Kenneth Colegrove and Japan, 1927–1946

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Among the small group of American scholars specializing in studying modern Japan, Kenneth Wallace Colegrove (1887–1975) was a recognized name in the academic community, both in his field of political science and in the study of modern Japan. A scholar who had begun his career as an Americanist, Colegrove in the 1920s switched his specialty to the study of modern Japanese government; the reason behind this is not known but Colegrove probably became fascinated by the democratization of Japan in the 1920s. Spending the bulk of his academic life in the political science department at Northwestern University until his retirement in 1953, Colegrove was well-connected in the American academic community and in influential circles as a result of his stature as secretary-treasurer of the American Political Science Association from 1937 to 1946 and a member of the editorial board of *Amerasia*, a journal specializing in contemporary U.S.-Asia relations, from 1936, to his resignation from the board in May 1943.

My article argues against Tetsuro Kato’s portrayal of Charles B. Fahs, Colegrove’s student, as the originator in the American government about using the Emperor as “the symbol of peace.” While I do not dismiss Fahs’ role in the wartime policy debate about the Japanese Emperor, it is far more important to note Colegrove’s prewar influence in Japan Studies in the U.S. regarding the spread of Tatsukichi Minobe’s constitutional interpretation of the Japanese Imperial Throne and the Emperor as Japan’s “symbol of unity.”

Furthermore, although Shoichi Koseki writes in his influential and award-winning book that Colegrove arrived in Japan in early March of 1946, Colegrove was unable to arrive in Japan until after mid-April. Colegrove left

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Washington D.C. on April 13 and arrived in Tokyo on April 20, 1946. Contrary to Koseki’s portrayal of Colegrove, the Northwestern University professor played no influential role in the formulation of Japan’s postwar Constitution. Had Colegrove arrived in Japan at the time MacArthur ordered General Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Government Section in the General Headquarters (GHQ), to write a Constitution for Japan, Colegrove’s ideas that were based on his prewar studies of the Japanese politics and constitutional system, would have been at odds with the content of the postwar Constitution formulated by MacArthur’s staff because Colegrove’s view of reforming the Meiji Constitution shared the prospoals made by the Japanese government and by Prince Fumimaro Konoe. Colegrove’s late arrival in Japan was probably a blessing in disguise for him because had he arrived early he could have disputed with MacArthur and Whitney over the postwar Japanese constitution. Colegrove was content with their constitution that was far more democratic than the Meiji Constitution and that preserved the Imperial Throne as a symbolic monarchy.2

Finally, Colegrove was never on the far left of the American political spectrum as suggested by Robert P. Newman. Colegrove’s world outlook was that of a conservative anti-Communist internationalist since the prewar years.3

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2 Shoichi Koseki, *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution* (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 141–43, 153–56; the latter pages here point to Colegrove acting as an informal liaison between GHQ and FEC but Colegrove’s role was only reporting to MacArthur and Whitney FEC’s activities and defending the two men and their occupation policy of Japan; see the files “Courtney Whitney, 1946” and “Courtney Whitney, 1947–1949” in the Kenneth W. Colegrove Papers (hereafter KWC), Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa (hereafter HHL). With regard to Colegrove’s arrival date to Japan and departure date from Japan, see an undated and untitled document he submitted to the War Department in “War Department Civil Affairs, undated” in KWC, HHL. In addition, see in KWC, HHL, Echols to Colegrove, April 12, 1946, “War Department Civil Affairs, April — December, 1946,” One should note here the State Department’s support for MacArthur’s push to realize a new constitution for Japan and the open or tacit approval by the American delegates in the FEC for the Department’s such decision. See A.J. Bacevich, *Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1949* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), Chapter 12.

This article examines four issues to understand Colegrove’s view of Japan and his role in U.S.-Japan relations from the late 1920s to the immediate postwar years. First, when did Colegrove begin his study of Japan’s Meiji Constitution and what academic theories in his field most influenced his observation of the Japanese government? Second, this article demonstrates that since the early 1930s Colegrove consistently maintained his view of the Japanese Emperor as “the symbol of unity” and a positive influence for a liberal trajectory in the Japanese polity. Third, who assisted Colegrove, who had no language competency in Japanese, in his study of the Japanese government and what were Colegrove’s intellectual contributions in Japan studies? Finally, what were Colegrove’s contributions as a conservative internationalist in U.S.-Japan relations from the 1930s to the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War? By examining these issues, one realizes that Colegrove’s anti-communism and preference for Tatsukichi Minobe’s teachings of the Japanese constitution were the central factors that motivated him to support both a moderate reform of the Japanese government and the conservative prewar internationalists around the Emperor, thoughts that went hand-in-hand with his belief in Japan’s ability to renew a not-so-drastic liberal democratic trajectory that would be perceived as conservative from people of left-wing persuasions, including those with whom he vehemently disagreed (such as Owen Lattimore) regarding the future of East Asia from the late 1930s to 1945. The significance of Colegrove’s visit to Japan in April 1946 was his role in reuniting conservative internationalists such as himself and Joseph Grew, the prewar American Ambassador to Japan, and Japanese conservative internationalists such as Count Shinken Makino, Ayske Kabayama, and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Japanese leaders close to Emperor Hirohito.

Colegrove’s Positive View of Japan’s Prewar Conservative Internationalists around the Emperor and of the Emperor

Colegrove’s study of the Japanese constitution began in the late 1920s. He contacted his acquaintance, Count Michimasu Soejima, a former House of Peers member who at the time was the President of Keijo Nippo, a major Japanese news agency in Korea. Soejima, the third son of a prominent Meiji
government leader, Taneomi Soejima, had received his education in England, receiving his B.A. from Cambridge University. His previous job experiences, prior to being President of Keijo Nippo, included working in the Imperial Palace and teaching at the Peer’s School (Gakushuin). In September 1927 Colegrove sent Soejima a letter requesting his advice on “best commentaries [in Japanese] on the Japanese constitution and government, indicating what in your opinion is the special value and authority of each book.” Colegrove’s Northwestern University had standard texts on the Japanese constitution in English, French and German languages but he was determined to grasp Japanese scholarly debates over the Japanese constitution by rendering the services of Northwestern University language scholars who read Japanese; none of the scholars in the Political Science department, including himself, could read Japanese. Colegrove also asked Japanese students to help translate Japanese texts.4

Soejima’s response came quickly and gave the following advice to Colegrove.

[T]here are only three books on the Constitution of Japan which are worth studying, viz. the works of Dr. Uyesugi, Dr. Minobe and Dr. [Toru] Shimizu. The former is a firm believer in the divine right of the Emperor, while the latter two are of the opinion that power emanates from the people. The latter view is correct, for several successive Emperors, especially the great Emperor Meiji, the grandfather of the present Emperor, wrote poems in that sense.

