thanks to the increased economic interaction between Japan and the PRC.\(^{418}\) One of the cabinet members who was in the Kishi faction was the Minister of Justice Kaya Okinori (賀屋興宣). He tried to use his power to derail the negotiations by blocking Wu Xuewen from entering Japan with the Nan Hanchen delegation, which had the desired effect of angering the Chinese. The PRC then put the entire delegation as well as the invitation of Matsumura on hold.\(^{419}\) This became a major scandal and the “Wu problem” was prominently in the news in early April, signalling the rift between the Kishi faction and the Matsumura faction and the Prime Minister.\(^{420}\) Kaya, together with Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi stated that during Wu’s visit on Liu Ningyi’s delegation the previous year had he had criticised Japan and therefore would be banned from visiting this time, but that the rest of the trade delegation was welcome.\(^{421}\) After a meeting with Furui Yoshi, Ikeda stated that he wished that Matsumura’s visit to China, which was after all Ikeda’s idea, would go ahead.\(^{422}\) According to Wu Xuewen, Zhou Enlai had realised that if the negotiations in April would not go ahead it would be a major triumph for the Kishi faction, therefore he decided the Nan delegation could go without Wu, and Matsumura could come to China.\(^{423}\)

\(^{416}\) Go Gakubun [Wu Xuewen], “Chūnichi shimbun kōkan e no tōki michinori,” 275.

\(^{417}\) Ryū Tokuyū [Liu Deyou], “Chūnichi kisha kōkan no kiroku,” 173.

\(^{418}\) Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978, 96-98.

\(^{419}\) Go Gakubun [Wu Xuewen], “Chūnichi shimbun kōkan e no tōki michinori,” 276.

\(^{420}\) “‘Gō mondai’ de sakusen kaeru Shatō,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 3, 1964 (m), 2.

\(^{421}\) “‘Kojin dake no mondai’ Go shi nyūkoku kyōhi hōshō hōkoku,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 3, 1964 (e), 1.

\(^{422}\) “Matsumura hōchū yotei-dōri ni shushō, Furui-shi ni ikō hyōmei,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 3, 1964 (e), 1.

\(^{423}\) Go Gakubun [Wu Xuewen], “Chūnichi shimbun kōkan e no tōki michinori,” 276.
On April 21, Liao and Okazaki would sign the agreement on the Memorandum on LT Trade, and Liao and Matsumura signed the Sino-Japanese Journalist Exchange Agreement. Liu Deyou, who was interpreter at the meetings between Zhou and Matsumura, is of the opinion that the agreement largely reflected China’s wishes, especially with regards to the guarantee of safety and assurance of the same treatment as other correspondents in Japan for the Chinese journalists. It was not an agreement between governments, nor between the two countries’ journalists’ associations, but between the Liao and Takasaki offices that would deal with the handling of concrete affairs. Matsumura had actually made a courtesy visit to NSK chairman Ueda Tsunetaka (上田常隆) before his visit to China, and the latter had no choice but to give his consent to Matsumura “indirectly helping with the negotiations,” as the NSK history volume puts it. The published NSK history further points out that the terms that Matsumura and Liao agreed upon, like eight correspondents on both sides that would stay for a period of one year each time, were similar to the terms proposed by the NSK. The NSK seems to have been oblivious to the fact that the political issue, meaning that there should be at least tacit agreement with Zhou’s “Three Principles,” was of the utmost importance to the Chinese. It was for this reason that they had cultivated channels in Japan that could bypass those organizations and people who did not comply, and still get their way. The establishment of the Tokyo Liaison Office of the Liao Chengzhi Office in August 1964 and the Beijing Liaison Office the Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office in January 1965 was a landmark achievement. Finally both countries had permanent representation in the other country. Of course the offices were officially nongovernmental, but especially on the Chinese side there is little doubt that they treated their Tokyo Liaison Office as an embassy. Liao Chengzhi told Sun Pinghua that “In addition to the five representatives there will be the nine journalists, so fourteen people in total. Quite an embassy. This will give you all plenty of opportunity to demonstrate your abilities.” Mayumi Itoh points out that for the Takasaki Office in Beijing the Japanese too was involved, as they sent an ex-official of the Ministry of International

424 Ryū Tokuyū [Liu Deyou], “Chūnichi kisha kōkan no kiroku,” 174.
425 Nihon Shimbun Kyōkai nijūnen shi, 485.
426 Ibid., 486.
427 Son Heika [Sun Pinghua], Chūgoku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko, 124.
Trade and Industry, Sōma Toshitsune (相馬敏常), establishing a clear government connection although of course Sōma went in a private capacity.428

The Chinese Correspondents in Japan

Perhaps for the Chinese the most notable thing about the agreement to exchange correspondents was the amount of journalists that would be involved. Wu Xuewen points out that while usually when Xinhua would send journalists to reside abroad it would be one or two per country, with in exceptional cases two or three. A clear sign of the importance they attached to their relations with Japan in general and to this initiative in particular was that they had agreed to send eight.429 Due to circumstances, the Japanese later requested to send nine, which was granted, and the Chinese ended up sending seven. The correspondents from both sides would each represent one news organization, generally a newspaper or a broadcaster. Immediately after the agreement was concluded the Chinese started to select suitable candidates, a process that was no doubt made easier thanks to the hands-on approach of Liao Chengzhi in managing reporting on Japan at Xinhua. People were selected directly by the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council,430 presumably by Liao and the Japan Group, although Liu Deyou does not know who was directly involved in selecting him. Liu:

I was not selected by Xinhua, but by people higher up. But I do not know who selected me, I was never told directly. At the time I was very active as an interpreter. I had also done reporting for the magazine [Jinmin Chūgoku] so they must have thought ‘this guy is suitable.’ I was summoned suddenly. I was 33 years old, [other correspondent] Liu Yanzhou was two years younger than me.431

428 Mayumi Itoh, Pioneers of Sino-Japanese Relations: Liao and Takasaki, 118.
430 Ibid.
431 Interview by author, Beijing, August 25, 2014.
In the end the Chinese decided to send seven correspondents. Most of them were Japan hands with a lot of experience with Japanese affairs, both before and after 1949. Based on Wu Xuewen, we can give a quick overview of their backgrounds:

Xinhua News Agency (新華社)- Ding Tuo (丁拓) He was the deputy chief if the international department of Xinhua. Originally ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia, he had studied at Hosei University in Japan in his youth and moved to China to take part in the anti-Japanese struggle. He had started working for Xinhua while in Yanan, when Liao Chengzhi was the head of Xinhua. Wu Xuewen calls him Liao’s first subordinate. He was an influential Japan Group member as discussed in Chapter 2, and together with Wu Xuewen had been very active in achieving the Journalist Exchange. As the most senior member of the group, he was the leader of the seven correspondents.

Beijing Daily (北京日報)- Tian Jianong (田家農) He studied East Asian history at Tokyo University in Japan. He returned during the Sino-Japanese War and taught University in China for several years. From 1959 he had worked for the State Council’s Foreign Culture Liaison Committee (對外文化聯絡委員會).

China News Service (中國新聞社)- Li Guoren (李國仁) He was from Taiwan and had been educated in Japan in his youth. After 1949 he had moved to the PRC and worked on Overseas Chinese issues at the China News Service. He was also a Japan Group member.

Guangming Daily (光明日報)- Liu Deyou He has already been introduced earlier, but he hailed from Dalian and had been a Japanese interpreter for Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai since the early 1950s. He had visited Japan on many delegations like Guo Moruo’s and Lei Renmin’s in 1955. He also worked on the magazine Jinmin Chūgoku and according to Wu Xuewen (and many others) he was famous for his fluent Japanese.

Dagong Daily (大公報)- Liu Zongmeng (劉宗猛) He was international editor at Xinhua. Originally from Dalian, he had been researching and reporting on Japanese economical issues for a long time.
Wenhui Daily (Shanghai) (文匯報)- Liu Yanzhou (劉延州) He was the youngest of the group. He had graduated from the media department of Peking University and had been working as a journalist for ten years already.

People’s Daily (人民日報)- Li Hong (李紅) He was international editor of the People’s Daily and had been stationed in London. He was the only one of the group who did not speak Japanese.\(^{432}\)

Their allocation to a particular news organization was somewhat random, and done mostly so as to comply with the agreement that said that each journalist must represent one organization. In reality they all worked for Xinhua. According to Liu Deyou:

> We had all become part of Xinhua before departure. What was established at the time was a Xinhua office. What had been agreed with the Japanese in the 1964 agreement was that one organization would send one person. So everyone was nominally from a different organization. Ding Tuo was from Xinhua. I was initially supposed to go for Jinmin Chūgoku, but [representing] a magazine was not allowed. The Japanese were not sending people from magazines, everyone was from a newspaper, broadcaster, or from TV. So I had to belong to some organization and I was placed with Guangming Daily. But in reality I was transferred to Xinhua and would work for them. Xinhua is a government organization. For the outside world we were called the ‘Chinese journalists’ group’ but internally we were one unit; the Xinhua Tokyo office. Internally we were all Xinhua members. All our articles were sent to Xinhua.\(^{433}\)

Those Chinese, headed by Sun Pinghua, who were sent to Tokyo to set up the Liao Office arrived in August 1964. The journalists would follow in late September of that year, and received several weeks


\(^{433}\) Interview by author, Beijing, August 25, 2014.
of rigorous training at the Xinhua offices that started in early July. They would spend most of their
time studying “the Central Committee’s principles behind the establishment of the Liao Office in
Tokyo, and behind the sending of correspondents to Japan, as well as the general situation in Japan,
Sino-Japanese relations, and the country’s Japan policy.”434 There is no doubt that all those involved
took this opportunity very seriously, and Wu Xuewen even likens their preparation to that undertaken
before a war.435 At the end of their training period they received a visit from Liao Chengzhi. His
parting advice was to be aware of the challenges ahead:

When you live in Japan, there will be many friendly Japanese and friends from the
newspaper world who will welcome you happily. But there will also be those who
will not be happy that you came. You will be beset by reactionaries wherever you
go. They will hinder, restrict, and keep watch over you. You must be sufficiently
prepared for this in your thinking. You all come from different backgrounds and
now you must unite, help each other, be disciplined, develop your work, and you
must make efforts to establish a long-term foothold.436

Especially the last sentence is significant, as it echoes Zhou Enlai’s advice to the first delegation from
the PRC to visit Japan in 1954; regardless of that the issue at hand happens to be, the Japan hands had
to train their eyes on the long-term goal, and for that it was of the most importance to gain a “foothold.”
The rest of Liao’s advice also reflected a lot of the principles behind the Japan Group “mechanism”
developed over the last decade. Like Liao had been urging his Japan hands to do, he encouraged the
journalists to mix with a wide variety of Japanese, and not to limit themselves to those Japanese
already friendly to the PRC:

434 Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben, 349.
435 Ibid., 350.
436 Ibid.
The work of journalists is the work of making friends widely. In principle, you can mix with and befriend people from the left, the centre, and the right... There are those people who oppose us today who might change tomorrow and become relatively friendly. When making friends you must think ahead. If in your surroundings you only have leftist friends or those who speak well of us, and no rightists or those who speak ill of us, your grasp of the situation is not complete… The more widely you have friends, the more useful it will be for you in establishing a long-term foothold.437

On the eve of their departure Liao Chengzhi invited Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi to speak to the journalists, and Chen gave them some advice that could serve as a motto for all Japan related work in the pre-1972 era: “Japan is a capitalist country, you will live there long-term so you must make sure to ‘emerge from the mud unsoiled.’”438

Both groups of journalists left at the same time and on September 28 their paths crossed in Hong Kong, where they met for dinner. On the evening of the next day both groups arrived at their destination. The Chinese were met at the airport by Sun Pinghua and by Japanese sympathizers.439 At first pro-PRC ethnic Chinese in Japan had organized for the group to stay for a few days in the Diamond hotel in Tokyo’s Chiyoda ward, and after a few days they moved to the Grand hotel in the same ward, conveniently located close to the Diet building, and in the hotel they could use an office. Ding Tuo, as his first action as leader of the group of journalist, in his first days visited many news organizations, well as nongovernmental groups.440 At the end of 1964, Sun Pinghua had found an appropriate building in Bunkyo ward for the Chinese of the Liao Office as well as for the journalists so that is where they established their offices and their homes.441

437 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
439 Ryū Tokuyū [Liu Deyou], “Chūnichi kisha kōkan no kiroku,” 175.
440 Ibid.
441 Ibid., 177.
The Journalist Exchange was achieved during the relatively benign, where the PRC was concerned, rule of the Ikeda government in Japan. Ikeda belonged to the progressive wing of the LDP and in his more lenient attitude towards China he was constrained by the conservative wing of the party. The Journalist Exchange finally became reality in September 1964, the same month that Ikeda was admitted to the hospital for treatment of his swiftly worsening laryngeal cancer. He would officially step down the next month and that suddenly meant the Chinese in Japan, as well as the Japan hands back in Beijing, were faced with an uncertain new situation. The Chinese correspondents threw themselves into covering the unfolding leadership context, which was a three-way election between Satō Eisaku, Kōno Ichirō, and Fujiyama Aiichirō. Liu Deyou describes his impression of the frenzied media coverage of the campaign, and his bemusement that it was backrooms deals that in reality brought Satō Eisaku to power, after Ikeda had endorsed him from his hospital bed. Matsumura and his associates were in favour of Fujiyama becoming the next Prime Minister and Matsumura had conveyed this to Zhou Enlai on his visit in April 1964, explaining that an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations was most likely under Fujiyama. Soon after this however, on Nan Hanchen’s visit to Japan in May, Satō Eisaku had dispatched Kuno Chūji (久野忠治) of the Satō faction in the LDP to meet with Nan in order to ensure him that if Satō would prevail in any future leadership contest, he would strive to continue improving relations with the PRC. Yoshihide Soeya has described how the Chinese by this time had gained a favourable opinion of Satō, as someone who might be even more inclined than Ikeda to improve Sino-Japanese relations. However, after he came to power one of the first things he did was to block a visit to Japan by Beijing mayor Peng Zhen, as well as expressing his gratitude to Chiang Kai-shek for the Treaty of Taipei, signalling a tougher stance on the PRC. The mixed messages continued with a statement expressing a willingness to proceed on the path taken by Ikeda regarding the promotion of Sino-Japanese trade. All this meant that the Chinese in Japan as