Soejima donated three books — a copy of each works — to the Northwestern University Library.5

From around the time of his contact with Soejima, Colegrove began to write about the Japanese political and administrative system. In 1932, he published a two-part series on the role of the Japanese Emperor in the Japanese

4 Colegrove to Soejima, September 6, 1927. Colegrove to Soejima, August 22, 1928, “Japan — Soejima, 1928–1932,” KWC, HHL.
5 Soejima to Colegrove, October 7, 1927, Japan — Soejima,” KWC, HHL.
constitution and political system in *The American Political Science Review*. In his article, “The Japanese Emperor II,” Colegrove indicated in its final two pages the possibility of a democratic Japan under the present constitution, even though this article was published in the aftermath of the Manchuria Incident and the creation of the puppet regime of Manchukuo:

[I]t is entirely possible to have a liberal development in Japan without formal amendments to the constitution. Much depends, of course, upon the enlightenment of the Emperor, and perhaps even more upon the sagacity and liberalism of the group of men who form the small circle around the Throne. In any case, the initiation of new developments must generally come from the cabinet, for it carries the burden of administration and the parliamentary direction of legislation.... [T]he process [for amending the constitution] is less complicated than that required under the American constitution.... [I]n Japan, as in America, great constitutional changes are possible without formal amendment.

In conclusion, it may not be an exaggeration to say that the Emperor is the cornerstone of the Japanese polity. This is due not only to the enormous powers which are vested in his person under the constitution, but also, and perhaps more trenchantly, to the traditions of the office and the psychology of the Japanese people, who offer a deep and abiding loyalty to the Emperor. Thus, while the Emperor plays a moderate and constitutional role, his great office is the instrument, through appeals to the Throne, whereby conflicting political forces secure adjustment without violent means. The British monarch is a symbol of unity in the British Empire. The Japanese Emperor *is not only a symbol. The Throne is the very essence of national unity, patriotism, justice, and constitutional progress.* [italics mine]⁶

Colegrove was undoubtedly influenced in his view of the Emperor’s role in the Meiji Constitution by the scholarly works of Tatsukichi Minobe, professor of the Tokyo Imperial University who retired in 1934 and thereafter was nomi-

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nated as a House of Peers member until he was forced to resign as the result of attacks on his constitutional theory of the Emperor by militarists and ultranationalists and outlawing Minobe’s works in 1935.

Minobe’s persecution in Japan motivated Colegrove to have his work translated into English. In 1929 Colegrove had received permission from Minobe to translate all of his writings into English. In 1939, Colegrove secured funding from the American Council on Learned Societies to translate Minobe’s *Kempo Seigi*, Minobe’s major work on the Japanese constitution. During the period Colegrove negotiated with this Council (1937–1939), he was assisted by Hugh Horton, who was a faculty at Columbia University and also Secretary of the Council’s Japan Committee. Both Horton and Colegrove’s student, Charles Burton Fahs, had agreed to assist Ikdu Oyama’s translation of Minobe’s book. Both Horton and Fahs were undoubtedly influenced by Colegrove’s teachings about the Japanese Emperor. Oyama, until his political asylum to the U.S. in 1932, had been a professor of politics at Waseda University and the leader of the Ronoto (Worker-Farmer party) and was instrumental in removing Communists from this small socialist party. Colegrove protected Oyama from being deported back to Japan by filing annually for the extension of the stay in the U.S. of Professor and Mrs. Oyama; Colegrove was instrumental in getting Oyama a minor research position at Northwestern University.8

Fahs was eternally grateful for Colegrove’s decision to take him into the graduate school program in Political Science at Northwestern University in spite of the fact that Fahs had never studied that field as an undergraduate.9 While a graduate student, Fahs received a grant from the General Education Board in 1935 to study in Japan for two years. During this period Fahs became friends with Horton and future professor of Japan Studies at

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7 See the following in the Kenneth W. Colegrove (KWC) papers, Northwestern University Library, Evanston, Illinois (hereafter NWU): Colegrove to Horton, December 6, 1937, Horton to Colegrove, January 21, 1938; Colegrove to Horton, February 17, 1938, Folder 6, Box 10; Horton to Colegrove, June 14, 1939, Colegrove to Horton, June 21, 1939 (regarding Minobe’s permission to Colegrove in 1929), Colegrove to Horton, September 27, 1940, Horton to Colegrove, October 2, November 25, 1940, Folder 7, Box 10.
8 See “Oyama 1932–1949” file in KWC, HHL.
9 Fahs to Colegrove, September 21, 1945, “Fahs,” KWC, HHL.
Harvard, Edwin O. Reischauer, both of whom were also studying in Japan. It was during this time that Fahs expanded his study on the Japanese constitution and the administrative system of the central government while studying at the Kyoto and Tokyo Imperial Universities. Fahs was already familiar with the general aspects of Minobe’s teachings through the works and teachings of Colegrove. Colegrove asked Fahs to send him Minobe’s major works on the Japanese Constitution so that they could be translated into English by Professor Oyama. Upon his return from Japan, Fahs joined as a non-tenured faculty at Pomona College where he taught East Asian studies until he began working for the government in 1941.10

Although Colegrove had been concerned about the rising militarism in Japan, he perceived Emperor Hirohito as a pacifist and a positive element in the Japanese polity. Shortly after the attempted coup by Japanese militarists on February 26, 1936, Colegrove published a short book in July entitled *Militarism in Japan*. In this work, Colegrove pointed to the fact that according to the Japanese constitution Article XI stated that “The Emperor has the supreme command of the army and navy” while Article XII stated “The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the army and navy.” In other words, the Emperor has the prerogative of the sole jurisdiction over the armed forces of the Empire.”11 Because the Emperor “personally heads the military forces,” unlike the British parliamentary system, the civil arm of the government has not brought all the armed forces under its control.12 Colegrove understood very well the fact that Japan has a “dual government” in which “the command of the military force is separated from the regulation of all other governmental matters. . . . The Emperor’s military camp and his civil government are thus separated by law, although unity is obtained through the Emperor.” Hence, the ministers of war and navy, who are career military officers, play the role of soldier-politician.13

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12 Colegrove, 17.
13 Colegrove, 18, 22.
Colegrove pointed to the fact that scholars disagreed over the extent of this arrangement, one of which was “the Emperor’s prerogative in the determination of the organization and peace standing of the army and navy.” In other words, although scholars agreed about “the character of the supreme command,” they disagreed over the military camp having the sole “power to fix the size, the recruitment, and the equipment of the army and navy.” Constitutional scholars of the old scholars such as Yatsuka Hozumi and Shinkichi Uyesugi countered:

that Article XI admits the sole power of the Emperor over the important feature of national defense... On the other hand, Professor Minobe and the new school of jurists insist that the constitution of 1889 established a parliamentary government with the result that advice to the Emperor on the establishment of the army and navy can only be given by responsible ministers—members of cabinet whose administration may be criticized in the Diet. ¹⁴

Regardless of these academic debates about the civil-military relations in the Japanese government, was the February 26 coup Japan’s final turn toward military dictatorship or fascism? Colegrove rejected both characterizations:

The bourgeois parties, in spite of the Manchurian incident, have not entirely lost the battle for the preservation of parliamentary government... and there has never been a complete surrender to the militarist. Neither the Saito nor Okada cabinet was such a surrender, and the formation of a cabinet by Hirota, in 1936, is a distinct rebuff to ultramilitaristic influence.

Furthermore, Colegrove argued that:

¹⁴ Colegrove, 18–19.
The Genro, the Emperor and the circle of high officials surrounding the Emperor have not been in sympathy with the Fascist and militaristic movement. Prince Saionji, the eighty-seven year old Genro, is a steadfast believer in parliamentary government. Through his advice the high officials — the lord privy seal, the grand chamberlain and the minister of the Imperial Household — tend to be statesmen who prefer a parliamentary regime to a military or Fascist dictatorship. And, finally, Emperor Hirohito himself appears to favor a constitutional regime.\(^\text{15}\)

Colegrove believed that the reason why the culprits of the February 26 incident received death sentences was because they had disobeyed the Emperor’s command to surrender immediately.\(^\text{16}\) He also perceived that the Army was divided into groups “with widely differing views regarding the part that the services should play in politics as well as regarding the policies which the militarists should urge in case they do participate.”\(^\text{17}\)

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Colegrove began to work from time to time as a consultant without compensation for the Japan Section of the Far East Division in the Research and Analysis Department in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).\(^\text{18}\) His student, Charles Fahs, was in charge of that section. Beforehand, Fahs was working for the predecessor to the OSS, the Office of Coordinator of Information shortly after its inception in the fall of 1941. According to Tetsuro Kato, Fahs was the chief architect in the OSS plan that advocated using the Emperor to induce Japanese surrender and retaining it as a symbol of Japanese unity in the postwar era.\(^\text{19}\) However, Colegrove’s influence on Fahs’ thinking about the Emperor cannot be ignored.

A year before he began his consulting job with the OSS in December 1943, Colegrove wrote an article in the October 25, 1942 edition of *Amerasia* about

\(^{15}\) Colegrove, 40–41.
\(^{16}\) Colegrove, 18–19.
\(^{17}\) Colegrove, 55.
\(^{18}\) Travel Order form dated December 26, 1943 and other documents in the “Office of Strategic Services,” KWC, HHL.
\(^{19}\) Colegrove to Fahs, October 14, 1941, Folder 2, Box 24, KWC, NWU; Kato, 24–46, 76–80, 134–36, 238–41
the need to retain the throne.  

Colegrove’s anti-Communism and Support of Joseph Grew’s Approach to Ending the Pacific War

Colegrove may have become suspicious of diplomats in the State Department in April 1945 because of an attempt by John Emmerson, an American diplomat, to create a united front between Japanese Communists and Professor Ikuo Oyama. In early April, Colegrove received two letters from Fahs and Hugh Borton, now working in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department. Borton asked Colegrove to meet John K. Emmerson, a Japan hand in the State Department.

Both Borton and Fahs asked Colegrove that Emmerson meet with the Oyamas, particularly Professor Ikuo Oyama. Both men knew Oyama through Colegrove who had agreed to take care of Oyama and his wife when they sought political asylum in the U.S. in 1932 because fascist elements were attempting to assassinate Professor Oyama.

Colegrove seems to have sat in on Emmerson’s meeting with Professor and Mrs. Oyama, a meeting that lasted several hours. To Oyama Emmerson handed letters from two Japanese leaders fighting Japanese militarism, one who centered his activities in Chiang Kai-shek’s Chungking and the other who centered his activities in Mao Tse-tung’s Yenan; the latter was the future Japanese Communist Party leader, Susumu Okano, also known as Sanzo Nosaka. Emmerson supported Nosaka’s idea of a united front approach in conveying to Japanese people the need to surrender. And he was trying to recruit Oyama to participate in this endeavor by having him join K.K. Kawakami, a Japanese-American journalist in Washington, D.C., and others in issuing a joint statement to the Japanese people.

According to Colegrove, Oyama, who had undergone major surgery to remove an ulcer from his stomach the previous year, was unwilling to cooperate, based on the same reason in declining requests to help translate Japanese documents for the American government: “inasmuch as he expected to return

20 Kato, 222–25.
to Japan and attempt to re-create his party, he hesitates to make a public statement.” Oyama wanted to avoid being perceived in Japan as an American collaborator. In addition to campaigning to raise money for Oyama’s surgery in 1944, which was done free of charge by doctors at the Northwestern University Medical Hospital, Colegrove, as he had been doing during wartime, continued to respect Oyama and protected him. Oyama’s illness had halted the translation project of Minobe’s book after 1942.\(^\text{21}\)

After the German surrender in early May, Colegrove began to establish a close rapport with Undersecretary of State Joseph C. Grew. Colegrove’s appreciation of Grew’s endeavors to bring about a Japanese surrender was clearly reflected in his letter to Grew dated around the time of Japanese surrender, August 13, 1945:

I am writing to congratulate you on the statesmanlike management of the Japanese request for a condition to the unconditional surrender ultimatum of the Allies. In spite of a whirlwind of demands from any so-called experts on the Far East for the annihilation of the Japanese emperor, I believe most scholars support your position with references to the imperial throne.

Anyone intimately acquainted with Japanese government and politics recognize how useful the Emperor can become to the Allies during the period of military occupancy. I am delighted that you were able to impress this view upon not only the American government but also the British, Soviet Russia and Chinese governments.\(^\text{22}\)

Grew was delighted to hear Colegrove’s such comments and he sent him a


\(^{22}\) Colegrove to Grew, August 13, 1945, “Grew,” KWC, HHL.
reply dated August 20:

Your letter have touched me very much and I thank you for it heartily. I especially appreciate your support of the line I have taken to the effect that the only man who could stop the war with Japan was the Emperor as the Japanese armies would never in the world have listened to anything less sacred than an Imperial Rescript. From now on we shall have to be guided by developments in Japan itself, which will probably show us in due course whether the Emperorship is going to be an asset or liability in the complete reconstruction which will have to take place in that misguided country.23

Grew was impressed by Colegrove’s understanding of his role and position in the fierce domestic debate over the future of the Japanese Emperor.