443 Furukawa Mantarō, Niechū sengo kankei shi, 228, 229.
444 Ibid., 234.
445 Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978, 48, 49.
446 Furukawa Mantarō, Niechū sengo kankei shi, 232, 233.
447 Ibid., 232.
well as those back in Beijing were struggling to making sense of the nature of the new government. One thing the correspondents were challenged by when evaluating the ideas of the new Prime Minister was the extreme vagueness of his statements, with Liu Deyou often finding himself unable to render them into intelligible Chinese. The young Japan Group member Wang Taiping, who would be based in Tokyo as a correspondent from 1969, recalls that back in Beijing, the Japan Group was actively involved with the reorientation on the new government:

In 1965, at one of Liao Chengzhi’s gatherings, in the form of the Japan Group those active in Japanese affairs from different departments had come together to discuss the nature of the Satō Cabinet, an order from Zhou Enlai. The Japan Group meeting was held in the restaurant Hefeng in the Wangfujing area of Beijing and more than 20, around 30 people attended.

The reality was that that in many ways the Satō government would come to resemble the government of his brother Kishi as far as relations with China were concerned. Still, not even during the Cultural Revolution would relations deteriorate to the level seen after the Nagasaki Flag Incident in 1958, and throughout the Satō years (1964-1972) the Chinese of the Liao Office and the correspondents that were based in Tokyo were able to remain and work there. And having a semi-official Chinese presence in Japan was considered as very important by the Chinese. The Liao Office functioned almost like an embassy, and the correspondents contributed to mutual understanding. Liu Deyou:

[Those in the Liao Office] did not have official status. However, we could send personnel to live there, and this was major progress. To be able to get to know each other was very important. The Japanese wanted to know about China. And of course the Chinese also wanted to know about Japan. And this was a step forward. There was no embassy. However, those who worked [in Japan] played an

448 Ryū Tokuyû [Liu Deyou], “Ryûnen’ saserareta jûgonen: tokuhain seikatsu no-to,” 72.
449 Interview by author, Tokyo, September 13, 2013.
important role. The understanding of the Chinese was that they were representing China. While they came to Japan under a nongovernmental label, I believe they were on a level that was half governmental half civilian. On the Japanese side some were also of the government weren’t they? Only we did not say so.\textsuperscript{450}

The Liao Office in Tokyo stood in contact with Liao Chengzhi and the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council, and Sun Pinghua would keep Liao informed about the activities of the office as well as of the journalists.\textsuperscript{451} Liu Deyou recalls how the journalists worked ferociously to keep up with all the news in Japan, and would usually begin their workday with reading newspapers and magazines for two hours, and would try to watch as much TV as they could. When something important had happened, the reading could take up the whole morning.\textsuperscript{452} As they had been instructed by Liao Chengzhi, the journalists would try to go out and meet people in order to be able to give a first hand account of the country, also outside of Tokyo. Liu Deyou:

\begin{quote}
As the first generation of journalists we could not just stay in our rooms but had to go out and get our hands on some primary materials. So not only in Tokyo but in all areas we would attend meetings and discussions, and would visit people from various backgrounds.\textsuperscript{453}
\end{quote}

While the Chinese journalists were relatively free to mix with people in this way, they would usually be shadowed by plainclothes police, who would get in their cars whenever the Chinese did. They told them it was for their own safety, although Japanese friends told Liu Deyou that the real purpose was more likely intimidation.\textsuperscript{454} While Liu Deyou describes how he pro-actively went out to report on Japanese society the way Liao Chengzhi had instructed him to do, not all Chinese journalists seem to

\textsuperscript{450} Interview by author, Beijing, August 25, 2014.
\textsuperscript{451} Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, \textit{Liao Chengzhi yu Riben}, 351.
\textsuperscript{452} Ryū Tokuyū [Liu Deyou], “Chūnichi kishō kōkan no kiroku,” 178.
\textsuperscript{453} Ibid., 179.
\textsuperscript{454} Ibid.
have had the same experience, especially those not of the first generation. Chen Bowei (陳泊微), who took over as People’s Daily correspondent from Li Hong in June 1965, describes the many obstacles he faced like this:

When we were in Tokyo, our activities were restricted by various conditions. In those days internationally there was a strong anti-communist atmosphere, and Japan was no exception. It was an era of mutual misunderstandings and no official relations, and many Japanese had the view that they had to be on guard against and keep a distance from us journalists from ‘Communist China.’ Moreover, there was the aggressive presence of anti-communist rightwing groups, who were known for harassment and terrorism. We had to take security seriously and made the rule that whenever we went out, whether on reporting business or just to buy something, we had to do so at least in pairs. Of course for the work of a newspaper reporter, this was very unsuitable.455

This situation likely worsened the longer the Satô government was in power, but the real difficulty was that as Chen’s year in Japan progressed, the atmosphere in China was rapidly radicalizing with the first signs of the Cultural Revolution. Chen:

In addition to the special international situation, we were also limited in subject matter (at the time in China the Cultural Revolution had already started and the leadership asked for reporting that was more and more leftist) and this had a big influence on our reporting. So as a result we stopped going out and spent most of

our time writing in the office. We would collect a large amount of Japanese publications and write articles with information from that.\textsuperscript{456}

\textbf{The Japanese correspondents in China}

Although it was agreed both countries would send eight correspondents, in the end the Chinese sent seven and the Japanese sent nine. The Japanese requested this change because while there was one television broadcaster represented, namely the national broadcaster NHK, this excluded the commercial TV stations. Thanks to the mediation of Tagawa Seiichi, in July 1964 the Chinese agreed that the Japanese could send an extra correspondent, with a different commercial station dispatching a representative each year.\textsuperscript{457} In the first year Tokyo TV station TBS would send Ōkoshi. TBS was chosen because they were the most keen, and had already been active in covering China, for example they had conducted the first Japanese TV interview with Foreign Minister Chen Yi in June 1964.\textsuperscript{458}

Asahi Shimbun (朝日新聞)- Matsunō Tanio (松野谷夫)

Yomiuri Shimbun (読売新聞)- Nishimura Chūrō (西村忠郎)

Mainichi Shimbun (毎日新聞)- Arai Takeo (新井宝雄)

Nihon Keizai (Nikkei) Shimbun (日本経済(日経)新聞)- Samejima Keiji (鲭島敬治)

Sankei Shimbun (産経新聞)- Suga Eiichi (菅栄一)

Nishi Nihon Shimbun (西日本新聞)- Miyata Kōji (宮田弘司)

Kyodo News Agency (共同通信社)- Yamada Reizō (山田礼三)

NHK (日本放送協会)- Kobayashi Kazuo(小林一夫)

TBS (東京放送)- Ōkoshi Yukio (大越幸夫)


\textsuperscript{457} Ōkoshi Yukio, “Pekin tokuhain no hibi-shodai Pekin tokuhain no kaisō,” in Wasuregataki saigetsu (Beijing: Wuzhou Chuanbo Chubanshe/ TBS kyōryoku, 2007), 183.