Towards the end of the Pacific War, Colegrove had apparently become very suspicious of some of his former acquaintances such as Owen Lattimore, a professor of Chinese and Central Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, and the Institute of Pacific Relations, an institution of which he and Lattimore were members since the prewar years. Colegrove had developed a perspective that people in the Institute such as Lattimore were fellow travelers if not Communists and were serving the interests of the Soviet Union.

Lattimore had served for eight years until his appointment as an American adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in June 1941 as the editor of Pacific Affairs, a journal published by the Institute for Pacific Relations. In addition, he had been serving as an editorial board member of Amerasia shortly after the journal was launched in 1936 by financier Frederick V. Field and Philip Jaffe, both of whom in the postwar years were identified as Communists. Jaffe met Lattimore in China in early 1937 and visited the Communist leaders in Yenan in late spring of 1937 with Lattimore and few others. Amerasia’s office was located in the same building complex as the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) and its editorial board members included, in addition to Lattimore, Colegrove, Cyrus Peake, who was a graduate of Northwestern

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23 Grew to Colegrove, August 20, 1945, “Grew,” KWC, HHL.
University (1922) and later became the head of the Executive Subcommittee in drafting the postwar Japanese Constitution in the Government Section of GHQ, and Chi Ch’ao-ting, a covert Chinese Communist agent who had married Jaffe’s cousin in 1927 and was a research staff at the IPR from 1937 to 1940.

In November 1937, Colegrove was already thinking of resigning from the editorial board of *Amerasia* if its editorial policy did not change within a year. He consulted on this issue with his two friends who were Japan specialists at Columbia, Borton, who at the time turned down *Amerasia*’s offer to join its editorial board, and Cyrus Peake. Colegrove perceived *Amerasia*’s editorial policy as pro-China and anti-Japan. Colegrove was an anti-Communist interventionist in the 1940-1941 debate in the U.S. over intervention in European affairs; he supported American assistance to Britain before Pearl Harbor and had served as the chairman of the Evanston chapter of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. But he did not advocate intervening in the Far East.

After his return from his assignment in Chungking in late 1942, Lattimore was actively involved in the domestic debates concerning the future of the Japanese Imperial Throne. In spring 1945 Lattimore in his *Solution in Asia*, a widely-read book published in February, spearheaded the argument to abolish the Imperial Throne, exile the current Emperor and the imperial family members, and expel from Japan’s power structure the prewar elites and replace them with leaders “liberal enough to be friendly to Russia...and China,” a situation just “as necessary” as “friendly relations” between “a democratic Japan” and the U.S. Lattimore’s argument, in addition to his advocacy of supporting Chinese Communists and a Nationalist-Communist coalition government led by Chiang Kai-shek, reinforced Colegrove’s antipathy towards those Asian specialists who were sympathetic towards Communism and anti-Britain and anti-Dutch, issues that had motivated him to resign from the editorial board of *Amerasia* in May 1943. In addition, Colegrove was undoubtedly irritated by Lattimore’s criticism of Grew and those who supported Grew’s approach to dealing with Japan by trying to use the Japanese Emperor in inducing Japanese surrender. Supporters of Grew included virtually all of Japan specialists in the U.S. whom Lattimore harshly criticized in his *Solution in Asia* for their view of the Japanese Imperial
Throne. 36

Although Colegrove respected Grew, he was suspicious of the integrity of the State Department because Colegrove saw infiltration into that organization by those sympathetic to or serving as agents of the Soviet Union. Such a perception was built in Colegrove’s mind after the Amerasia incident in early June of 1945. When the incident was in the process of reexamination in spring 1946, Colegrove, who was about to leave for Japan, asked Grew not only to write him letters of introduction to Grew’s friends in Japan — Count Shinken Makino, Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara, Count Ayske Kabayama, Max Bishop, who was a member of the political advisory staff sent by the State Department to MacArthur — but also to solicit Grew’s opinion on the Amerasia case, an incident in which several members affiliated with the editorial board of the publication were arrested by the FBI based on the suspicion that they had stolen confidential documents from the State Department and had contributed to leaks of OSS-related activities in Thailand.

I am somewhat disturbed over reports that the case against Mr. Philip Jaffe is to be reopened and that Mr. [John] Service is seeking complete vindication in the courts.

It seems to me that the defect to the procedure of the United States in such cases is due to the fact that we do not have an Official Secrets Act

rather than depending upon our old espionage law.

Colegrove asked for Grew’s off-the-record remark on whether Colegrove was right about this opinion.25

Grew’s reply to Colegrove showed that Grew concurred about Colegrove’s point regarding the U.S. espionage laws. Grew, however, stayed away from assessing whether or not Jaffe, Service and others indicted in the Amerasia affair were guilty or innocent. After reading this letter, Colegrove gathered statements by Grew and Secretary of State James Byrnes related to this incident issued by the State Department.26 In November 1946, Colegrove remained suspicious of the State Department because of two men arrested in the Amerasia affair continued to exert influences which in his opinion caused problems for MacArthur’s occupation policies.

A great many perplexities still surround the State Department espionage case of June 1945. Two of the persons arrested in this case, namely, [John] Service and Mark Gayn, are now in Japan. One is in the diplomatic service and the other is still sending poisonous pro-Russian stories from Tokyo to the Chicago Sun. After my return from Japan I complained to Marshall Field [Department chain owner who also owned that newspaper] regarding several stories about the American Occupation of Japan which Gayn had sent from Tokyo which were flagrant misrepresentations. Field was only mildly interested in my account. He is not greatly impressed with the seriousness of using newspapermen who are ardent fellow travelers.27

25 Colegrove to Grew, March 23, 1946, “Grew,” KWC, HHL. For Grew’s letter of introduction on behalf of Colegrove to his friends in Japan, see: Grew to Kabayama, Grew to Shidahara, Grew to Makino, April 12, 1946, Grew to Max Bishop, undated, “Grew,” KWC, HHL, Grew’s such letters to Kabayama and Bishop were handwritten and likely to be handwritten copies of the original letters by Colegrove. On the Amerasia case, see Nagao, 147–48 and Newman, 133–36.
26 Grew to Colegrove, March 25, 1946, “Grew,” KWC, HHL.
Colegrove’s 1946 Visit to Japan and His Support for a Moderate Reform, MacArthur, Conservative Internationalists, and the Emperor

After Japan’s surrender, Colegrove advocated a moderate reform of Japan and reestablishing American ties with Japan’s conservative internationalists centered around the Emperor. He also became an ardent supporter of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

In December 1945, General MacArthur contacted the State Department to send a team of American experts to advise him on reorganizing the Japanese government. In a letter dated December 18, Major General J. H. Hildering, Director of Civil Affairs, informed Colegrove the following:

[General MacArthur] has expressed an urgent need for twenty qualified research experts for an intensive project requiring approximately nine months. When selected the research group will work for the Government Section of Supreme Headquarters.

The research team will be utilized to make non-military and survey of the social and governmental conditions, on the basis of which recommendations will be made to modify the Japanese Government structure by decentralizing and corresponding encouraging local responsibilities. The recommendations will also include elimination of feudalistic and totalitarian practices and the further development of occupation policies working toward the removal of war potentials by eliminating government control of business.

Colegrove was excited about this new assignment and his opinion about MacArthur completely changed. In September 1945 when the Truman administration criticized MacArthur for making a public statement without consulting with the administration about the adequacy of American manpower in handling the occupation of Japan, Colegrove wrote to the Secretary of War, suggesting to him that MacArthur should be dismissed from his assignment because his statement was a military officer’s intrusion into political judgment reserved for civilian political leaders in the American govern-
Colegrove was now more than willing to advise the Supreme Commander. This was his first step that propelled him to become an ardent MacArthur supporter. Colegrove thought he “could . . . undertake immediately an assignment of two months . . . a suggestion . . . to the Commander-in-Chief and to the experts who will study Japanese government to have within the next two months an over-all survey of Japanese parliamentary government.” Colegrove advocated “an annotated survey of the Constitution of 1889, with specific recommendations, article by article, for changes in this document,” a task that could be accomplished in two months “if undertaken by [a small group of] men who have already studied the parliamentary system of Japan for a number of years,” men such as “Professor Harold T. Quigley (University of Minnesota), Dr. Charles Burton Fahs (Pomona College, and the State Department), Professor William M. McGovern (recently with the Combined Chiefs of Staff) and Dr. Hugh Borton (State Department) and a few others” and Colegrove himself. Colegrove argued “that the research experts will ultimately base their recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief upon the answers to three questions. (1) Should the parliamentary system of the central government be changed to another form? (2) If the parliamentary regime be retained, what changes should be made to promote a greater degree of democracy? (3) Should there be extensive changes in local governance?”

In addressing these questions, Colegrove predicted that:

(1) The Japanese parliamentary system should be retained in preference to either a presidential or commission or a one-party system. (2) The devices proposed in 1920–1931 by Professor Tatsukichi Minobe (Imperial University of Tokyo), Professor Sakuzo Yoshino and other progressive Japanese jurists are adequate to promote democracy in Japan. (3) Practically no changes should be made in local government except to: (a) alter the relations of the central and local governments in regard to the Home Ministry and the Education Ministry, (b) abolish the kempei or military police, and (c) reform the local police system.

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28 Colegrove to Secretary of War Robert Patterson, September 21, 1945, “R. Patterson, 1945,” KWC, HHL.
Admonishing those who advocated “radical views regarding slashing reforms of the Japanese government,” Colegrove was well aware that his recommendations were “conservative” “but aside from the complete annihilation of militaristic agencies, experts on Japan will ultimately recommend only a minimum of change in the parliamentary system.” Colegrove’s views of constitutional reform would have been welcomed by Japanese leaders considering constitutional reform at the time.

The proposed annotated revision of the Constitution should proceed along the following lines: (1) To include definite prohibitions on militaristic agencies of government. (2) To include definite prohibition of militaristic agencies. (3) To retain the monarchy as a constitutional institution as a symbol of stable government. (4) To reduce the Emperor to an organ of the state as proposed by Minobe and others. (5) To strengthen the parliamentary government in a manner to produce effective democratic control. (6) To limit the iaku joso or advice to the Throne to the Prime Minister alone. (7) To abolish the Privy Council as a controlling organ. (8) To reduce the power of the House of Peers. (9) To render the Cabinet entirely responsible to the majority in the House of Representative. (10) To promote free elections. (11) To revise the “Rights and Duties of the Subjects” so as to give Japan a modern constitutional bill of rights.

Colegrove advised “that two or three American experts who already have long familiarity with the Japanese parliamentary system be sent to Japan to make the preliminary survey.” These men should consult with such parliamentarians as Shidehara and Wakatsuki, with such constitutional jurists as Minobe... with such public administration experts as [Masamichi] Royama, with such labor leaders as Kanju Kato and Bunji Suzuki and with such newspapermen as [Nyoisekan] Hasegawa and [Tsunego] Baba. Then they should lay down a set of principles for the reform of the Japanese government, followed
by a complete annotated revision of the Constitution of 1889.\textsuperscript{29}

Although Northwestern University released him on February 15 during the spring semester — two days after MacArthur rejected the proposed constitutional change by the Japanese government and handed it his own draft\textsuperscript{30} — Colegrove’s departure for Japan was frustrated by red tape in the State Department which delayed the issuance of his passport. Colegrove was put in suspended animation until mid-April when he finally departed for Japan. In early April, Colegrove asked a friend since the 1910s, Elbert Thomas, a senior U.S. Senator from Utah, to look into why Colegrove’s passport was not still issued. Thomas was the leading figure in Congress who knew the Far East as he had lived in Japan from 1906 to 1912 as a Mormon missionary (and later became the head of the mission in Japan) and named his first daughter Chiyo, a common Japanese female name in spite of the fact that he and his wife were Caucasian. Thomas received his Ph.D. in Chinese Political Thought from the University of California-Berkeley in the 1920s. Before being elected a Senator in 1932, this New Deal Democrat had taught subjects on East Asia at the University of Utah’s Department of Politics and History. Before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Thomas tried to salvage American relations with Japan from war and after the outbreak of the war between the two countries, he tried to ameliorate the war hysteria that led to persecutions of Japanese-Americans. (He also publicly advocated saving Jews from Nazi death camps as early as 1943.) Before Secretary of State James Byrnes appointed Frank McCoy chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), he seemed to have given serious consideration to appoint Thomas as FEC chairman and Thomas accepted when Byrnes offered that position, a situation that changed shortly afterwards to the appointment of McCoy. It was a short while after Colegrove contacted Thomas that the State Department finally got its act together and issued Colegrove a passport. Thomas saw no conspiracy in this delay, although Colegrove had wanted to

\textsuperscript{29} Colegrove to Lt. Col. R.B. McRae, December 29, 1945, “War Department Civil Affairs, 1945,” KWC, HHL.

\textsuperscript{30} Colegrove to Hildering, January 29, 1946, “War Department Civil Affairs, January-March, 1946,” KWC, HHL.
know who was behind this delay and why.\footnote{Colegrove to Thomas, March 1, 1946, a letter from a Northwestern University secretary to Thomas, April 2, 1946, Thomas to Colegrove, April 26, 1946, Thomas to G.B. Heal, October 20, 1950, Thomas to Colegrove, November 29, 1950, “Elbert Thomas,” KWC, HHL.}

During his stay in Japan, Colegrove met with conservative internationalists of the prewar elite such as Count Shinken Makino, Ayske Kabayama and Shigeru Yoshida. He even had an audience with Emperor Hirohito shortly before his return to the U.S. in mid-July. The last event was the result of Colegrove informing Makino of Grew’s aforementioned efforts regarding the debate in the American government over the future of the Japanese throne and Japanese surrender.