\textsuperscript{458} Ibid., 184.
The nine journalists arrived in Beijing on September 29, 1964, after having dined with their Chinese counterparts in Hong Kong the night before. It was Wu Xuewen who took care of their travel arrangements and shipment of luggage from Hong Kong to Beijing, as issue especially for the two TV reporters who travelled with a lot of equipment.\textsuperscript{459}

Ōkoshi has described how the first batch of Japanese correspondents to be based in the PRC had a generally favourable view of China and did not subscribe to any anti-PRC policy that the Japanese government might adhere to, instead it seems there was a sense of excitement to be part of an endeavour to promote mutual understanding and a move towards diplomatic normalization.\textsuperscript{460} This attitude was partially a product of the major progress that had been made during the Ikeda years, a period that were now coming to an end. Within days of their arrival, the Japanese correspondents attended the October 1 celebration, for which a record number of “Japanese friends” had come to China, as described in Chapter 3. Ōkoshi:

At the celebrations there were many Japanese and those who had dealings with Japan; Liao Chengzhi, Saionji and his wife, Nakajima Kenzō, Matsumoto Jiichirō, and so on. This time was a relatively stable era. It was an era where on both sides there were people who attached great importance to the relationship between Japan and China. I have the feeling that in Japan and in China these kinds of people do not exist anymore.\textsuperscript{461}

The journalists would be housed in the Xinqiao Hotel in Beijing, where they also had office space. On their first day they visited the Foreign Ministry to receive their foreign press cards. Within the Foreign Ministry the responsibility for foreign correspondents fell under the Press Bureau and there were

\textsuperscript{459} Ibid., 186.  
\textsuperscript{460} Ibid., 182.  
\textsuperscript{461} Interview by author, Tokyo, October 27, 2014.
several young Japan hands that had been assigned to deal with the unusually large number of Japanese journalists. Suga Eiichi recalls that most of them had recently graduated from the Japanese departments of Peking University and the Foreign Languages Institute (外国语学院), and several of them would go on to work at the Chinese embassy in Tokyo after 1972. The two Japan hands they dealt with at first were Wang Zhenyu (王振宇) and Wang Yueqin (王月琴); the former had graduated from Beijing University in the Spring of that year (1964) and would later be press counsellor at the Tokyo embassy, while the latter had graduated from the same university the year before (1963) and would move to Tokyo as the wife of the Chinese diplomat and future ambassador to Japan (in the 1990s); Xu Dunxin (徐敦信). From the end of November each of the Japanese correspondents was assigned an assistant from the Foreign Ministry. Ōkoshi was assigned Wang Zhenyu’s co-year from Peking University; Li Hongmin (李鸿敏). Sundays aside, he would come to the Xinqiao Hotel every day from 10AM to 6PM. He would help with translating whatever was needed, like the People’s Daily editorial of the day, and he would accompany Ōkoshi whenever he ventured out:

When going out to gather material to report on, he would not only interpret but also help carrying the tape recorder and film materials; we would be always together.

All the correspondents would pay the Foreign Ministry 190 yuan a month for the assistance, but I do not know how much each of the assistants received from that.

One can safely assume that having a Chinese assistant accompany the correspondents whenever they would go out to report also served to keep a check on their activities. However, Ōkoshi insists that “in my daily life in Beijing there were basically no restrictions in my freedom.” He adds that contrary to his expectations he could travel freely within the country, and in the year he spent in China, more than 60 days were spent outside of Beijing. One particularly notable trip was when he and Li Hongmin

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463 Ōkoshi Yukio, “Pekin tokuhain no hibi- shodai Pekin tokuhain no kaisō,” 186.
464 Ibid., 192, 193.
465 Ibid., 193.
travelled to Manchuria and they encountered the many Japanese who had remained there since 1945. The Chinese did make a distinction however between the Japanese media they considered friendly, and the Japanese media they considered relatively hostile. Correspondents from the latter group, comprising for example of those from the Sankei Shimbun, might be kept somewhat at a distance, with people like Wu Xuewen very mindful of the stance of each journalist and news organization. Ōkoshi:

> When it came to journalists’ exchange, there were also cases where the Chinese were not so active. On the road to Japan-China rapprochement, it put it negatively, they wanted to use the Japanese media to attract supporters. So they would make a sharp distinction [between friendly and hostile media]. For example, when announcing news and someone from Sankei was there, they would keep their distance. But with Kyōdo they had good relations. Wu Xuewen understood this situation very well.  

Of the media from outside of the communist bloc, Reuters, DPA, AFP, as well several Canadian correspondents were represented in the PRC, and all had to abide by the same rules for reporting. For specific investigative reporting permission was required from the Foreign Ministry’s Press Bureau, and when they wanted to travel outside of Beijing they need permission for his from the Press Bureau and the police, which could take one or two weeks. There were no press conferences in China at the time and generally news would be relayed by the Foreign Ministry via written announcements, for which the journalists would have to rush to the Ministry, often in the middle of the night. These announcements were in Chinese, French, Russian, and English. While for the first two months all the Japanese correspondents would rush over in taxis, after a while they organized themselves in a “Beijing Japanese Journalist Club” (北京特派員記者クラブ) so that one representative of the group

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466 Ibid., 195.  
467 Interview by author, Tokyo, October 27, 2014.  
468 Suga Eiichi, “Mō Takutō shakaishugi- Chūgoku no fūkei,” 54, 55.
could receive the statements. Naturally the journalists were keen to interview China’s leaders but this was not possible. Suga Eiichi recalls when he requested this at the Press Bureau, he was told the leaders were too busy, or that “this is because the Chinese journalists in Tokyo are not able to meet with the leaders of the Japanese government.”

They were granted a rare privilege however, that shows that the Chinese leadership did in fact value their presence in the country; the monthly “Breakfast Meeting” with Liao Chengzhi.

The Hefeng Breakfast Meetings

Unlike in Japan in the 1960s, in China there were no press conferences held by the government. As described above, announcements would be handed out in written form by the Foreign Ministry without the opportunity to ask questions. This lack of direct communication with members of the government was a major handicap for foreign correspondents in China at the time. Wu Xuewen recalls that with the large contingent of Japanese journalists due to join the ranks of foreign correspondents in September 1964, it was Saionji Kinkazu who brought up this issue with Liao Chengzhi. Liao understood the expectations of the Japanese correspondents, and for their sake it was decided to organize a monthly “Breakfast Meeting” (朝飯会) in Hefeng (和風) in the Wangfujing area of Beijing; the only Japanese restaurant in the city at that time. Ultimately it was Zhou Enlai who was behind the plan. Liao would attend these meetings, at which the Japanese could freely ask questions. These meetings were a unique privilege not granted to journalists from any other country, signifying how much the Chinese valued the presence of the Japanese media in China. Naturally other foreign correspondents in Beijing viewed this treatment of their Japanese colleagues with envy. Looking at Hefeng Breakfast Meetings more closely can provide us with a window into one of the most interesting interactions between China and Japan in the pre-1972 period.

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469 Ōkoshi Yukio, “Pekin tokuhain no hibi- shodai Pekin tokuhain no kaisō,” 189.
471 Go Gakubun [Wu Xuewen], “Chūnichi shimbun kōkan e no tōki michinori,” 278.
473 Go Gakubun [Wu Xuewen], “Chūnichi shimbun kōkan e no tōki michinori,” 279.
First of all, the existence of a Japanese restaurant in the heart of Beijing in the 1960s was in itself a small achievement in Sino-Japanese cooperation. By 1961, the second year of the Ikeda government, friendly trade and other exchanges with Japan were increasing rapidly and about twenty Japanese from companies and business associations would be based for short periods in Beijing at any one time, all in the Xinqiao Hotel. In 1961 one of them was Minamimura Shirō; at the time he was stationed in China for six months but he had in fact been born in Dalian in the Manchukuo puppet state in 1928 and lived in China until he was of middle school age, and on and off from the late 1950s. In 1961 he had befriended Saionji Kinkazu, and Saionji one day asked Minamimura to manage and set up the first Japanese restaurant in Beijing. Minamimura recalls:

One day Saionji suddenly said he had something he wanted to discuss with me. I had no idea what it would be, but he asked: ‘Would you like to run a Japanese restaurant in Beijing?’ I was asked to run it even though I had no restaurant experience. But it was not a joke. Saionji was very good in these things. It was Liao Chengzhi who wanted to eat Japanese food and had said: ‘Can anything be done about it? I want to eat it, you want to eat it!’ Saionji had then said to Liao: ‘I also think it would be good if there was a Japanese restaurant.’ And to me he said: ‘And then we thought about you.’ When Liao Chengzhi and Saionji wanted something then one could not refuse, so I said I would start learning and asked where the restaurant was. He said it would be in the old Dongan market (東安市場) in Wangfujing, and after requesting to see it we went there. It was in a warehouse, large but dirty. I was thinking about how to make it into a Japanese restaurant.474

474 Interview by author, Yokohama, January 30, 2014.
While there were no Japanese restaurants in Beijing at the time, in the Northeast there was still a sizable Japanese community, especially in Dalian, and Minamimura could draw on this expertise: “I had been learning all kinds of things, but still wondered from where to get a cook. Then Liao said we could find a good one in Dalian. In the early 1960s in Dalian, there were still Japanese restaurants and many people who cooked Japanese food in their homes.” Tatami mats were imported from Kyoto, and shipped to Tianjin, as were certain seasonings and drinks:

Japanese sake, soya sauce, and miso would be imported by ship. As for what kind of sake would be good, I consulted with Saionji, who was a connoisseur. Exported sake would come with added preservatives, but there was no other way. A difficulty was fish. It would be flown in from Dalian, Qingdao, or Ningbo. Since it was a project of Liao Chengzhi, anything was possible.

More than just to indulge the fancy of Liao Chengzhi however, the restaurant was created in anticipation of growing interaction between the Chinese and Japanese from the early 1960s onwards. So the story of Hefeng is more than an interesting anecdote; Liao Chengzhi had a vision for the restaurant as a meeting place for both sides, and it is yet another example of the optimistic atmosphere under the Ikeda government. Minamimura:

The management was done by Liao’s office and I was just helping. At the time it was the only Japanese restaurant in Beijing. It was not only about Liao wanting to eat Japanese food, it was also meant to be a place of reception for those Japanese who would visit as part of the people-to-people exchange.

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475 Ibid.
476 Ibid.
477 Ibid.
The clearest example of how Hefeng functioned as a place for the facilitation of Sino-Japanese interaction is clearly the monthly Breakfast Meetings held with the journalists. It was also a meeting place for the tiny Japanese community in Beijing in the 1960s. For example the Japanese journalists, together with other Japanese in Beijing like those who worked in Hefeng, would celebrate the many Japanese traditions surrounding the new year there, like rice-pounding and the making and offering of mochi rice cakes. Minamimura had travelled especially to the Yanbian region in Jilin province, where among the ethnic Korean community he was able to find the type of millstone and mallet that are essential for the Japanese end-of-year tradition of rice-pounding, a ritual that the Japanese in Beijing enjoyed a lot. The Chinese Japan hands around Liao Chengzhi would also occasionally use the restaurant for their meetings. As was noted earlier in this chapter, Wang Taiping recalls that when they held their large meeting discussing the incoming Satō cabinet, they did so in Hefeng. According to Minamimura, on ordinary days the majority of customers were Chinese:

[Ordinary] city people would come too, but mostly were [high-ranking] cadres. A bowl of rice was three yuan, so quite expensive. At that time the beginning workers’ wage was around thirty yuan. When calculating the cost, this was the price. But we also prepared a curry rice dish for some tens of cents. But most of the customers were of bureau chief level in some organization. The employees would wear Japanese clothes. The name Hefeng came from Saionji or Liao.