Colegrove met Makino at his home in Chiba prefecture on May 29 and described his meeting with the elderly Count in a June 13 letter to Grew:

In my visit with [Count Makino], he was eager to relate the details of the six different attempts on his life by the militarist from 1930 to 1936. He also discussed rather graphically several historical phases of his career as naidaijin and chief adviser of the Emperor.

Count Makino was also eager to secure from me a day to day account of your life after your departure from Japan. I gave him a detailed account of your policy-making in the State Department; in particular, I told him the story of your long battle with the “experts”, led by Owen Lattimore, who demanded the destruction of the Japanese Emperor — a battle that continued down to your victory in causing the acceptance of the one condition to the Japanese offer of surrender.

Visibly shaken and moved by Colegrove’s statement, Colegrove ended his conversation with Makino by telling him that Grew “had told me that your concept of Japanese constitutional life had come chiefly from your conversation with him.” Makino replied “that he was grateful for every conversation he had had with [Grew]” and stated “Indeed... inasmuch as the national unity of Japan to-day depends on the Emperor, the Japanese people have Ambassador Grew to thank for the preservation of their symbol of unity.”

At the end of his visit, Colegrove was asked by Makino if he could present
the latter with a written statement of Grew’s wartime activities regarding the Japanese surrender. Colegrove could not deny Makino this request and took the liberty without prior consultation with Grew to hand Makino the following summary of Grew’s role in the American debate over the Emperor through Makino’s son-in-law, Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who had just been appointed the new Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister):

Shortly after his return to the United States in 1943, Mr. Grew was appointed Under-Secretary of State. The then Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, and President Roosevelt placed great confidence in him. In this position in the State Department, Mr. Grew became the leader of the policy that the American Government must refrain from any denunciation of or attack upon the Emperor of Japan or any intervention between the Emperor and the Japanese people. Mr. Grew constantly contended that peace with Japan could most easily be secured and maintained through the Japanese Emperor.

Mr. Grew’s position was bitterly assailed by various officials, experts, and newspapers who demanded the use of force against the Emperor. He stubbornly stood his ground, and succeeded in convincing President Roosevelt and later President Truman of the correctness of his policy.

This program reached its climax in August 1945 when Mr. Grew’s arguments led to the acceptance of Japan’s offer to surrender on condition that the Allies would not bring about the overthrow of the Imperial Throne in Japan.

I should add that Mr. Grew has frequently told me that his understanding of the character of the Imperial Throne was largely secured by means of his many conversations with you.

Count Makino was deeply impressed by Colegrove’s description of Grew’s role in the debates among American policymakers regarding the Japanese Emperor. Makino decided to forward this information to Emperor Hirohito himself.32

32 Makino to Colegrove, June 9, 1946, “Makino,” KWC, HHL.
Shortly before Colegrove’s return to the U.S. MacArthur gave his blessing to the event based on the strict condition that no publicity be made of this event. Colegrove later informed Grew the following:

Emperor Hirohito . . . asked General MacArthur to permit me to have an audience with him . . .

The Emperor asked me to take a personal message to you. He wishes to express regret for the war between our two countries, satisfaction that you labored valiantly to preserve peace; regret for the lack of proper courtesies upon your departure from Japan; and gratified for your gracious policy regarding Japan after your return to the United States.

The Emperor asked me several questions regarding your service in the Department of State and your policy making while acting as Under Secretary of State. I also conversed with him regarding the present occupation, the achievement of General MacArthur, and the proposed constitution of Japan. The Emperor also gave me a brief account of his efforts on behalf of peace during the war.31

Upon receiving Colegrove’s letter to him, Grew expressed his delight about what transpired in Japan among Colegrove, Makino, Yoshida and the Emperor. Grew thanked Colegrove for informing “the Emperor and to some of our other friends in Japan concerning my own efforts to prevent some blind action being taken against the Emperor in the heat and prejudice of war.” Grew was impressed by Colegrove’s knowledge of Grew’s activities towards Japan and presented Colegrove’s confidential remarks and a document regarding his role in inducing Japanese surrender.

I am enclosing for your confidential information the substantive part of the memorandum of my talk with President Truman on May 28, 1945 in which I told him that unconditional surrender by the Japanese would be unlikely unless they were informed in advance that this would not mean the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution

31 Colegrove to Grew, August 2, 1946, “Grew,” KWC, HHL.
of the Throne. I also of course knew that the Emperor, by issuing an Imperial Rescript, was the only man who could stop the war.

Grew told Colegrove that President Truman “was decidedly sympathetic and said that his own thoughts had been following the same line and he asked me to discuss the question with the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then to bring the same group to the White House for a conference with him.” Grew recalled he “was very anxious to have the President make this statement in his Memorial day address and I submitted to him a rough draft of a proposed statement which I felt would carry maximum weight if issued immediately following the great destruction of Tokyo by our B29 bombers.” Grew recalled he had “an immediate meeting at the Pentagon Building and found that the Army and Navy Chiefs were in principle in accord with my proposal but they thought that such a statement by the President should be postponed until our military and naval action was still further advantaged.” Grew told Colegrove that he had “disagreed with the argument for delay and with the necessity of using the atomic bomb, in the first instance, on non-military objectives.” But “there was nothing further that I could do until Mr. Byrnes, who in the meantime had taken office, left for the Potsdam conference.” Byrnes “was very much rushed during the last few days [before attending the Potsdam Conference] . . . but just before he left his room for the air field I handed him a statement in which I urged him most strongly to issue as soon as possible and he cramped the paper into his pocket just as he went out of the door of his office.” In addition to lobbying Byrnes, Grew “took occasion to get Mr. Stimson [sic] and Jack McCloy, who were going to Potsdam, to follow the matter up and that paper fortunately was the basis of the Potsdam Declaration which I think had more effect in bringing about the Japanese surrender than any other single step.”

Although Grew expressed his pride in contributing to Japan’s surrender, he told Colegrove that “I have told this story to very few people and I seek no credit for my own part in the matter” because the “victorious end of the war with Japan, with the least possible further loss of life, was all we sought and the satisfaction of the magnificent climax of the greatest naval and military campaign in history left no need for emphasizing the contribution of any individual except that of our principal naval and military leaders.”
Grew trusted Colegrove to the extent that he sent him the still-secret memorandum that Grew had written to President Truman.\textsuperscript{34} Colegrove was very impressed by this document which reinforced his impression that Grew played a central role in spearheading the argument to use the Emperor to induce the Japanese surrender.