The Breakfast Meetings started almost immediately after the Japanese journalist had arrived in China in late September 1964. There seems to be some disagreement when exactly the first meeting was held; according to Ōkoshi Yukio it was on October 12, and Suga Eiichi saying it was sooner after

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478 Ōkoshi Yukio, “Pekin tokuhain no hibi- shodai Pekin tokuhain no kaisō,” 194.
479 Interview by author, Yokohama, January 30, 2014.
480 Interview by author, Tokyo, September 13, 2013.
481 Interview by author, Yokohama, January 30, 2014.
482 Ōkoshi Yukio, “Pekin tokuhain no hibi- shodai Pekin tokuhain no kaisō,” 191.
arriving, on October 2 or 3.⁴⁸³ Liao Chengzhi made clear it was to be an informal gathering, and an opportunity to ask questions freely. Ōkoshi Yukio recalls:

Liao said: ‘Let’s speak informally and frankly, and without reservations on both sides.’ This made for a very comfortable atmosphere from the start and it was as if we had been friends for years. The Breakfast Meetings were generally held in Japanese and organized by Liao Chengzhi and Saionji. The meetings were held for a year but stopped abruptly in the second year.⁴⁸⁴

Suga Eiichi confirms this: “We were told we could ask anything. Actually it was like a press conference. The one who led and spoke was Liao Chengzhi.”⁴⁸⁵ The Japanese correspondents and Saionji Kinkazu would the Breakfast Meetings attend without fail, and from the Chinese Liao would often be accompanied by around six Japan Group members. Ōkoshi Yukio describes the scene:

In Hefeng, apart from the seating area with chairs, there were three Japanese style rooms. For the Breakfast Meeting, the rooms would be added together, opening a long narrow space. The Japanese and Chinese would sit on opposite sides of a long table, with the Chinese on the wall side with Liao Chengzhi in the middle. Next to him would be Zhao Anbo and one or two people from the Foreign Ministry’s Press Bureau. They would sit in order like they would in the office. Wang Zhenyu and Tang Jiaxuan were there sometimes. From the Liao Office [Japan Group] Wang Xiaoyun and Xiao Xiangqian would be there. Saionji would be sitting in the corner on the Chinese side, observing carefully. Sometimes he would tell us afterwards ‘don’t ask such and such a question.’ Zhao Anbo, at the time the deputy head of the CJFA, was a big drinker and was the type who would drink from the morning

⁴⁸³ Interview by author, Tokyo, June 20, 2014.
⁴⁸⁴ Ōkoshi Yukio, “Pekin tokuhain no hibi- shodai Pekin tokuhain no kaisō,” 191.
⁴⁸⁵ Interview by author, Tokyo, June 20, 2014.
onwards. Wu Xuewen and others attended as well. The Japanese would appoint a leader from among themselves. They would sit in order of arrival and split the bill among them.486

The Japanese were well aware that this was an opportunity that was granted only to them and that it greatly surpassed a press conference in terms of the amount of interaction they could have with government officials.487 This stood in marked contrast to the situation of the Chinese correspondents in Japan. When they were back for brief visits in Beijing they would also attend the Breakfast Meetings. Liu Deyou recalls:

During a holiday I attended once. Liao Chengzhi was a great speaker, very articulate. This was because he was so knowledgeable about Japan. The Japanese journalists also received information. I was in Japan so I felt very envious. At the Japanese foreign Ministry press conferences the [Taiwanese news agency] CNA (中央社) was represented.488

While Ōkoshi Yukio maintains, as we will see below, that it was the Chinese would suggested to meet every month, Suga Eiichi recalls that some months “it was held, and some not. It was us who suggested holding it regularly every month, to which Liao Chengzhi then agreed.”489 Later generations of Japanese journalists look back at this opportunity with nostalgia. For example Iwaki Hiroyuki (岩城浩幸), who was Beijing correspondent for TBS in the early 1990s, puts it like this:

This way the Japanese journalists could learn things not just from Xinhua news or People’s Daily articles, but get a grasp of the Chinese government’s inner workings.

486 Interview by author, Tokyo, October 27, 2014.
487 Ōkoshi Yukio, “Pekin tokuhain no hibi- shodai Pekin tokuhain no kaisō,” 190.
488 Interview by author, Beijing, August 25, 2014.
489 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 20, 2014.
Via a broad scope of discussions… they were privy to some bold predictions for the near future… Gradually the Japanese journalists got the impression that by speaking with Liao Chengzhi in the ‘Hefeng talks’ they actually got to speak with Zhou Enlai.\footnote{Iwaki Hiroyuki, “‘Chūgoku no mado’- Shū Onrai ‘ryû’ to kisha,” 201, 202.}

Suga Eiichi describes how “apart from Sino-Japanese relations, we would speak about China –USSR relations, the situation in Vietnam, and so on, and get a good grasp of China’s position and thinking, and it was a great resource for gaining an understanding of the situation.”\footnote{Suga Eiichi, “Mō Takutō shakaishugi- Chūgoku no fūkei,” 57.}

Regularly important news would be conveyed at the meetings, which made it convenient that it was in the morning. According to Suga Eiichi, this was “for the sake of Liao Chengzhi. He was busy in the evening. It would last for about two hours. Whenever there was news we would all rush back to the office.”\footnote{Interview by author, Tokyo, June 20, 2014.} Ōkoshi Yukio also says that this made attendance a must for the Japanese; “No one would be absent from the Breakfast Meeting. This is where possibly the most important news would be revealed.”\footnote{Interview by author, Tokyo, October 27, 2014.} Suga recalls that Liao said to them they would be the first to hear certain news:

Liao had said: ‘When there is important news, you Japanese correspondents will know even before [USSR news agency] TASS.’ [Therefore] people from the French and Eastern European embassies, as well as the TASS and Pravda correspondents, would seek out the Japanese correspondents about the Breakfast Meeting. Also, I have heard that in among some people there was resistance against the holding of the meetings.\footnote{Suga Eiichi, “Mō Takutō shakaishugi- Chūgoku no fūkei,” 57, 58.}
Of course this resistance had to do with the unfair advantage the Japanese had, thanks to the special concerns of Liao Chengzhi. There was plenty of opportunity to bring up topics that the Japanese were interested in, often concerning current issues. Ōkoshi gives an example:

What we were interested in, since it was the year of the Tokyo Olympics, was why China had not participated? Also, why did they not participate in the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union,\(^495\) under the leadership of NHK? My impression is that it had to do with the ‘Two China’ issue. It was hopeless. Basically there were unacceptable conditions. The Japanese media had visited Taiwan with a delegation, which was denounced. We had not gone. It was thoroughly denounced in Beijing.\(^496\)

But much more than just a question and answer session between the journalists and Liao, Liao Chengzhi also used the Breakfast Meetings to keep a finger on the pulse of what was going in Japan. According to Ōkoshi; “The Chinese wanted to hold the Breakfast Meeting once a month from the start. Using this route, they hoped to obtain information that the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not have yet.”\(^497\) At the meetings Liao would impress the Japanese by how informed he was about Japanese society, and he wanted to discuss articles he had read in the Japanese press. Also, it is clear one of the main sources of information about Japanese society for him was Saijonji Kinkazu. Suga recalls that Liao would always address Saionji with great respect, often calling him “Lord” (tonosama 殿様), as in: “Isn’t it so, my Lord?”\(^498\) Ōkoshi describes a typical meeting:

Liao Chengzhi would start by wishing everyone a good morning, and told us to make ourselves comfortable. He spoke frankly. In my memory, he would often

\(^{495}\) Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU, アジア放送連合) was also founded in 1964, and exists to this day. Because of the Taiwanese media’s participation the PRC refused to join.

\(^{496}\) Interview by author, Tokyo, October 27, 2014.

\(^{497}\) Ibid.

\(^{498}\) Interview by author, Tokyo, June 20, 2014.
read [the Japanese magazines] bungei shunjū (文藝春秋), sekai (世界), and chūō kōron (中央公論) and would ask: ‘Who has written this?’ and ‘Did everyone read that?’ His intention was to clarify the real meaning behind the article in question. The Liao and Saionji families knew each other intimately, and had a close relationship.\(^{499}\)

As noted before, Liao Chengzhi and the Chinese leadership were highly concerned about the succession struggle in the last days of the Ikeda government in October and November 1964. In fact, Liao had already been concerned about the next government at the 1962 talks with Matsumura Kenzō, because any progress made between the negotiators could possibly be undone if a Prime Minister unfriendly to the PRC would succeed Ikeda.\(^{500}\) Liao used the first few Breakfast Meetings to hear the views of the journalists about the current situation. From his persistence we can see how much interest the Chinese had in the unfolding leadership contest. Ōkoshi:

The Satō government was established in mid November I believe. Before we left [for China] Ikeda’s health had worsened and it was announced he would retire to recuperate. So at the first Breakfast Meeting, Liao Chengzhi asked: ‘Is Ikeda really that ill?’ and ‘If Ikeda retires who will be next?’ as well as ‘Will it be Fujiyama? Will it be Kōno? Will it be Satō?’ and ‘What does everyone think?’ I remember this very clearly. And not only at the Breakfast Meetings; when we met him at parties and so on, he would go on about it.\(^{501}\)

After the founding of the new government a lot of the discussions at the Breakfast Meetings dealt with; the subject of Sino-Japanese relations, changes in the Japanese political scene, and the gradual move towards the right of the Satō government. Ōkoshi:

\(^{499}\) Interview by author, Tokyo, October 27, 2014.

\(^{500}\) Tagawa Seiichi, *Nicchū kōshō hiroku*, 36.

\(^{501}\) Interview by author, Tokyo, October 27, 2014.
The Chinese were most interested in the political situation, and trends in Japanese politics. On the Chinese side the goal of the Zhou-Liao line was to realize diplomatic normalization between Japan and China soon. Small steps forward had been made by the efforts of Matsumura and the establishment of the Ikeda government, but the establishment of the Satō was a great setback. The Chinese wanted to know where this would lead. For the Chinese the mistrust of Satō hardened after his visit to Taiwan.502

The founding of the Satō government set in motion another period of slow deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations, that would eventually lead to a cancellation of the Breakfast Meetings. Suga:

More than on issues like politics and economics we would focus on Sino-Japanese relations. At the start the Ikeda government was in power, but when the Satō government took over, Liao Chengzhi would attack Satō vigorously, especially after Satō had visited Taiwan… He also criticised the USSR heavily. Then the Breakfast Meetings were held sporadically. In the end, it was held twelve times until November 1965. [Of the journalists] only me and Samejima attended all twelve meetings… Its ending had a lot to do with the founding of the Satō government. Nothing would be said about Prime Minister Ikeda but Satō was much criticised.503

The Breakfast Meeting was a unique arrangement in Sino-Japanese relations in the pre-1972 period, starting from a very brief window of rapidly improving ties at the end of the Ikeda era. While this era was basically at an end when the Journalist Exchange started, the ripples of goodwill would continue for a while and make the Breakfast Meetings possible. It was the worsening relationship under the

502 Ibid.
503 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 20, 2014.
government that finally led to the cancellation of the Breakfast Club. The restaurant Hefeng was not affected by this and according to Minamimura Shirō it was open from around 1962/1963 to 1966/1967, when the Cultural Revolution led to the restaurant closing its doors.  

The achievement of the Journalist Exchange in 1964 was an excellent example of the efforts of the Matsumura network, especially Tagawa Seiichi, and shows the use of this kind of “pipe” for the Chinese. The task of the Chinese journalists in Japan, who worked for the government’s Xinhua agency was clearly defined by and aligned with Zhou’s Japan policy. The Japanese journalists were of course in a very different situation, but they were also at the centre at one of the most interesting interactions of People’s Diplomacy in this era: the “Breakfast Meetings.”

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504 Interview by author, Yokohama, January 30, 2014.
Conclusion

China’s People’s Diplomacy towards Japan as it developed from the early 1950s was aimed at creating favourable circumstances for a Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. The fact that Japan had been pressured to forego relations with the PRC in favour of relations with the ROC in 1952 meant that nominally people-to-people ties were the only avenue open to the Chinese for achieving their goals. The term People’s Diplomacy is perhaps somewhat confusing when we have seen the tight government control the Chinese exerted over these supposedly nongovernmental exchanges. The strategy of “using the people as government officials” was born out of necessity and did not imply a freewheeling interaction between Chinese and foreigners. The people that were to engage in the exchanges had to be schooled in the government’s aims and principles regarding Japan, which in turn necessitated the creation of the Japan Group. The Japan Group members could serve as a vanguard managing People’s Diplomacy; they were well aware of its goals and were in charge of overseeing all contact. It is no coincidence that this Japan Group mechanism was in place by the mid-1950s, before projects like promoting cultural exchange via the JCACE were embarked upon. In order for an increase in people-to-people exchange with Japan to have the desired effect, careful deliberation and oversight was essential. A lot of thought went into the management of the Chinese that were to partake in the exchanges and the Japanese that were the desired targets for it. For the Chinese participants, Japan Group members would always be among visiting groups to Japan and take care of the long-term contacts made on these visits. For the Japanese participants in the exchanges, a painstaking process of recruiting “pipes” started paying off from the late 1950s, when loyal “Japanese friends” like Nakajima Kenzō and Saionji Kinkazu could be relied upon to serve as channels facilitating the type of exchanges the Chinese leadership desired. As for the political contacts that were made by the late 1950s, especially with Matsumura Kenzō and his network, these were responsible for the most eye-catching successes of People’s Diplomacy like the trade liaison offices and the Journalist Exchange. In addition to the Japan Group mechanism and the Japanese connections that it made, the use of media to enhance understanding on both sides was a target for the Chinese and
many Japanese journalists from the mid-1950s. This then became possible as a result of People’s Exchange. Delving more deeply into the background of the Chinese journalists, we have been able to see that their training before they embarked on their mission was similar to that of the Japan Group, and some members of the journalists and the Japan Group even overlapped. This shows that all activity in this period was steeped in the principles of People’s Diplomacy and was guided by Liao Chengzhi and Zhou Enlai. An overall concern for the Chinese leadership was clearly to widen their network beyond the leftist circles that were already sympathetic to them.