I want to thank you for the copy of the memorandum of our conversation with President Truman on the 28\textsuperscript{th} of May, 1945. I had heard of this conversation form other sources, and I am convinced that was the turning-point in preserving your policy regarding the Japanese Emperor from the persistent assaults of the China group, which sought to sabotage it. I have read the memorandum of this conversation with great interest, and I shall respect your injunction for secrecy.

In conversation with General MacArthur I found that he had expected that the number of casualties in the Olympic Operation and the Coronet Operation would have been well over six hundred thousand American boys. It was due to the adoption of the wise policy toward the Emperor, which you inaugurated, that all this loss of life and limb was avoided. After the Emperor’s broadcast on surrender, General MacArthur entered Japan without the loss of a single life.\textsuperscript{35}

Colegrove and Postwar Cultural Exchange

During his visit to Japan, Colegrove contacted Count Ayske Kabayama, whose son-in-law, Jiro Shirasu, was a top confidant of Prime Minister Yoshida. Fluent in English as the result of his education in England, Shirasu was serving as a liaison for Yoshida, Kabayama and others in the Japanese establishment and GHQ. Grew had received a letter from Kabayama in January 1946, his first letter from Kabayama since the war interrupted their friendship and Grew was looking forward to rekindling this friendship be-

\textsuperscript{34} Memorandum of Conversation, May 28, 1945, “Grew,” KWC, HHL.
etween the two. In contacting Kabayama, Colegrove may have had no need for Grew’s letter of introduction. Colegrove was apparently acquainted with Kabayama and his prerwar activities promoting cultural exchange between the two countries. In 1938 Colegrove had written a letter of introduction to Kabayama for R. Douglas Stuart, who had just graduated from Princeton University. Stuart was planning to visit Japan as part of his trip to “study the international situation in the Orient.” In 1938 the Northwestern University professor and the young Princeton alumni would not have known then that the outbreak of World War II would set apart the two in their outlook on American involvement in world affairs; in the fierce domestic debates over American intervention in the European War during 1940–1941, Colegrove became a leader in the Chicago area for a major interventionist group while Stuart became the founder of the anti-interventionist America First Committee; whether or not Stuart’s meeting with Kabayama during his trip to Japan in 1938 had any influence on Stuart’s anti-interventionist thinking is unknown.37 (The 1939 letter was a letter of introduction to Kabayama for a young Northwestern University alumni who was about to visit Japan.)

Kabayama was very eager to resume Japan’s cultural exchange with the U.S. and he was particularly wishing to commence the sending of high caliber Japanese highschool graduates to American universities for a four-year education there. Kabayama, who received his college education at Amherst College, had approached an official in the Education Section of the GHQ who was supportive of Kabayama’s idea. Kabayama also received support from both Colegrove and Roy Howard, a newspaper mogul and a friend of Kabayama since the prerwar years who was visiting Japan for a few days around the time Kabayama was discussing the same idea to Colegrove. Colegrove advised Kabayama to hand a proposal to him, Grew and President Nicholas M. Butler of Columbia University.

Kabayama’s proposal narrated a history of modern Japan that had derailed during the past quarter century from a progress starting with the Meiji Restoration to establish a peaceful, democratic, Western-style civilization. Because Japan’s such progress was carried out by hundreds of young

36 Grew to Kabayama, April 12, 1946, “Kabayama,” KWC, HHL
37 Colegrove to Kabayama, May 17, 1938, June 9, 1939, “Kabayama,” KWC, HHL.
men who studied overseas in Europe and the U.S., including conservative internationalists such as Count Makino, Kabayama called for launching a program to send talented Japanese high school students to American colleges so that they could eventually help Japan’s resumption of a peaceful and democratic trajectory.

The program is to send at the earliest opportunity and with SCAP’s approval 50 Japanese high school graduates, just at the right age to enter college in the United States and make it compulsory to complete the regular course. . . .

Our boys will be selected from fairly well-to-do families: i.e. middle class families that are ordinarily able to educate their sons in any Japanese University and that are able to provide some pocket money. . . .

There are several means of raising the needed funds.

First, by appealing to my intimate friends among the capitalists. Here a drawback is that one’s entire capital is frozen now and it requires very special permission by the occupation force for releasing the capital.

Second, the money needed may be included in the Reparation; in this case special permission is also necessary.

Third, there is Y700,000,000 (seven hundred million) now in the charge of the occupation government (this amount is what was left unused).

Fourth, in case I do not succeed, I may appeal to some foundation, such as the Carnegie Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation. 38

Upon his return to the United States, Colegrove forwarded Kabayama’s above proposal to Columbia University President Nicholas Butler who evinced interest in the proposal. However, this route seemed to reach a dead end with the departure of Butler from the Presidency of the University in Fall 1947 as former Joint Chiefs of Staff Dwight Eisenhower entered the office of the university presidency.

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38 Ayske Kabayama, “My private proposition for sending High School graduates to the United States of America,” July 18, 1946, “Kabayama,” KWC, HHL.
In addition, Colegrove sent Kabayama a State Department press release describing the Fulbright Act which allocated twenty million dollars for educational exchange with foreign nations. Colegrove informed Kabayama he was going to ask Senator William J. Fulbright the possibility of permitting the funds from this Act for the former enemies of the U.S. Colegrove continued to prod the State Department for the possibility of realizing Kabayama’s proposal to send 50 Japanese high school students to American colleges but he informed Kabayama in October 1947 that State Department officials expressed genuine interest in Kabayama’s proposal but felt nothing could be done until the peace treaty with Japan was signed; at that time, there was a possibility that such a treaty would be signed in 1948. Colegrove also told Kabayama that he had been working with several others in trying to extend the Fulbright Act to Japan so that funds would be made available for the exchange of students between both countries.

These endeavors on both sides of the Pacific contributed to the commencement of the precursor to the Fulbright program, GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas), and then the Fulbright program after Japan regained full sovereignty with the implementation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952. Kabayama’s proposal for sending Japanese high school students was realized by Grew himself with the commencement of the Grew program whose first class of Japanese high school graduates included Akira Iriye, the eminent scholar of U.S.-East Asia Relations at Harvard University. 39

Colegrove later contacted the Rockefeller Foundation whose director of East Asia was his student and wartime OSS East Asia specialist Charles Fahs. When the war ended OSS was dismantled and Fahs and others in the OSS were transferred to the State Department where Fahs served as Chief of the Far Eastern Intelligence Division. In 1946 Fahs joined the Rockefeller Foundation as Assistant Director of Humanities. Fahs initially thought his involvement with the Foundation would be temporary since he continued to think of returning to teaching as a tenured university professor of East Asian Studies. Fahs did not return to university teaching until after his in-

39 Colegrove to Kabayama, August 19, 1946, October 21, 1947, “Kabayama,” KWC, HHL.
volvement in the Rockefeller Foundation as Director of Humanities (1950–1962) and his stint in the American Embassy in Japan under his old friend Ambassador Edwin Reischauer as the director of cultural affairs.