One question raised in the introduction was how the Chinese went about creating new allies. As we have seen in Chapter 1 and 2, to a large extent the Chinese used the negotiations with Japanese nongovernmental groups on issues like trade and repatriation, as well as international conferences, to seek out Japanese that could serve as useful “pipes” in the future. Until around 1956 this would largely have been political figures, like Sonoda Sunao and Kazami Akira, who could advance the PRC’s cause in parliament and allow the Chinese to move closer being in touch with actual government figures. But once it became clear, after Kishi Nobusuke came to power in Japan in 1957, that a swift rapprochement was not in the cards, the existing network was used to expand into different sections of Japanese society more widely. Introductions were made via people deemed loyal, such as Kazami Akira and Senda Koreya introducing Nakajima Kenzō and Miyazaki Ryūsuke introducing Matsumura Kenzō. Once these types of channels were well oiled the network could expand even further. In Nakajima’s case he drew in many of the mainstream intelligentsia that the Chinese were interested in meeting, while Matsumura was someone with very real connections in the halls of power. As for the question why these types of “pipes” were a priority, it should be clear by now that these informal channels were a way to create a groundswell of support of the PRC, or at least for the idea of Sino-Japanese rapprochement, among influential sections of Japanese society. For this it was essential to broaden the PRC’s appeal beyond traditional leftist circles, while at the same time riding the wave of growing discontent within Japan regarding Japan’s foreign policy stance and relations with the US. At the same time, a constant trickle of “Japanese friends” visiting China, something that was widely covered in the domestic media, served to soften Japan’s image and
emphasize the point that Japan’s leaders might be the enemy, but the Japanese people’s goals were in fact aligned with those of the Chinese. This was a necessary precaution since the improved relations with Japan that the Chinese desired were not necessarily supported by Chinese public opinion.

In Chapter 1, after a brief overview of the scene in 1950s Sino-Japanese relations was given, after which the mechanism and ideas behind the establishment of two important “pipes” among the Japanese have been explored. In many ways the 1950s were a decade in which the Chinese were still grappling with how to approach the unusual international situation in which they found themselves; their relations with countries outside the communist bloc severely hampered by the US’ efforts to isolate them. One thing that proved to be a particular challenge when developing People’s Diplomacy towards Japan was the lack of consistency of the China policy of the Japanese leadership. During the Hatoyama years (1954-1956) the Chinese pushed for as much recognition from the Japanese government as possible, without really achieving their aim. Then when things looked more promising than ever during the brief interlude of the Ishibashi government, this was only followed by the rise of Kishi and the darkest period in Sino-Japanese relations after 1949. But the two “pipes” that were cultivated in the latter half of the 1950s, Saionji Kinkazu and Matsumura Kenzō, as well as Nakajima Kenzō, show that this was a period that was very fruitful indeed for the development of relations in the future. This was a time when China’s Japan policy started concentrating on the long-term, laying the basis for the transnational network that had to bring about the desired goal of diplomatic normalization.

In Chapter 2, the role of the Japan Group has been analysed; by looking at its history, the profiles of the Japan hands themselves, and the mechanism that enabled them to be the vanguard of Zhou Enlai’s People’s Diplomacy towards Japan. Centred on the Zhou Enlai-Liao Chengzhi axis, the key value of the Japan Group was that they provided the continuity necessary for carrying out Zhou’s strategy of building a transnational network working towards the shared goal of rapprochement. For the cultivation of ties with a wide variety of people in Japan, this continuity was needed for the focus on the long-term, beyond any immediate result in this negotiation or other. Often particular Japan hands
were encouraged to interact with particular members of a visiting delegation, and from the 1950s it became common to send them along with delegations to Japan, to keep the backchannels well oiled. Especially when a breakthrough was around the corner, like in the case of the trade liaison offices and the Journalist Exchange in the 1960s, someone like Sun Pinghua would accompany unrelated delegations to Japan to meet with “pipes”, in this case from the Matsumura network. Their prime task was to widen their network in Japan, especially outside of leftist circles. They embodied the strategy behind people-to-people exchange, and in a way they did not just carry out this policy but they were the policy themselves.

In Chapter 3, one particular avenue within China’s People’s Diplomacy towards Japan has been explored; cultural relations. Cultural relations as a politically significant vehicle for exchange is not a field that receives a lot of attention, but since the Chinese saw it as a promising route through which they could widen their reach in Japan, this vehicle is particularly interesting. The interest in widen cultural exchange can be traced back to 1955, when at the urging of Liao Chengzhi and Zhou Enlai, Katayama Tetsu and Senda Koreya set out to find someone who could serve as a cultural “pipe.” The fact that the JCACE was founded as a brain-child of the Chinese leadership makes this association a particularly interesting case-study. This fact makes the JCACE unique among the many Japanese pro-PRC nongovernmental groups, and it is a testimony to the importance the Chinese attached to broader exchange with the mainstream intelligentsia in Japan after the mid-1950s. Another reason that this is a good example of how the Chinese pursued their aims is that in Nakajima Kenzō was the prominent figure in Sino-Japanese relations because of his neutral image, which would widen the association’s appeal among the mainstream. This stood in marked contrast to the other nongovernmental groups in Japan that were seen as more leftist. It is somewhat ironic however, that the JCACE was the one association in Japan that was founded directly at the instigation of the PRC. By tracing the founding and development of the association, we have been able to see how a particular channel was cultivated by the Chinese Japan hands and for what purpose. A channel within the cultural scene in Japan allowed the PRC to tap into the groundswell of anti-establishment feeling towards the late 1950s and place improved Japan-China relations at the centre of the Japanese progressive struggle.
In Chapter 4, by taking the achievement of the Journalist Exchange of 1964 as the starting point, the role of media within People’s Diplomacy has been explored. This was one of the two major breakthroughs of the 1960s, the other being the establishment of “LT Trade” and the trade liaison offices. But while the latter is well known by academics, the former event has not yet received the academic attention it deserves. By tracing the process by which the 1964 exchange came about we have been able to highlight the important role of Matsumura Kenzō and his network, among which Tagawa Seiichi especially played a pivotal role. On the Chinese side the Japan Group member Wu Xuewen worked for years to bring about the exchange, and he gives a detailed account of exactly how the Chinese correspondents were to carry out their tasks. This was in many ways similar to the way the Japan Group itself had to approach the Japanese, with the key focus being on broadening their access within Japan. For the correspondents this meant looking beyond the leftist circles in Japan and get information from a wider variety of sources, something that was thoroughly aligned with the the Japan policy of the Chinese leadership, keen to engage with mainstream Japan. As for the Japanese correspondents, naturally their motivations were very different and each journalist simply represented their respective media organization. For the Chinese their presence was important because they wanted favourable coverage of the PRC in the Japanese media. The Japanese journalists were part of a unique exchange of ideas however when they took part in the monthly “Breakfast Meetings” with Liao Chengzhi in the Japanese restaurant Hefeng. These meetings were a dynamic example of People’s Diplomacy in action, with Liao Chengzhi keen to discuss the domestic situation in Japan while at the same time sharing the Chinese vision of Sino-Japanese relations with the assembled Japanese.
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