In January 1948 Fahs submitted a confidential report to the Rockefeller Foundation based on his trip to Japan the previous year. In it Fahs prescribed ways to reintegrate Japanese educators, scholars and journalists into the international community and advocated against American imposition of Western traditions and discarding Japanese traditions. In this respect, Fahs took a very critical look at MacArthur’s occupation policies, a stark contrast to Colegrove who worshipped MacArthur.

Although Fahs did not pursue Kabayama’s idea of funding Japanese high school students for their studies in the U.S., in 1949 Fahs helped realize a program financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and MacArthur’s GHQ in enrolling Japanese broadcasters in a program sponsored by Columbia University. In addition, Fahs helped arrange through the Rockefeller Foundation money to arrange a training program at Columbia University’s American Press Institute. 40

Colegrove’s Reports to President Truman and Grew

Upon Colegrove’s return from Japan, Senator Thomas encouraged him to submit a letter to President Truman on his observations of progress in the occupation of Japan regarding the Emperor, the new Constitution and the political environment. Colegrove informed Truman that “the Emperor expressed to me his deep appreciation for the lenient policy toward Japan which he felt had been developed by you, President Roosevelt, Ambassador Grew and Senator Thomas.” Both Colegrove and MacArthur thought that the Emperor was “not a forceful character” but were “impressed by his sincerity and sound common sense.” With regard to the Occupation, Colegrove praised “General MacArthur’s policy toward the drafting of the new Japanese

40 Colegrove to Kabayama, August 19, 1946, “Kabayama,” KWC, HHL; Reiko Maekawa, 116-18. Fahs became professor of East Asian Studies at the University of Miami in Florida after his sixteen-year involvement in the Rockefeller Foundation. For Fahs’s interest in returning to university teaching, see Colegrove to Fahs, July 31, 1947, Folder 3, Box 24, KWC, NWU.
Constitution" as “both timely and wise. Any change in this policy by a contrary directive from the Far Eastern Commission [FEC], sitting ten thousand miles from Japan, would confuse and bewilder the Japanese people and might lead to disaster.” Colegrove believed MacArthur was “eminently correct in his program of promoting the abandonment of the old autocratic Constitution and the adoption of a democratic Constitution in the shortest possible time.” In ending his letter to the President, Colegrove cautioned that among the political leaders whom he met, Sanzo Nosaka of Japan’s Communist Party stood out as expanding the party’s influences in the Japanese polity.

I met most of the political leaders of both Japan and Korea. I am particularly impressed with the sincerity and vision of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party. The most clever man in Japan whom I saw was, I regret to say, Nosaka, one of the leaders of the Communist Party. How far Nosaka will dominate his party remains to be open. But, because of its connections with Soviet Russia, the Communist Party will continue to complicate the political situation in Japan.41

Colegrove was not upset about MacArthur scrapping the Meiji Constitution and creating a new postwar Constituion, a decision that substantially weakened his relevance in visiting Japan. He was, however, disturbed by Nosaka, a man who had approached Oyama in April 1945 through Emmerson in forming a united front among overseas Japanese against Japan. Colegrove was most likely aware that Nosaka had used his alias, Okano, while in Yenan. Did the Emperor name the two Presidents as well as Senator Thomas? Aside from Grew’s name, it is questionable whether the other three names were mentioned. With regards to political parties, although Colegrove struck close ties with the conservative internationalists such as Makino and Yoshida, his letter to Truman gives the impression that

41 Colegrove to Truman, July 29, 1946, Truman to Colegrove, August 2, 1946, 24, “E. Thomas, 1940–1953,” KWC, HHL. Truman only stated in his August 2 letter to Colegrove that he was “glad” to receive Colegrove’s opinions and observations. See the same file and “Truman,” KWC, HHL.
he was very enthusiastic about the Social Democrats. This may have been a reflection of the preference indicated within Whitney’s Government Section as to which political party would be worthy of SCAP’s support as part of SCAP’s push for democratization.

Colegrove pointed to the President the danger posed by the FEC in obstructing MacArthur’s occupation policy but his criticism of the lack of American governmental support to MacArthur was better reflected in his letter to Grew.

I sincerely regret to say that I have the impression that the Supreme Commander had not received the full support of his own government. The establishment of the Far Eastern Commission last December was a dangerous experiment in international goodwill. It could only be justified in the event that SCAP would receive the constant and vigilant support of the United States Government in every phase of the negotiations in the [FEC].

General McCoy is a most sincere and competent diplomat. But, of course, he must receive his instructions from his Government. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the War Department has shown considerable neglect in the negotiations in the [FEC], while the State Department has permitted a policy that is detrimental to the successful administration of the Occupation in Japan. The directives on food for Japan and on the Japanese Constitution are harmful and ill-conceived.42

Conclusion

Contrary to his initial idea reflected in December 1945 about reforming the Meiji Constitution, Colegrove letter to Truman revealed his full acceptance and support of MacArthur’s actions in spearheading a complete change of the 1889 Constitution, a position that he may have not taken had he arrived in Japan in late February instead of mid-April when the new constitution was already a fait accompli. Nevertheless, both Colegrove and MacArthur shared

42 Colegrove to Grew, June 13, 1946, “Grew,” KWC, HHL.
a common view of the role of the Emperor in the postwar Constitution, an outlook that for Colegrove was based on his view of the Imperial Throne since the early 1930s. Colegrove was determined to reunite conservative internationalists in both the U.S. and Japan and he supported the postwar Japanese Constitution because he opposed the discourse that he perceived was being supported by scholars such as Owen Lattimore and the Soviet delegates in the FEC from gaining an upper hand in the Allied Occupation of Japan: a radical political reform of Japan that went hand-in-hand with the abolition of the Imperial Throne.

Given the dramatic break from the Meiji constitution, Colegrove’s knowledge of Japanese law had to be updated. In the postwar years, although Colegrove played some role in reestablishing cultural exchange with Japan, Colegrove was now preoccupied with domestic and international ideological battle against Communism, a battle, that resulted in his support of McCarthyism, political persecution of Owen Lattimore, and denunciation in 1953 of his socialist friend, Ikuo Oyama, who upon returning to Japan in 1947, broke his promise to Colegrove and began to advocate a common front between the Socialists and Communists against the Japanese government and GHQ. Colegrove’s world outlook was not transformed over the years but was merely an outgrowth of his conservative, anti-Communist internationalism.

43 Simmons to Colegrove, December 5, 1953, 46, “Oyama, 1950–1955,”, KWC, HHL; Newman, 308, 343,